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Formal development of capital structure theory began with the celebrated paper of 
Miller and Modigliani (1958). Their work triggered intense scrutiny and often bitter 
controversy as observed by Miller (1988). After forty five years and hundreds of 
theoretical and empirical papers in the US, developed, and developing countries it is still 
safe to ask what Myers asked in his (1984) seminal paper, "How do firms choose their 
capital structure?" The answer remains, "We don't know". He added: "In general, we 
have inadequate understanding of corporate financing behavior and of how that behavior 
affects security returns". 
Theories have tried to explain firms' financing behavior through the Static 
Tradeoff (STO) and the Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH). These frameworks take into 
account numerous factors in their explanations of the debt/equity choice of financing. 
Whether it is STO or POH, the determinants of corporate capital borrowing are 
summarized in the debt tax shield benefits, agency and bankruptcy costs, asymmetry of 
information, corporate control factors, input/product market factors and control variables 
like size, tangible assets, interest rates among others. Some of these control variables are 
empirical and have no theoretical foundation to support them. 
This dissertation attempts to test the models of capital structure theory in the Arab 
world, an environment that is different from that where the theory was born i.e. Western 
economies. A sample of 3-6 year panel data from the 12 Arab countries (Bahrain, Egypt, 
111 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and 
the United Arab Emirates) that have stock markets is used. 
Maximum likelihood and TOBIT models are used to regress 6 debt ratios on a 
host of theory and empirical determinants of capital structure. 
Due to institutional factors and country traditions, the regressions show mixed 
results on the directions, magnitudes and levels of significance of these determinants. 
Arab countries are divided into tax countries and non-tax countries (Gulf States usually 
have no tax regime in place). The results support the tax models of capital structure while 
they do not support the Agency and information asymmetry models. Moreover, Arab 
firms are found to follow a reverse POH. Country of origin is found to be a significant 
factor in determining the firm's capital structure. These results are consistent with the 
general findings in developing countries and partially with those in developed countries. 
The differences show that the theory of capital structure is not robust and needs to be 
either amended or expanded to include such patterns. 
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Myers (1984) suggested that capital structure was a puzzle then. Since then 
numerous empirical tests have been conducted and various new theories have been 
developed; nonetheless, no one has been able to conclusively explain why and how 
capital structure decisions are made. This would lead us to believe that capital structure is 
still a puzzle now as it was then. Beside problems with empirical tests and the use of 
different estimation techniques, the apparent reason for this puzzle is that the potential 
factors that significantly affect firms' choice of capital structure are numerous. Some of 
these factors have been accounted for in some models, but no single model has been able 
to include all of them. The reasons include the following: 
1- The scarcity of data or the fact that the factor is unobservable and cannot be 
proxied for by any other factor. The anomalistic behavior of a firm's management 
would be one of these factors. Miller (1977) and Myers (1984) described these 
anomalies as neutral mutation, which means that a firm's choice of capital 
structure is arbitrary and it has no effect on firm value. 
2- Differences exist amongst the environments in which firms operate. For example, 
Singh and Hamid (1992) found that special country traditions and institutional 
factors explain why developing countries follow a reverse pecking order. Booth, 
et al. (2001) found that capital structure choice is partially explained by the 
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country of the firm's origin. None of the capital structure theories developed thus far, 
accounts for these country traditions and institutional factors in explaining capital 
structure decisions. 
3- Theories do not agree on the driving reasons for the choice of the level of 
leverage a firm may pursue. For instance, while the Static Tradeoff (STO) theory 
suggests that firms have· an optimal debt target in mind, and that they keep 
adjusting to maintain that level ofleverage, the Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH) 
suggests that firms only follow a capital structure that reveals the least amount of 
information about the firm and there is never a target capital structure. 
In summary, the problems are with both theory ( a comprehensive theory that 
includes all the factors that affect the capital structure decision is yet to be developed) 
and empirical works ( empirical studies either choose proxies arbitrarily or do not include 
all the factors that may influence the choice of capital structure). 
In their value-maximizing efforts, firms pursue strategies and policies that are 
consistent with this objective. One central strategy is to equate the marginal benefits of 
debt (debt tax shield - DTS) to its marginal costs (cost of financial distress (COFD) 
including agency costs (AC) and bankruptcy costs (BRC)) to insure the lowest cost of 
capital and the highest value of the firm. This static tradeoff (STO) theory suggests the 
existence of an optimal capital structure (CS) that should be targeted by sound firms. In 
addition to this tradeoff, leverage is also a function of both firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables. These variables have been presented in the numerous capital 
structure theories and empirically tested in both developed and developing countries. The 
results of these studies vary between conclusive results like those of Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and puzzling results like those of Myers (1984). At the end of the day, no 
2 
consensus has been reached. 
The other widely tested capital structure theory is the Pecking Order Hypothesis. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that because of information asymmetry (between 
corporate insiders and the market) and to avoid any unwanted dissipation of information, 
firms use the least risky (the one that reveals the least information) financing sources, and 
they move up the ladder of financing sources within this information asymmetry 
guideline. Internal financing from retained earnings would be the first source, followed 
by debt, hybrid securities like convertibles, and as a last resort, external equity. In this 
hypothesis, financing stems from the need for new investments and from dividend and 
retained earnings policies; no targeted optimal capital structure is anticipated, and capital 
structure is simply a consequence of funding requirements. 
The main difference between STO and POH is the existence of an optimal target 
CS. STO assumes that a firm's financing behavior is governed by a strategy that calls for 
a targeted debt ratio that optimally equates marginal DTS with COFD. POH assumes that 
any tradeoff efforts are second order and that no debt ratio is dominant. These theories 
have been tested extensively in the US, less in developed countries, and least in 
developing ones. None of these theories and their tests took into account institutional 
factors and country traditions. This is a weakness of capital structure theory that has not 
been given the deserved attention in finance literature. 
The main goal of this dissertation is to empirically test capital structure theories in 
the Arab world. These tests will take into account the effect of Arab country traditions 
and institutional factors' on both the aggregate level of leverage and its determinants. 
Hypotheses based on STO and POH models and their applicability in the Arab world are 
developed and tested. To test these hypotheses, three to six year panel data from 461 
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listed companies (1115 company years) in 12 Arab countries are used. Due to the nature 
of the data, TOBIT model is used to regress six leverage ratios (short term, long term, 
and total book values of debt over both book and market values of equity) on empirical 
and theory-suggested determinants of capital structure. Tests are conducted both at the 
national and regional levels. The findings are compared to the findings of similar tests in 
both developed and developing countries in an attempt to test the robustness and 
applicability of capital structure theory in different environments. The preliminary 
expectation is that the degree of applicability of CS theory in the Arab world is low and 
depends on the extent to which the Arab economy shares features of the Western 
economy (tax system, capital markets, form of business, etc.). Formal testing of the POH 
model is not possible due to the fact that the data set that was available for this 
dissertation is short (3 - 6 years). However, indirect evidence will be provided by using 
summary statistics of financing patterns and their implications for POH. The evidence is 
discussed in a fair amount of detail. 
This dissertation is unique in many respects: it is the first work that empirically 
tests CS theory in Arab countries. It is also one of the few studies to tackle these issues 
outside the US, much less in developing countries. It utilizes a unique database 
assembled by the author from several data sources. It tests capital structure theory and its 
applicability in environments different from those in Western economies. Finally, and of 
most significance, is the fact that this dissertation is the first work to test capital structure 
theory in countries that do not have tax regimes in place. 
Of the 22 Arab countries, only the 12 countries that have stock markets will be 
studied: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Untied Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. These countries are divided 
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into two main groups, the oil states (the first five) that do not levy taxes (non-tax 
countries, hereafter) and the remaining tax levying countries (tax countries, hereafter). 
This dissertation finds for tax models of capital structure, on the other hand it does not 
find for the other models. Specifically: 
1- Tax models are supported by empirical evidence; hence, tax models of capital 
structure are robust and portable across countries regardless of country specific 
factors. The only requirement for tax models to work as theorized is the existence 
ofa tax regime. 
2- Agency and information asymmetry models are not supported by empirical 
evidence and need to be revised to cope with new environments. 
3- The country of origin model of capital structure is supported by empirical 
evidence. Further theoretical and empirical research is warranted. 
4- This work discusses other significant findings that affect debt determinants. These 
include: absence of debt markets, strong and well developed banking system, state 
sponsored stock markets, cultural and regional factors like the prohibition of 
interest rates in Islam, (the dominant religion in the Arab world), the dominance 
of family ownership, absence of corporate or personal taxes in oil rich countries 
and the urge to follow on the lead of western economies. 
5- The main conclusion is that tax is the main driver of debt, and Arab countries' use 
of debt is in strong conformance with capital structure theory if tax is levied and 
do not conform at all when no applicable taxes are levied. Future developments in 
capital structure theory should venture into environments where taxes are not a 
factor in borrowing. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II contains a review 
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of literature relevant to the topic. Chapter III analyzes the Arab country traditions and 
institutional factors that are expected to affect capital structure decisions. Chapter IV 
presents the measures of capital structure, its determinants, and the expected effects of 
the Arab world country traditions and institutional factors on these determinants and 
develops the hypotheses. Chapter V describes both the data and the methodology used. 
Chapter VI enumerates empirical results. Chapter VII provides a brief summary and the 





In their efforts to understand the incentives for a firm to use debt, finance scholars 
put forward different theories and models. Each explains one or more of the determinants 
of capital structure. These theories cover the various aspects of the firm that can explain 
the use of debt. We have yet to see a comprehensive theory that covers all of these factors 
in one interconnected analysis. The most commonly found theories in capital structure 
are the following: 
Tax Based Theories: Assume that an optimal capital structure involves balancing 
the tax advantage of debt against the present value of its costs, i.e. a Static Tradeoff 
framework. Leverage-related costs include bankruptcy costs, agency costs of debt, loss of 
non-debt tax shield and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Due to the rare availability 
of data from countries that do not have a tax regime in place, tax-based theories will be 
discussed extensively in this dissertation. 
The Agency Approach: Assumes that capital structure is determined as a result of 
the conflicts of interest among the various groups that have claims on the firm's 
resources. These groups include managers and equity and debt holders. 
Asymmetric Information Approach: Explains the level of debt in a firm by the 
differences in the information available to the managers of the firm and to the capital 
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markets. Debt level is chosen to mitigate the adverse effects of external equity and 
capitalize on the advantages of internal financing, i.e. the Pecking Order Hypothesis 
framework. 
Corporate Control Considerations: Use the fact that equity carries voting rights 
while debt does not; thus capital structure affects the outcome of takeover contests 
through its effect on the distribution of votes. Knowing that the market for corporate 
control is virtually nonexistent in the Arab world, corporate control theories will not be 
tackled in this dissertation. 
Product I Input Market: Exploits the relationship between a firm's capital 
structure and its strategy when competing in the product market and the relationship 
between the firm's capital structure and the characteristics of its products or inputs. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) state that these models are new in the western economies and 
very little empirical work has been done to test them. Also, because of the limited 
competitive product and input markets and the limited data available, there is very little 
use in tackling these theories here. 
Neutral Mutation: Miller (1977) and Myers (1984) state that capital structure 
choice is arbitrary and has no economic reasoning to it. In other words, it is just a 
financing pattern or a habit, which has no material effect on the value of the firm. This 
position can be considered a hypothesis of no theory of capital structure and will not be 
pursued here. 
This chapter presents a thorough literature review over capital structure theory. 
Section 2.2 reviews tax based and non-tax based capital structure theories including 
agency costs based models and models using asymmetric information. Section 2.3 
presents the relevant empirical work done in the area of capital structure and 
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financing behavior. The empirical work is classified into three broad categories: (1) 
empirical work from the US, (2) empirical evidence from other developed countries and 
(3) that conducted in developing countries. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
The theoretical literature related to capital structure (CS) in firms has focused on 
how firms choose their financing mix as part of their efforts to maximize their value. In 
this section some of the most important studies will be reviewed. From there, the focus 
will move to theoretical papers that have emphasized the determinants of corporate 
borrowing. 
When reviewing the theoretical literature related to capital structure, one must 
always start with the celebrated paper of Miller and Modigliani (MM) (1958). Since then, 
many scholars have followed their path. MM's proposition I states that the cost of capital 
and hence the value of the firm (V) are unaffected by the firm's CS. This with their 
second proposition, which states that the rate of return on a stock increases as more debt 
is used, shows an inverse relationship between the value of the firm's equity (S) and the 
utilized level of debt (D). To illustrate, if the value of the firm V = S + D = constant 
(proposition I) then any increase in the value of debt will be balanced out by a loss in the 
value of equity (proposition 11).In other words, any gains from using more of what seems 
to be cheaper debt capital would be offset by the correspondingly higher cost of the now 
riskier equity capital. MM explained this inverse relationship between debt and equity by 
the increase in risk due to the increase in the use of debt. MM show this effect 
mathematically in equation 2.1, which demonstrates a positive (negative) relationship 




i = the cost of the firm's equity, 
pK = the cost of equity for the firm class, 
r = the cost of debt, 
D = the value of the firm's debt, and 
S= the value of the firm's equity. 
MM (1958) propose the irrelevance of capital structure under the assumptions of perfect 
capital markets. Subsequent theoretical works focus on relaxing these assumptions and 
their effects on the relevance of capital structure. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature Focusing on 
the Tax Effect on Capital Structure 
The static trade-off theory of capital structure (STO) states that the trade-off 
between the tax advantage of debt and its costs is expected to yield the optimal level of 
leverage that maximizes the value of the firm. The first paper to extensively demonstrate 
this relationship was the Miller and Modigliani tax correction article (1963). By including 
taxes, MM demonstrated that the value of the firm increases by an amount equivalent to 
the debt tax shield (the corporate tax rate* interest paid on debt). Mathematically: 
(2.2) 
where 
yL = the value of the levered firm, 
Vu = the value of the unlevered firm, 
10 
Tc = corporate tax rate, and 
D = value of used debt. 
This gives us the first factor to consider in our effort to find the driving factors of the 
firm's level ofleverage. Modigliani (1988) summarizes the MM (1963) finding as the 
dollar of debt that will increase the value of the firm by Tc* 100 cents. He also states that 
this result rests on the assumptibn that the tax savings stream Tc *D is constant, perpetual, 
and absolutely certain, like the coupon of a government bond. MM (1963) mentioned 
some limitations to the validity of the assumption, such as the possibility of changes in 
the tax code and of profits falling below contractual interest. However, the assumption 
that the choice of capital structure is permanently fixed seems untenable in a world in 
which the movement of expected profit and size of the firm is supposed to follow a 
random walk (or a martingale). MM ended their (1963) piece by noting that other factors 
-beside taxes- affect CS decisions. This note opened the way for other scholars to 
contribute to CS theory as we now know it. 
Farrar and Selwyn (1967) introduced personal taxes to CS policy. They calculated 
the net after tax (both corporate and personal) earnings to the individual investor who 
uses personal debt to finance the purchase of the firm's equity as: 
Y =[(EBIT-r* Dc)*(l-Tc)-r* Dp]*(l-Tp) 
where 
Y = net after tax earnings to the shareholder, 
r = interest on debt, 
Dp = personal debt, 
De = corporate debt, 
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(2.3) 
Tc = corporate tax rate, and 
T P = personal tax rate. 
Taking the first partial derivative of Y with respect to Dp and De, as shown in equations 
2.4 and 2.5, 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
we find that oY/oDc < oY/oDp, In other words, corporate debt is cheaper than personal 
debt --regardless of the personal tax rate-- by a factor of (1- Tc), By including the 
personal income tax on capital gains, they found that what leverage adds to the investor's 
stream-of-returns net of both personal and corporate taxes can be written as: 
Y = [(EBJT-r* De) *(l-Tc) *(l-TG)-r* Dp]*(l-Tp) (2.6) 
where 
T g = personal income tax rate on capital gains. 
Again, taking the first partial derivatives we find: 
(2.7) 
and 
:: = -r * (1-TP) *(I-Tc)* (1- TG) 
C 
(2.8) 
In this case corporate debt is cheaper if ( 1 - Tp) > ( 1 - Tc) * ( 1 - T g ). To clarify, if a 
dollar of profit is received as return on equity and we assume no dividends, then the tax 
that will be paid is first the corporate tax and then the capital gains tax, leaving ( 1 - Tc) * 
12 
( 1 - T g ). On the other hand, a dollar of interest will be taxed only at the personal level, 
leaving (1-Tp). They also write the tax advantage of debt as: 




1 = the tax advantage of debt. 
When there are no personal taxes or when Tp = T g, it can be seen that 1 reduces to MM's 
Tc because it makes no difference in what form corporate earnings are paid out - leverage 
is valuable only because it saves corporate income taxes. Farrar and Selwyn concluded: 
first, since personal tax on regular income is greater than that on capital gains, it is 
optimal for firms to use earnings to repurchase stock rather than pay cash dividends. 
They should use at least retained earnings to finance investments rather than paying cash 
dividends and using external financing. Second, since corporate debt dominates personal 
debt for investors, then, in a dividend-paying firm, it is optimal to use leverage. Third, in 
a non dividend-paying firm, corporate debt dominates personal debt for low-tax-bracket 
investors. The opposite is true for high-tax-bracket investors. The company's use of debt 
depends on its investors' tax bracket. These findings lie midway between those of the 
Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH) and those of Miller (1977), which we will see shortly. 
Brennan (1970) criticized Farrar and Selwyn's work for two reasons. First, they 
assume that CS is chosen to maximize the investor's after-tax income instead of 
maximizing the market value of the firm. Second, their results are built on a comparative 
static model, which does not take into account the dynamic impact on the firm's value of 
issuing debt. Brennan concludes that the value of the firm increases as the firm takes on 






T = market effective tax rate, 
T d = personal tax rate on cash dividends, and 
T g = personal tax rate on capital gains. 
(2.10) 
Given that Tis between zero and one, Brennan found that the first derivative of the value 
of the firm (V) with respect to debt (B) is: 
BV (Tc -T) -=~~-
BB (1-T) 
(2.11) 
ifwe neglect personal taxes (T = 0) then dV/dB = Tc which is consistent with MM's 
conclusion in equation 2.2, which states that the value of the levered firm equals the 
value of the unlevered firm plus the value of the tax shield. In the same manner, he also 
concludes that if debt proceeds are to be used (or dividends rather than stock repurchase, 
then the advantage of issuing debt is reduced. 
Miller (1977) addresses taxes by assuming that the marginal tax rate (MTR) is 
equal to the statutory tax rate (STR) and concludes that whatever tax gains accrue from 
issuing debt at the corporate level will be exhausted at the personal tax level and that the 
value of the firm, in equilibrium, is still independent on its capital structure. In particular, 
under his assumptions, the joint corporate-personal tax gains from corporate leverage, 




G1 = the joint corporate-personal tax gains from corporate leverage, 
B1 = the value of the levered firm's interest-deductible debts, 
T ps = the marginal investor's personal tax rate on income from corporate shares, 
and 
Tpb = the marginal investor's personal tax rate on income from interest-bearing 
corporate debts. 
If markets are perfect (i.e. no taxes) then the gain from debt is equal to zero, and as MM 
(1958), indicated capital structure is irrelevant. In the special case where the two personal 
tax rates are equal, the gain from leverage reduces to Tc *B1 -precisely the expression in 
the MM (1963) tax model. In the contrasting extreme case in which (a) the capital gains 
provisions or other special relief has effectively eliminated the personal tax on equity 
income, (b) full loss offsets are available at the corporate level and ( c) the marginal 
personal tax rate on interest income just equals the marginal corporate rate, the purely tax 
gains from corporate leverage vanish entirely, as in Miller (1988). The gains from interest 
deductibility at the corporate level are exactly offset by the added burden of interest 
includability under the personal tax. These findings support the MM proposition I (the 
irrelevance of capital structure). When the marginal tax rate is lower than the statutory 
tax rate (which is usually the case because of the non debt tax shield (NDTS), NDTS is 
the amount of tax savings from depreciation, losses, and investment tax credit) then the 
corporate tax benefits will overwhelm the personal tax disadvantage as per DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). Without the offsetting effects of the personal tax code, the only factor 
limiting the expansion of firm debt would be the contracting costs implicit in bankruptcy 
(Ross 1988). Since the cost of bankruptcy seems relatively small (Warner 1977) in 
15 
comparison with the tax advantages of corporate debt, it is difficult to explain the 
relatively conservative debt policies of many corporations. Miller (1977) concluded as 
stated by Stiglitz (1988): "while the fact that debt payments are deductible under 
corporation tax might seem to give debt an advantage over equity, to find the real effect 
one needs to look at the total tax consequences - at the combined effects at the individual 
and corporate levels." 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) contend that Miller (1977) overlooked other factors 
like non-debt tax shields (NDTS), bankruptcy costs (Miller actually did not completely 
overlook it, he just dropped it from his theory based on Warner's (1977) assertion that 
bankruptcy costs are negligible), and agency costs of leverage, among others. In building 
their model, DeAngelo and Masulis show that investors make their investing decisions by 
taking into account the difference in risk and tax treatment of bond and equity income; 
debt is less risky but taxed more heavily than equity. Mathematically, if (1-T pct) is less 
(greater) than (1-Tpe)( 1-Tc), then investors will demand equity (debt) over debt (equity); 
if equal, then they are indifferent. On the other hand, the borrower will add debt so long 
as no tax shield (DTS orNDTS).is lost. Each firm will have a unique interior optimum 
leverage which equates the present value of marginal net tax advantage of debt to the 
present value of expected marginal default costs, (i.e. bankruptcy costs BRC = (1-T pct)(l-
Tpe)( 1-Tc)*firms debt). DeAngelo and Masulis also emphasized the trade-offbetween 
DTS and NDTS and the positive relationship between Tc (not MTR) and the use of debt. 
Myers (1984) summarizes the above research in a descriptive, mathematical and 
graphical way. He describes the static tradeoff model as the optimal debt ratio that can be 
determined by a tradeoffbetween the costs [Financial distress= AC+BRC] and the 
benefits [DTS] of borrowing. Figure 2.1 shows a graphical representation of the STO 
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theory. It suggests that a firm's target debt ratio is its optimal ratio. Due to the dynamic 
nature of the firm's assets (book and market values ofE and D change continuously, and 
DIE keeps departing from its optimal level), firms need to adjust their CS to the optimal 
level. If these adjusting costs are small, then materially similar firms should have the 
same capital structures. On the other hand, if these costs are large, then firms tend to lag 
in adjusting to the optimal debt ratio. If the latter is true, then one cannot tell if firms are 
just lagging on reaching their targeted optimal level or ifthere is no targeted level. Also, 
since both firms and investors have different marginal tax rates ( depending on non debt 
tax shields (NDTS) and personal tax brackets, respectively), then similar firms may have 
different targeted optimal debt ratios. We know that the marginal tax rate (MTR) is equal 
to zero when non-debt tax shield (NDTS) consumes all generated income and greater 
than zero when it does not. Also MTR equals the statutory tax rate (STR) when NDTS = 
0. MM (1963) considered that 
DTS =MTR*r* D 
where 
DTS = debt tax shield, 
MTR = marginal tax rate, and 
r = debt interest, 
D = level of debt. 
(2.13) 
which means that O ==DTS ~TR*r*D. After accounting for personal taxes, Miller (1977) 
considers that DTS = 0 and MTR= STR, but if MTR<STR then the investor loses the 
difference, which is equal to (MTR-STR)*r*D<O. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) reached 
a more realistic compromise theory between the two above, assuming a range of personal 
taxes paid on interest received according to the different personal tax rates (PTR); PTR 
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may be greater, equal to, or lower than MTR. Depending on their personal marginal tax 
rates and the relationship to a firm's MTR, investors may benefit, break even, or lose 
when they invest in levered firms. The three arguments on debt and taxes are summarized 
in Figure 2.2, which plots the net tax gain from corporate borrowing against the expected 
realizable tax shield from a future deduction of one dollar of interest paid. The MM 
(1963) line shows that interest tax shields are 100% reaped at the MTR rate. The Miller 
(1977) line shows that the tax shield is 100% exhausted by personal taxes when STR = 
MTR, and when MTR<STR, there will be a loss because of the firm's use of debt. The 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) line shows a tradeoffbetween reduction in net gain from 
borrowing because of personal taxes and an increase in net gain due to deductibility of 
interest paid on debt. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Literature Focusing on 
Nontax-Driven Capital Structure theories 
The fact that this dissertation is empirically testing the determinants of capital 
structure in general and that some of the surveyed countries have no relevant tax systems 
in place lends credence to non-tax theories of capital structure. Agency and information 
asymmetry models will be given special attention in the following two subsections. 
2.2.2.1 Models Based on Agency Costs 
A significant portion of research has been devoted to models in which capital 
structure is determined by agency costs, i.e. costs due to conflict of interest among the 
firm's stakeholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) initiated the research in this by building 
on the earlier work of Fama and Miller (1972). Jensen and Meckling identified two types 
of conflicts. Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because 
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managers hold less than 100% of the residual claim. Consequently, managers do not 
capture the entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, while they bear the entire 
cost of wealth maximizing activities. Hence, managers have the incentive to invest less 
effort in managing the firm's resources and may be able to transfer firm resources to 
their own personal benefit, e.g., by consuming more perquisites. Increasing the fraction 
of the firm's equity owned by the manager can mitigate such behavior. This can be 
accomplished in ways like direct purchase of the firm's stock by the manager, bonuses in 
the form of shares, stock options, or increasing the firm's debt while holding the 
manager's absolute investment in the firm constant. Grossman and Hart (1982) pointed 
out that if bankruptcy is costly for managers because they lose benefits of control or 
reputation, then debt can create an incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer 
perquisites, and make better investment decisions. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) add 
that since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of "free" cash 
available to managers to indulge themselves with perquisites and value decreasing 
investments. The optimal capital structure is determined by the trade off between debt-
preventing investments in value decreasing projects and the costs associated with debt-
preventing investments in value increasing projects. 
The second type of agency conflict is the one between debt holders and equity 
holders, which arises because the debt contract gives the latter an incentive to invest 
suboptimally in risky projects. If these projects yield large returns, above the face value 
of debt, then equity holders capture most of the gain. If these projects fail, debt holders 
bear most of the consequences because of limited liability. As a result, equity holders 
may benefit from "going for broke," i.e. investing in high risk projects, even if they are 
value decreasing. This effect, generally called the "asset substitution effect," is an agency 
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cost of debt financing that can be weighed against the benefits of debt to obtain the 
optimal capital structure for the firm. 
Myers (1977) points out that when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near 
future, equity holders may have no incentive to contribute new capital, even for value-
increasing projects. The reason is that while equity holders bear the entire cost of the 
investment, the debt holders may capture most of the returns. Thus, larger levels of debt 
may result in the rejection of more value-increasing projects. This result can be seen as a 
cost of debt, and the optimal strategy involves a tradeoff between the tax advantages of 
debt and this cost, not the probability of default. He also concludes that assets-in-place 
should be financed with more debt than growth opportunities and that the determinants of 
debt financing of assets-in-place include capital intensity, operating leverage, 
profitability, covenants and other indenture provisions that mitigate the probability of 
underinvesting that is caused by the hypothesis that wealth is transferred from equity 
holders to debt holders when the firm is highly levered. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) contend that managers are inclined to continue the firm's 
current operations even if investors prefer liquidation of the firm. Debt mitigates this 
conflict by giving investors (bondholders in the existence of debt) the option to force 
liquidation if cash flows are poor. On the other hand, equity holders cannot enforce 
liquidation unless information is generated through a full investigation of the firm's 
prospects. The optimal capital structure in Harris and Raviv trades off improved 
liquidation decisions versus higher investigation costs. Table 2.1 compares and 
summarizes ATF CS models. 
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2.2.2.2 Models Based on Information Asymmetry 
This approach in explaining capital structure uses private information that firm 
managers or insiders are assumed to possess about the characteristics of the firm's return 
stream or investment opportunities. Using this information asymmetry argument, two 
approaches have been developed in finance literature. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle 
(1977) assert that the firm's choice of capital structure signals to outside investors the 
information held by insiders. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) chose the 
approach that capital structure is designed to mitigate inefficiencies in the firm's 
investment decisions that are caused by information asymmetry. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that if management has favorable inside 
information and acts in the best interest of the existing shareholders, then management 
will refuse to issue shares even if it means passing up positive NPV projects because the 
loss in existing stock price ( due to the issuance of new stock) might outweigh the 
project's NPV. On the other hand, passing up positive NPV projects is contrary to wealth 
maximization. To get out of this trap, issuing debt is in order if internal resources are not 
sufficient to take on the positive NPV investment projects because they both ( external 
debt and internal funds) are not information-revealing sources of funds and involve no 
undervaluation due to any information asymmetry. Empirical support for Myers and 
Majlufs arguments can be found in Dann and Mikkelson (1984), who show that issuing 
stock to finance investments does in fact have a negative impact on share price, but 
issuing debt has no effect. Myers and Majluf (1984) also show that the value of the firm 
is inversely related to the riskiness of the financing source. Riskless debt (which is not 
applicable to firms) or slack (cash and marketable securities) have no adverse effect on 
the value of the firm, debt is less risky than hybrids ( e.g. convertibles), and equity is the 
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riskiest of all. Accordingly, investments are to be financed in that order. This theory has 
grown to be called the pecking order hypothesis (POH) of Myers and Majluf. Three 
issues are in order here. First, since active shareholders can shuffle their portfolios 
according to their objectives, not according to the method of financing of the firm's 
investments, then financing is irrelevant. Second, managers pursue their own best interest 
in all situations, and they will take advantage of their superior information to serve self-
interest, which also suggests that financing is irrelevant. Third, POH suggests that 
financing relies on asymmetry of information and the riskiness of the financing source, 
combined with available investment NPV, not on the tradeoffbetween marginal benefits 
and costs of debt; hence POH suggests no optimal targeted capital structure. 
Myers (1984) states that firms adapt their dividend payout ratio to their 
investment opportunities. Though dividends are sticky, target payout ratios are only 
gradually adjusted to shifts in investment opportunities. Thus, sticky dividend policies, 
and unpredicted :fluctuations in profitability, together with changes in investment 
opportunities may exhaust internally generated funds leading to an unavoidable situation 
where external financing becomes a necessity. External financing choices depend on the 
information available to management; if management has unfavorable information, then a 
security with any risk exposure will be overpriced and the firm should issue stocks or 
even warrants. On the other hand, if information is favorable, then the firm should issue 
guaranteed debt. Myers (1984) compares POH with STO and finds that neither is able to 
strongly explain capital structure policies, and a mix of both may lead to the optimal 
capital structure decision. 
Signaling with debt is the other leg of the capital structure information 
asymmetry theory. Here, investment is fixed and capital structure serves as a signal of 
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private insider information. According to Ross (1977), managers benefit if the firm's 
securities are more highly valued by the market but are penalized if the firm goes 
bankrupt. Investors take higher debt levels as a signal of higher quality. Since lower 
quality firms have higher expected marginal bankruptcy costs for any debt level, 
managers of low quality firms do not imitate higher quality firms by issuing more debt. 
Ross (1977) finds that the firm value (or profitability) and the debt-equity ratio are 
positively related. Also, an increase in bankruptcy penalty will decrease both the debt 
level and the probability of bankruptcy. Thus the firm value, debt level, and bankruptcy 
probability are all positively related. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) exploit managerial risk aversion to obtain a signaling 
equilibrium in which capital structure is determined. They find that an increase in the 
firm's leverage allows managers to retain a larger fraction of the equity. The larger equity 
share reduces managerial welfare due to risk aversion, but the decrease is smaller for 
managers of higher quality projects. Thus managers of higher quality firms can signal this 
fact by having more debt (and owning more equity), meaning that there is a positive 
correlation between value, equity ownership of insiders, and the firm's leverage. 
2.2.2.3 Models Based on the Market for Corporate Control: 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the models of corporate control 
are not expected to be of great significance in the Arab world, because of the absence of 
mergers and acquisitions markets. However, for the sake of completion, a brief review of 
the literature on these models is presented. 
Models of corporate control explain the firm's choice of capital structure by 
exploiting the fact that common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Harris 
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and Raviv (1988) show that capital structure affects the outcome of takeover contests 
through its effects on the distribution of votes, especially the fraction owned by the 
manager. Thus, capital structure affects the value of the firm and the probability of 
takeover. The manager's ownership share in the company has a great impact on the 
outcome of the takeover. The manager determines his optimal ownership by trading off 
capital gains on his stake against the loss of any personal benefits he derives from being 
in control. Since the manager's ownership is indirectly determined by the firm's capital 
strncture, this trade off results in a theory of capital structure. 
Stulz ( 1988) shows that the shareholders can affect the outcome of a takeover 
attempt by changing the manager's stake in the firm. Increasing the manager's ownership 
in the firm increases the premium paid by the targeting firm and reduces the probability 
of both the takeover and the shareholders' benefiting from this increased premium. 
Again, since the manager's ownership is determined by the firm's capital strncture, there 
is a link between the firm's capital structure and the market for corporate control. In other 
words, the probability of a takeover is negatively related to the target's level ofleverage 
while the takeover premium is positively related to it. The shareholders can increase the 
manager's voting rights by increasing his ownership in the firm through increasing the 
firm's debt/equity ratio. Thus, a tradeoffbetween the level of managerial ownership and 
the probability of getting a higher premium determines the firm's optimal capital 
structure. 
These models explain the effects of leverage by the managerial ownership and on 
the probability of takeover and the increase in the premium paid by the acquiring firm. It 
follows that the firm's optimal level of leverage is the result of trading off the level of 
managerial ownership and the probability of increasing the takeover premium. 
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2.2.2.3 Models Based on Product I Input Market: 
Again, the models based on the product/input market are of limited applicability 
to this dissertation because of the lack of supporting data. A brief literature review is 
presented to keep the integrity of this work. These models consider the relationship 
between the firm's capital structure, its strategy when competing in the product market, 
and the characteristics of its products or inputs. Brander and Lewis (1986) derive a 
mathematical relationship that shows a positive relationship between the level of output 
and the level ofleverage in oligopoly firms. Maksimovic (1988) shows debt capacity as a 
function of characteristics specific to industry and firm. He shows that debt capacity 
increases with the elasticity of demand and decreases with the discount rate. Using 
Michael Porter's (1980) elements of competitive advantage, Titman (1984) shows that 
the cost imposed on customers when a producer goes out of business (bankrupt) is higher 
for unique and/or durable product companies, than for non-durable products or those 
made by more than one producer. This leads to the result that firms that produce unique 
products use less debt to avoid the possibility of going out of business. Using the same 
philosophy, Sarig (1992) argues that bondholders bear a large share of the costs of 
bargaining failures but get only a small share of the gains to successful bargaining. This 
implies that the greater the bargaining power and/or the market alternative of its 
suppliers, the more debt a firm should have. Thus, Sarig predicts that highly unionized 
firms and /or firms that employ workers with highly transferable skills will have more 
debt. 
These models use firm- and industry-specific characteristics as determinants of 
capital structure. They trade off the firm's strengths or weaknesses in such characteristics 
against the probability of going bankrupt to determine the firm's optimal CS. 
25 
The theories surveyed in this section have identified a great many potential 
determinants of capital structure. Since the theories are, for the most part, 
complementary, the relative importance of these factors remains a largely unanswered 
empirical question. Since these theories have a wealth of different implications, it is not 
surprising that a theory may have more than one determinant in its context. Some of the 
determinants discussed in the literature are only empirical and have no theory to back 
them, as we will see in the next section of this chapter. Finally, Harris and Raviv (1990) 
provide a comprehensive and more complete review of the literature. Table 2.2 
summarizes the various theories and their implications. 
2.3 Empirical Literature 
The purpose of this section of the literature review is to summarize the relevant 
empirical work done in the area of capital structure. Much of the empirical work has 
focused on the static tradeoff theory and some on testing the pecking order hypothesis. 
Friedman (1953) stated, "Theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of 
phenomenon that it is intended to explain. Only factual evidence can show whether it is 
right or wrong. The only test of validity of a hypothesis lies in the comparison of its 
prediction with experience." In accordance with this assertion, this dissertation will focus 
on empirically testing the determinants suggested by theories of corporate capital 
structure. Because of the lack of "a long enough" time series, the pecking order 
hypothesis will not be tested. Consequently, this review of empirical literature will focus 
on the determinants of capital structure only. 
As in the theoretical review, we will find rich literature in the empirical tests of 
the various models of capital structure theory. Some of these works have conflicting 
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results even though they are carried out on similar data, due to difficulties involved in 
measuring both leverage and the explanatory variables of interest. Some studies include 
short-term debt while others do not. Some use the book value of debt and divide it by the 
book value of equity while others divide by the market value of equity. With regard to the 
explanatory variables, proxies are often difficult to interpret. Harris and Raviv (1991) 
show that measuring growth opportunities as the ratio of market value of the firm to book 
value of assets may be misleading because while firms with large growth opportunities 
should have a large value for this ratio, other firms whose assets have appreciated 
significantly since purchase but which do not have large growth opportunities will also 
have large values for this ratio. In addition to measurement problems, there are the usual 
problems with interpreting statistical results. Finally, data problems and innovations in 
the estimation techniques employed are also expected to produce unexpectedly varying 
results. In what follows, the results are taken as reported without regard to any of these 
problems. 
The determinants of capital structure that are suggested by both theory and 
empirical work fit into four categories. These are trends, event studies, firm/industry 
characteristics, and ownership and corporate control factors. 
In trends, Mayers (1990) and Taggart (1985) record two general trends in 
financing behavior in developed countries. Mayers found that, with time, firms are 
relying more on internal financing and less on external sources. He also found that firms 
use more bank debt than market debt. Taggart reports secular trends in leverage using a 
variety of different measurements. He finds that leverage has increased steadily since 
WWII but that current levels of debt may not be higher than those of the prewar period. 
In event studies, Harris and Raviv (1991) summarize other studies' findings as 
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follows: Common stock abnormal returns are negative when stock or convertible 
securities are issued and zero when straight preferred stocks and bonds are issued. 
Masulis (1980) and Dann (1981) found positive abnormal stock returns when stocks are 
repurchased. Marsh (1982) shows that firms follow market trends when issuing securities 
and are more likely to issue equity when the previous year's share return exceeds that of 
market indexes. Masulis (1980)~ in a string of pure capital structure change events, 
reports that common stock abnormal returns are positive when debt is issued in exchange 
for common and preferred stock or when preferred stock is issued in exchange for 
common stock and negative when common stock is issued in exchange for debt and 
preferred stock or when preferred stock is issued in exchange for debt. In other words, 
leverage-increasing ( decreasing) exchanges of securities are accompanied by positive 
(negative) abnormal stock returns. 
With regard to industry characteristics, Bradley, et al. (1984) found leverage to be 
low in drugs, cosmetics, publishing, electronics and food and moderate in petroleum 
exploration, construction, metalworking and chemicals. The firm specific characteristics 
shown to influence capital structure theory include taxes, profitability, growth, collateral, 
size, payout ratio, and ownership structure. These are shown in Table 2.3. 
Regarding the ownership structure's effects on leverage, Bathala, et al. (1994) 
show that leverage is positively related to managerial ownership and negatively to 
institutional ownership. Harris and Raviv (1991) summarize corporate control 
considerations from various studies. They show that hostile bidders usually fail when 
target firms pursue capital restructuring; increases in leverage decrease the probability of 
takeover success. Also, higher free cash flows lead to a higher probability of going 
private and an increase in leverage. Finally, a higher concentration of ownership leads to 
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higher leverage to prevent dilution of ownership and to capitalize on the benefits of 
leverage, especially if information asymmetry is high. 
Section 2.3 .1 contains a summary of some of the well known empirical studies in 
the US. Section 2.3.2 focuses on empirical works in developed countries. Empirical work 
on firms in developing countries is presented in section 2.3.3. 
2.3.1 Empirical Tests in the US 
Due to the vast number of scholars and data resources, one finds that most 
empirical research has been conducted in the US. This dissertation is concerned with 
cross-sectional regressions to find what determines capital structure in the Arab world. 
Thus, the emphasis will be on cross sectional studies. The following is a review of the 
most prominent work in this regard. 
It is logical to start with the fathers of capital structure theory: MM (1966) tested 
the MM (1958) propositions I and II using data from electric utility and oil companies to 
run a univariate regression of the cost of capital on the DN ratio and the cost of equity on 
the DIE ratio and found evidence to support their two propositions. 
Bradley, et al. (1984) built a comparative static model that incorporated personal 
taxation on equity and interest income, costs of financial distress (BRC and AC), 
business risk, and NDTS. Using comparative statics they found that the firm's optimal 
leverage is negatively related to financial distress, NDTS, firm size, and variability of 
earnings. Using cross sectional data from firms in 25 industries in the US, they found that 
the industry factor explains 54% of the variation in leverage. They also found that 
leverage is correlated negatively with volatility of earnings, R&D, and advertising 
expenditures and positively with NDTS. The last finding contradicts the traditional 
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substitutability argument between DTS and NDTS, which they explained by assuming 
that NDTS is an instrumental variable for debt collateral. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) used factor analysis to mitigate the measurement 
problems encountered when working with proxy variables and to avoid linear regression 
problems. They regressed six different leverage ratios (long term debt (LTD), short term 
debt (STD) and convertible debt (CD) on both market value (MV) and book values (BV) 
of equity) on 9 groups of explanatory variables. They found that firms with unique or 
specialized products have relatively low debt and that smaller firms tend to use 
significantly larger amounts of STD than larger firms. They also found that none of the 
variables explain the use of convertible debt, and that growth, NDTS, volatility of 
earnings, and asset value are insignificant in all 6 models. Finally, they found that 
profitable firms use less debt. 
Givoly, et al. (1992) tested the effect of the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 shock 
on change in leverage in US firms. They tested leverage around the enactment of the 
TRA (1984-1987) and found support for tax-based theories of CS, a substitution effect 
between DTS and NDTS, and that personal and corporate tax rates affect leverage. 
Specifically, the propensity of firms to decrease leverage as a result of a drop in the 
statutory tax rate is greater with a higher effective tax rate. 
Bathala, et al. (1994) tested debt policy from the perspective of the manager-
shareholder agency conflict. They used simultaneous equations to find the inter 
relationship between managerial ownership and the use of debt as agency-reducing 
mechanisms. They also studied the impact of institutional holdings. They found that the 
use of debt and managerial stock ownership are inversely related to institutional 
ownership in the firm. Additionally, they found that the debt ratio is inversely related to 
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managerial equity ownership, research and development expenses, and growth. These 
results are consistent with the view that high research and development and high growth 
firms are associated with greater agency costs, making debt the preferred medium for 
raising capital compared to external equity. They also found an inverse relationship 
between debt and earnings volatility, and a positive relationship with NDTS 
(depreciation). 
Graham (1996) used MTR (the present value of current and future taxes paid on 
an additional dollar of income earned today) instead of just the average of past paid taxes 
as mistakenly used in Givoly, et al. (1992). He uses data on US firms to regress changes 
in debt on MTR, aMTR, STR (the statutory tax rate) - MTR, personal tax rates, 
probability of bankruptcy, NDTS, and control variables. He found that the coefficient for 
MTR confirms a positive relationship between debt use and tax rates. A firm with STR > 
(<) MTR will issue more (less) debt and firms with large aMTR will have a large 
expected tax bill and therefore will issue more debt. He also found that relative taxation 
of debt and equity at the personal level has no effect on debt, and the probability of 
bankruptcy is insignificant. The results also confirm the substitution between NDTS and 
DTS. 
Hovakimian, et al. (2001) found an inverse relationship between the firm's level 
of debt and its profitability, NDTS, growth, uniqueness, and selling expenses. They also 
found a positive relationship with both collateral and firm size. In testing the tradeoff 
theory of capital structure and the existence of an optimal level of debt, they found that 
debt ratios deviate from this suggested optimum level. The evidence shows that firms 
tend to accumulate past profits and losses in a manner that is consistent with the pecking 
order behavior. Their results suggest that although past profits are an important predictor 
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of observed debt ratios, firms often make financing and repurchase decisions that offset 
these earnings-driven changes in their capital structures. Finally, they found that capital 
structure considerations play a much more important role when firms repurchase rather 
than raise capital and that stock prices play an important role in determining a firm's 
financing choice. Firms that experience a large stock price increase are more likely to 
issue equity and raise debt than are firms that experience stock price declines. This 
observation is consistent with the idea that stock price increases are generally associated 
with improved growth opportunities, which would lower a firm's optimal debt ratio. 
As seen above, empirical tests of capital structure in the US are diverse and 
comprehensive. They deal with all the aspects that have been considered by theory. 
Moreover, these studies even consider determinants of capital structure that have not 
been covered by theory; Table 2.3 shows some of these empirical determinants. There are 
many reasons for the comprehensiveness of these studies, some of which are the 
availability of data and the abundance and competitiveness of scholars in the field of 
finance. These studies, however, are all based in the US and therefore lack the benefit of 
insight one can get through inter country comparisons. They also lack consideration of 
country traditions and institutional factors as determinants of capital structure. The next 
subsection will shed some light on these factors. 
2.3.2 Empirical Tests in Developed Countries 
Empirical tests in developed countries are generally less numerous and follow the 
lead of those done in the US. Some tried to test country-specific determinants of capital 
structure and found them to be compelling, thus proving that theory is still not complete 
and needs revision. 
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Marsh (1982), using data from the UK found that a company's leverage is 
influenced by market conditions and historical security prices. Specifically, employing 
Probit/Logit models, Marsh found UK firms are more likely to issue debt (equity) when 
they expect other firms to issue debt (equity) and more likely to issue equity if the 
previous share return exceeds that of the risk-adjusted market portfolio. He also found 
that the probability of issuing debt and equity in the UK is a function of the deviation of 
CS· from its targeted optimal level; firms are more likely to issue debt if their current 
long-term debt is below a target measured by the average debt level for the previous 10 
years. When regressing leverage on various explanatory variables, he found that the 
proven target debt ratio is a function of firm size, bankruptcy risk, asset composition, and 
tax considerations. 
Mayers (1989) calculated the weighted average net financing for non-financial 
enterprises between 1970 and 1985 in 8 developed countries and found that bank-based 
countries ( countries that depend on banks for borrowing; continental Europe and Japan 
are examples) use more debt than market-based countries (these are the countries that 
depend more on debt markets for borrowing. The US, UK and Canada are examples, 
these are also known as Anglo Saxon countries). In both groups of countries, corporate 
growth is financed mainly from internal sources. He also found that the equities market is 
not an important source of finance for the non-financial corporations in any of these 
countries. As far as external finance is concerned, bank loans are the main source of 
external finance for all countries and this source is growing over time. Finally, 
determinants of capital structure and financing patterns are very similar among western 
economies. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyzed financing patterns and determinants of capital 
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structure of the largest non-financial companies in G-7 countries using 1984-1991 data. 
In an effort to test the robustness of capital structure models developed with US data, 
they found that all countries have approximately the same amount of leverage, but the 
UK and Germany appeared to have the lowest leverage. When examining external 
financing patterns ( debt vs. equity) they also could not find any differences in fmancing 
patterns between market based and bank based G-7 countries. Significant determinants of 
leverage in the US were found to also be significant in other G-7 countries and with the 
same directions. Specifically, debt is negatively correlated with growth (the free cash 
flow agency cost of Jensen (1986)) and profitability (Myers 1984 POH; higher 
profitability means higher ability to finance investments form retained earnings) and 
positively correlated with tangible assets and size. In conclusion, the financing behavior 
and capital structure determinants and policy in G-7 countries seem to be homogeneous 
and consistent with POH, with only minimal differences between them. 
Antoniou, et al. (2002) used panel data from Britain, France, and Germany. They 
explored whether a firm's country of origin has an effect on capital structure. They found 
that firms pursue a target debt ratio and that country of origin affects the speed at which 
they revert back to target levels, with France being the fastest. They state that Anglo-
Saxon companies use lower leverage than companies in bank based economies. 
Furthermore, agency and indirect bankruptcy costs are known to be higher in Anglo-
Saxon countries due to the lack of a long-term relationship between firms and creditors 
and long-term objectives of business management; management can not afford to be 
myopic when dealing with creditors as opposed to the known short term concerns with 
stock markets. Germany follows the Germanic tradition where corporate decisions and 
restructuring are made through the involvement of universal banks and financial 
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holdings. In addition, capital markets are not as effective as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, 
and there are fewer listed companies. On the other hand, France is known to follow the 
Latinic tradition where corporate ownership structure can be characterized by family 
control, financial holdings, state ownership, and cross-shareholdings, and where agency 
problems are internalized. Much like this dissertation, this study sheds light on the role of 
these financial and institutionaltraditions (accounting and taxation systems, bankruptcy 
laws, corporate governance) on capital structure decisions. They find that leverage is 
inversely related to growth, interest rates, and stock prices, and positively related to firm 
size. They find mixed results (amongst countries) on profitability, tangible assets, 
marginal tax rates, dividend yields and equity premiums (cost of equity/ risk free rate). 
These mixed results show that institutional arrangements and country traditions 
contribute to capital structure decisions. French firms were found to pay low dividends 
and to have low debt. Family controlled firms pay fewer dividends, retain more earnings, 
and use less debt and public equity to maintain family control. Information asymmetry is 
high in the French family-owned firms and in market-dependent British firms; as a result 
Antoniou, et al. suggest that bondholders expect to be exploited. This expectation 
requires higher yields; consequently debt use is lower in these countries. In Germany, 
bank managers are usually on the corporate board, causing a strong relationship between 
banks and companies. Also, the long-term business relationship between banks and firms 
makes debt less expensive (lower bankruptcy costs and less important short term 
volatility) and debt use higher. For the same reason (German firms' reliance on bank 
loans), tangible assets show more significance in Germany than in the other two 
countries. 
In summary these studies have the following attributes: First, they followed the 
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same methodologies as those in the US and arrived at similar results due to similarities 
between these economies and that of the US. Second, though they are less numerous than 
those conducted in the US, they extended the tests to include factors that were neglected 
in US studies, especially institutional inter-country differences. Finally, they opened new 
venues in capital structure theory and empirical testing. This is where empirical tests 
followed suit in developing countries. 
2.3.3 Empirical Tests in Developing Countries 
Notwithstanding the setback of the 1980s (i.e. debt crises, currency problems and 
crashes in stock markets) in Latin America and Africa, the developing countries have 
achieved an impressive degree of industrialization during the last four decades. Since the 
1950s, these economies collectively have recorded high rates of industrial growth and an 
appreciable increase in their share of world manufacturing production. This phenomenon 
led to a large amount ofliterature on the various aspects of these countries' 
developments. However, the corporate financial structure and, more generally, the 
relationship among corporate organization, capital structure, and economic and industrial 
development has received very little attention. The chief reason for the paucity of studies 
on corporate finance in less developed countries has been the lack of suitable data on a 
standardized, comparative inter-company basis. However, with the recent emergence of 
stock markets in a number of developing countries, more information on company 
accounts has become available. Although these accounts are very far from being perfect 
in terms of either their quality or coverage, in view of the importance of the subject, they 
are sufficient for the purpose of the investigations to follow. 
Singh and Hamid (1992) used data from 9 developing countries from various 
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locations around the world for the years 1980-1988. They found the following 
determinants of capital structure in developing countries: leverage is positively related to 
firm size and is negatively related to growth and profitability. Minor differences in the 
magnitudes and signs among countries are due to differences in tax, legal, and other 
institutional factors ( accounting practices, degree of development of financial markets, 
etc.). No evidence was found to support any form of STO. They also found that firms in 
developing countries follow an exact reverse POH; this result holds for every country 
individually and for all the countries combined. 
Singh (1995) extended the data in Singh and Hamid (1992) to include more firms 
and one more developing country. He found that external equity is the first source to 
finance asset growth. By contrast, developed countries use external equity to finance 
mergers; conglomerates in developing countries are built by firms instead of acquiring 
existing businesses. He also found that developing countries are not repeating the 
financial history of developed countries, a unique and different pattern has emerged. 
Finally, he found that the conclusions of Singh and Hamid were robust to the inclusion of 
the new data. 
Booth, et al. (2001) assess whether capital structure theory is portable across 
countries with different institutional structures. Capital structure choices of firms in 10 
developing countries were analyzed, and the evidence showed that these decisions are 
affected by the same variables as in developed countries. However, there are persistent 
differences across countries, indicating that specific country factors are at work. The 
findings suggest that although some of the insights from modem finance theory are 
portable across countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different 
institutional features on capital structure choices. Their analysis and regressions show 
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that macroeconomic variables have no significant effects on the use of debt. They also 
found that debt ratios are positively related to tangible assets and firm size, but negatively 
related to profitability, growth, tax rate and business risk. In addition, they found 
evidence to support POH, STO (opposite to Singh and Hamid (1992)) and ATF (Agency 
Theory Framework). They suggest that since these results are similar to those in 
developed countries, finance theory is portable across countries. This proposition 
contradicts other results in the study. They found that the firm's country of origin 
explains up to 43.3% of the variability in the total debt ratio, which means that country 
factors are at work. Since capital structure theory does not consider country factors, it is 
premature to conclude that capital structure theory is portable across countries. Further 
research on these factors is necessary before reaching such conclusion. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) present a good example for such research. 
In conclusion, we find that empirical studies, though numerous, have concentrated 
mostly on testing the determinants of capital structure within the various theory models 
and frameworks. The tests above found mixed results. Some support the theory while 
others negate it, leading us back to Myers' (1984) question: "How do firms choose their 
capital structure?" The answer remains, "We don't know." Table 2.4 summarizes the 
reviewed empirical findings. 
Comparing different theories with corresponding empirical evidence, one can 
either find support for, lack of support for or the absence of empirical testing for a given 
theory. Table 2.5 matches the theories with the empirical findings. Some of the untested 
areas of the theory suggest recommendation for further work. The Harris and Raviv 
(1991) review of capital structure theories and empirical works concluded by finding that 
models that relate capital structure to asymmetric information have been investigated to 
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the point where diminishing returns have set in. It is unlikely that further effort in this 
area will lead to significant new insights. With regard to empirical work, Table 2.5 
provides a list of theoretical predictions that have not been tested (more can be found in 
Harris and Raviv 1991). Of course, testing these theories is complicated by the ceteris 
paribus conditions each requires, the statistical problems that data may have, and the 
methodological differences in the testing process. Nevertheless, it is essential that 
empirical work specifically addresses which effects are important in various contexts. 
This dissertation will empirically examine whether the models of capital structure 
work according to theory in an environment that is different from the one where the 
theory born. The initial motivation of this dissertation was the fact that capital structure 
theory has not been tested in the Arab world due to the scarcity of data. The relentless 
effort to build a reliable database for this purpose enhanced this motivation, especially 
due to the availability of data in countries that have no tax system (no personal or 
corporate income taxes). This dissertation is not merely another attempt to find whether 
STO works; it is a real and unique opportunity to lend support to the theory or just reject 
depending on how the determinants of capital borrowing react to country factors. Another 
motivation came from the increased use of leverage in the Arab world despite religious 
and cultural barriers that make debt and interest (usury) a taboo. What is the reason for 
this dramatic increase of debt? The sporadic literature about banking, ownership 
structure, and tax and bankruptcy laws suggest the following. First, the use of debt 
protects family ownership from dilution. Family owned enterprises are very popular in 
the Arab world. Second, Islamic banking practices blur the distinction between debt and 
equity returns. Third, tax laws can give incentives to borrow through the deductibility of 
interest (i.e. DTS) in some Arab countries. Fourth, most corporate debt is private debt. 
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Because banking is quite advanced in the Arab world, the credit worthiness of the 
borrowers is weighed accurately, and defaults are quite rare. Finally, the Arab business 
environment has lenient ( either not very strong and clear or poorly enforced by the 
executive branches of the respective governments) bankruptcy laws towards corporations 
when defaulting on a debt. Other regional and country specific factors that affect the use 
of debt in the Arab world will be hypothesized, tested, and analyzed in this dissertation. 
Examples are government and family ownership, firm's country of origin and reputation, 
and institutional ownership that is needed to acquire bank loans. 
Some of the determinants that are suggested by capital structure theory may not 
apply in the Arab world ( e.g. uniqueness, which was suggested by Titman and Wessels 
(1988)) because of the absence of such concepts in the Arab world and due to the 
nonexistence of the proxy for them. For example, of the hundreds of financial statements 
that were analyzed in collecting the data, none exhibited any research and development 
expenses. Other determinants include profitability, the availability of collateral, interest 
tax savings, the riskeness of the firm, future prospects and policies like dividend payout 
will all be considered. 
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Figure 2.1: The static tradeofftheory of capital structure 








Comparison of Agency Models Based on Manager-Shareholder Conflict 
Model Conflict Benefit of Debt Cost of Debt 
Jensen and Managerial Increase managerial Asset substitution 
Meckling (1976) Perquisites ownership 
Jensen (1986) Over investment Reduce free cash Unspecified 
Harris and Raviv Failure to liquidate Allows investors option Investigation costs 
(1990a) to liquidate 
Stulz (1990) Over investment Reduce free cash Under investment 
Source: Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, "The Theory of Capital Structure," 1991. 
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Table 2.2 
Summary of the Theoretical Results 
Leverage is related to: Model References -
Corporate taxes Tax MM (1963) 
Personal taxes Tax Farrar and Sylwin (1967), 
Brennan (1970), Miller (1977), 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
Non-debt tax shields Tax DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
Extent of information Asymmetric Info. Myers & Majluf (1984) 
asymmetry 
Increases in profitability Asymmetric Info. Ross (1977), Leland & Pyle 
(1977) 
Lack of growth opportunities Agency Jensen & Meckling (1976), Stulz 
(1990) 
Increases in free cash flow Agency Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) 
Decreases in free cash flow Asymmetric Info. Myers & Majluf (1984) 
Increases in liquidation value Agency Harris & Raviv (1990a) 
Decreases in investigation costs Agency Harris & Raviv (1990a) 
Firm Value Agency Harris & Raviv (1990a), Stulz 
(1990) 
Default probability Agency Harris & Raviv (1990a) 
Asymmetric Info. Ross (1977) 
The extent of managerial equity Asymmetric Info. Leland & Pyle (1977) 
ownership 
There is a Pecking order Asymmetric Info. Myers & Majluf (1984) 
Firms issue equity when info. Asymmetric Info. Myers & Majluf(1984) 
asymmetry is smallest 
Bonds are expected to have Agency Jensen & Meckling ( 197 6) 




Empirical Evidence Not Directly Related to Any Theoretical Results 
Empirical results Source 
The extent of external finance has Mayer (1989) 
increased over time 
Total leverage has increased steadily since Taggart (1985) 
WWII 
Firms are more likely to issue debt if Marsh (1982) 
current debt level is below target 
Leverage decreases with return volatility Bradley, et al. (1984), Friend & Lang 
(1988) 
Leverage decreases with increases in firm Titman & Wessels (1988) 
size 
Leverage is associated with ownership Bathala, et al. (1994) 
structure 
Leverage increases with increases in Kim & Sorensen (1986)** 
operating risk 
Capital structure is used to protect control Dann & DeAngelo (1988)** 
Leverage decreases with increase in Friend & Lange (1988) 
dispersion outside ownership 
*= Weak or statistically insignificant relationship 
**= Not reviewed in this dissertation 
***= Reviewed but not presented in this dissertation 
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Table 2.4 
Determinants of Leverage 
The sign of the change in leverage as a result of an increase in the given 
characteristics is shown for each of the eleven studies. Blank entries indicate that the 
specific study did not include the given characteristic. The studies are Bradley, et al. 
(1984) [denoted BJK], Titman and Wessels (1988) [TW], Givoly, et al. (1992) [GROS], 
Bathala, et al. (1994) [BMR], Graham (1996) [Gra.], Hovakimian, et al. (2001) [HOT], 
Marsh (1982) [Mar.], Singh and Hamid (1992) [SH], Rajan and Zingales (1995), [RZ], 
Booth, et al. (2001) [BADM], Antoniou, et al. (2002) [AGP]. Comparisons suffer from 
the fact that these studies used different measures of firm characteristics, different time 
periods, different leverage measures, and different methodologies. 
Characteristic BJK TW GROS BMR Gra. HOT Mar. SH RZ BADM AGP 
Volatility * * 
Bankruptcy -* 
Probability 
Collateral +* + + + + + + 
NDTS + * + 




Size * + + + + + + + 
Uniqueness 






* Indicates that the result was either not significantly different from zero at conventional 
significance levels or that the result was weak in a non-statistical sense. 
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Table 2.5 
Summary of Results by Model Type 
The table shows, for each model type, the main results [ with sources in brackets] and the 
empirical studies whose findings are either consistent ( after the word "Yes") or 
inconsistent (after "No") with the theoretical results. 
Theoretical results 
--------·-----·-------------·--·------·-·-·------------"'-""""-···--.. --·---
Empirical evidence ________ _ 
Panel A: Tax Models 
The value of the firm increases with the increase in 
the level of debt [Miller & Modigliani (1963)] 
Leverage is positively related with the corporate tax 
rate [Miller & Modigliani (1963)] 
Leverage is negatively correlated with personal tax 
rates 
Leverage is negatively correlated with the non debt 
tax shield [DeAngelo & Masulis (1980)] 
Yes: Miller and & Modigliani 
(1966) 
Yes: Graham (1996) 
Yes: Booth, et al. (2001) 
Yes: Titman & Wessels (1988)*, 
Givoly, et al. (1992), Graham 
(1996), Hovakimian, et al. (2001) 
No: Bradley, et al. (1984), 
Bathala, et al. (1994) 
Debt Issues 
Panel B: Agency Models 
Stock pnce mcreases on announcement of debt 
issues, debt for equity exchanges, or stock 
repurchases and decreases on the announcement of 
equity issues or equity for debt exchanges [Harris & 
Yes: Kim & Stulz (1988)** 
No: Dann & Mikkelson (1984), 
Ekbo (1986)*** 
Raviv (1990a), Stulz (1990)] 
Leverage is positively correlated with firm value 
[Harris & Raviv (1990a), Stulz (1990] 
Leverage is positively correlated with default 
probability [[Harris & Raviv (1990a)] 
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Debt for Equity exchanges 
Yes: Masulis (1980) 
Stock repurchases 
Yes: Masulis (1980) 
Equity Issues 
Yes: Masulis & Korwar 
(1986)** 
Equity for Debt exchanges 
Yes: Masulis (1980), Ekbo 
(1986)*** 
Yes: Bathala, et al. (1994), 
Graham (1996), Hovakimian, et 
al. (2001), Marsh (1982), Singh 
& Hamid (1992), Rajan & 
Zingales (1995) 
No: Titman & Wessels (1988)* 
No: Bradley, et al. (1984), 
Givoly, et al. (1992), Marsh 
(1982), Booth, et al. (2001) 
Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Leverage increases with lack of growth opportunities Yes: Titman & Wessels (1988), 
[Jensen & Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)] Bathala, et al. (1994), 
Hovakimian, et al. (2001), Singh 
& Hamid (1992), Rajan & 
Zingales (1995), Booth, et al. 
(2001), Antoniou, et al. (2002) 
Leverage increases with decrease m profitability Yes: Titman and Wessels (1988), 
[Myers & Majluf (1984)] Graham (1996), Singh and 
Hamid (1992), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth, et al. 
(2001) Antoniou, et al. (2002) 
Leverage increases with extent of regulation [Jensen 
& Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)] 
Leverage increases with increase in free cash flow 
[Jensen & Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)] 
Leverage increases with increase in liquidation value 
[Harris & Raviv (1990a)] 
Bonds can be expected to have covenants prohibiting 
"asset substitution" (Jensen & Meckling (1976)] 
No: Hovakimian, et al. (2001) 
Yes: Bradley, et al. (1984) 
No: Chaplinsky & Niehaus 
(1990)** 
Yes Bradley, et al. (1984), Friend 
& Lang (1988) 
No: Titman &Wessels (1988)* 
Yes: Smith & Warner (1979)** 
Leverage is negatively correlated with the interest Has not been tested 
coverage ratio and the probability of reorganization 
following default [Harris & Raviv (1990a)] 
Leverage increases with the extent to which the firm Has not been tested 
is a takeover target or lack of anti takeover measures 
[Stulz (1990)] 
Leverage increases with the decrease in investigation Has not been tested 
costs [Harris & Raviv (1990a)] 
Panel C: Asymmetric leformation Models 
Stock price increases on announcement of debt 
issues, debt for equity exchanges, or stock 
repurchases and decreases on announcement of 
equity for debt exchanges [Ross (1977)] 
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Debt Issues 
Yes: Kim & Stulz (1988)** 
No: Dann & Mikkelson (1984), 
Ekbo (1986)*** 
Debt for Equity exchanges 
Yes: Masulis (1980) 
Stock repurchases 
Yes: Masulis (1980) 
Equity for Debt exchanges 
Yes: Masulis (1980), Ekbo 
(1986)*** 
Stock Repurchases 
Yes: Masulis (1980), Dann 
(1981)*** 
Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Stock price is not affected by debt issues [Myers & See previous cell 
Majluf (1984)] 
Leverage increases with increase in profitability 
[Ross (1977), Leland & Pyle (1977)] 
Leverage increases with deceases in free cash flow 
[Myers & Majluf (1984)] 
Stock price decreases on announcement of equity 
issue [Myers & Majluf (1984)] 
There is a pecking order [Myers & Majluf (1984)] 
Leverage is positively correlated with firm value 
[Ross (1977)] 
Leverage is positively correlated with default 
probability [Ross (1977)] 
Leverage is positively correlated with the extent of 
managerial equity ownership [Leland & Pyle (1977)] 
Firms tend to issue equity after a price appreciation 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)] 
Firms tend to issue equity when price appreciation is 
smallest (Myers and Majluf (1984)] 
Stock price decreases more the larger the information 
asymmetry (Myers and Majluf (1984)] 
Leverage increases with the extent of information 
asymmetry (Myers and Majluf (1984)] 
* = Weak or statistically insignificant relationship 
**=Not reviewed in this dissertation 
*** = Reviewed but not presented in this dissertation 
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Yes: Long & Malitz (1985)** 
No: Titman & Wessels (1988), 
Friend & Lange (1988) 
Yes: Chaplinsky & Niehaus 
(1990)** 
Yes: Dann & Mikkelson (1984), 
Masulis & Korwar (1986)*** 
Yes: Singh & Hamid (1992) 
No: Myers (1984) 
Yes: Bathala, et al. ( 1994) 
No: Titman & Wessels (1988)* 
No: Bradley, et al. (1984), 
Givoly, et al. (1992), Marsh 
(1982), Booth, et al. (2001) 
No: Bathala, et al. (1994), Friend 
& Lang (1988) 
Yes: Marsh (1982), Antoniou, et 
al. (2002) 
Yes: Korajczyk, et al. (1990a)** 
Yes: Korajczyk, et al. (1990a)** 
CHAPTER III 
COUNTRY TRADITIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
IN THE ARAB WORLD 
3 .1 Introduction 
This dissertation will consider the 12 Arab countries that have stock markets: 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Arab world regional factors to 
be discussed here are the tax system, legal system, capital markets, banking system, Arab 
culture and religion, and corporate governance. These factors differ slightly from one 
country to another, but the main theme is the same due to similarities in political, legal 
and regulatory, religious, and cultural factors. These similarities are due to the fact that 
Arab countries were one unified state that was divided into small monarchies by the 
colonizing west between the two world wars. One expected weakness of discussing these 
country traditions and institutional factors is the scantiness of literature that deals with 
these issues in the Arab world. 
Though theory does not explicitly consider country traditions and institutional 
factors, it does include macroeconomic variables that can be seen as differentiating 
factors among countries. One variable in particular is the tax system, which includes 
differences in applying investment tax credit, losses, and taxes on interest, dividend 
income and capital gains. Nevertheless, capital structure theory does not address the 
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various country factors as determinants of firms' capital structures. These factors are 
expected to shed some light and give some answers to Myers (1984) questions. This 
dissertation's main theme is to empirically test capital structure theory in environments 
that have institutional factors and country traditions that differ from those in Western 
economies where capital structure theory was born and developed throughout the years. 
It has been established that Arab countries are fairly homogeneous in their level 
of economic development (Abu Alrub and Barakat 2001). This chapter will present the 
institutional factors and country traditions that are likely to have an effect on financing 
decisions. 
3.2 Tax Regimes in Arab countries 
Tax laws in Arab countries were retrieved from the laws of the respective 
colonizing countries (Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf 
states were colonized by England, while Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon were colonized 
by France) (Alsafarini 1988). These laws are usually well written, comprehensive and 
updated quite often. The most comprehensive is that of Jordan which was updated in 
2000 (The Official Gazette 2000). Table 3.1 shows both corporate and personal tax rates 
for the Arab countries considered in this dissertation. 
This subsection examines the effect of the tax code on aggregate leverage. The 
existing empirical literature on international capital structure differences claims that taxes 
have no explanatory power (Mayer 1990). However, as argued below, this conclusion 
may be unwarranted if personal taxes are considered in addition to corporate taxes. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) state that whether taxes have explanatory power or not is highly 
sensitive to assumptions about the marginal investor's tax rate. For instance, there is no 
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tax advantage (as calculated by the Miller (1977) model) in the Arab countries that have 
no tax systems in place. Since Tc= Tps = Tpb = 0, the tax advantage of debt GL = 0. For a 
tax exempt investor in countries that have a tax system, the tax advantage is highest for 
the country that has highest corporate tax rate; T ps = T pb = 0 and GL = Tc * BL, As shown 
in Table 3 .1, for the countries that levy both personal and corporate taxes, this tax 
advantage (for tax exempt investors) is highest for Egypt ( 40%, at the highest corporate 
tax rate) and lowest for Jordan (15%, at the lowest corporate tax rate). However, this 
conclusion is reversed if we consider an investor who is taxed at the top marginal tax rate 
in each of the two countries (-15 versus -9 percent). 
Clearly, these two cases do not exhaust all the possibilities. The traditional 
investor wants to minimize his entire tax burden, not just the taxes levied by the central 
government. If local corporate and personal taxes are included, then the magnitude of the 
computed tax advantage of debt will change. The inclusion of the various taxes at the 
various tax brackets for both the corporate and personal levels will change the rankings of 
the countries in the sample. Because there are many tax brackets for the corporation and 
for individual investors, and due to the complexity of such calculations, they are not 
presented in this dissertation and will be left for further research. 
In sum, the above discussion demonstrates the importance not only of including 
personal and corporate taxes in the computation of the tax advantage of debt, but also 
including the "right" personal taxes and the marginal tax rates of the corporation (MTR). 
Such a task is complex and does not serve the purposes of this dissertation. 
Arab countries are divided into two groups: those, which have taxes (tax 
countries) and those that do not levy taxes (non-tax countries, usually Gulf States or oil-
rich states). This division of the Arab world into two parts is very important because of 
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its implication for the determinants and level of leverage, as will be explained shortly. 
Other factors being equal (like risk, bankruptcy, maturity, etc.), as far as the non-
tax country corporations and investors are concerned, the use of debt is no different from 
the use of equity. The payout on both is treated the same in the absence of tax advantages 
of debt for the corporation or tax advantage of equity for the investor. However, for tax 
countries the story is much different. Unlike in western economies, dividends are either 
not taxed or taxed at a lower level than interest. For this reason, investors will require a 
comparatively higher return on debt to compensate them for the personal tax 
disadvantage, and this will eat up the corporate tax advantage of debt. To make matters 
worse, it is known in the Arab world that investors in corporate securities are the rich, or 
those in high tax brackets. The personal tax disadvantage, when combined with the 
higher return on equity to the investor (higher capital gains), will make debt more 
expensive to firms than equity. On the corporate level, unlike firms in non-tax countries, 
firms in tax countries enjoy the advantage of deducting paid interest from their taxable 
income (i.e. DTS). Consequently, tax countries are expected to use more debt than non-
tax countries, ceteris paribus. 
The above discussion has shown that one cannot easily dismiss the possibility that 
taxes influence aggregate corporate leverage in a country. In order to reach any 
conclusion on the effect of taxes on capital structure in a country, not only is it important 
to include personal and corporate taxes, it is also imperative to consider the effective tax 
rate (Rajan and Zingales 1995). 
3.3 The Legal System in Arab Countries 
Reading the corporate laws for each of the sample countries, one finds these laws 
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to be usually clear and compatible with those in other parts of the world. Just as in 
developed economies, limited liability corporations, partnerships and sole proprietorships 
are the main forms of business. This is also the case in other parts of the developing 
world. These laws define the form of business, the intra and inter relations among 
businesses and between businesses on one hand and society or government on the other. 
These laws also include bankruptcy and liquidation rules and procedures (Info Prod 
Research 1998). 
According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), Harris and Raviv (1992) suggest that 
bankruptcy law should be regarded as an integral aspect of a debt contract. Arab 
countries are homogeneous in their bankruptcy procedures in both the extent of 
liquidation over renegotiation of claims and the management's control during the 
bankruptcy process. 
Strict enforcement of creditors' rights enhances contractibility and gives creditors 
the right to penalize management and equity holders if the firm gets into financial 
distress, thus giving the management strong incentives to stay clear of it. Consequently, 
firms choose to use less debt when bankruptcy laws are strict and likely to be enforced. 
On the other hand, it may be of greater benefit to keep the firm as a going concern than to 
liquidate as per strict bankruptcy laws. Arab countries differ in the extent to which they 
manage this tradeoff. As shown in Table 3.2, countries that were colonized by Britain 
have bankruptcy laws that are friendlier to creditors (more strict to the firm) than the laws 
in those countries colonized by France. This is in accordance with the La Porta, et al. 
(1997, 1998) hypotheses of weak law (civil law/Roman) and strong law (Common 
law/ Anglo Saxon) countries. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, the first would use less 
debt due to the strict bankruptcy laws and the latter would use more debt because of the 
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higher possibility of keeping the firm as a going concern than liquidation in the case of 
financial distress. Table 3.3 shows the average debt financing for the individual Arab 
countries and for the countries grouped as colonized. The numbers do not support our 
predictions for the following reasons: 
1- Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia do not have enough observations to reach any 
reliable results. 
2- The very low market-to-book ratios in these countries exaggerate the debt to 
market ratios. 
3- The fact that other factors affect the use of leverage like the strength of the 
religious influence. This effect is higher in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia than in the more Westernized UAE and Egypt. Political and economic 
instability also drive down the use of leverage. 
4- The level of law enforcement varies from country to country, the lowest being 
in Oman and Egypt and the highest in Kuwait and Jordan. 
In sum, the Arab legal system gives mixed effects on the level of leverage 
because of the interactions among various factors. The main conclusion here is similar to 
that of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who show that the enforcement of the laws has 
an effect, not just enacting them. After considering the Arab countries' legal strengths 
and weaknesses, one would expect less use of debt. 
3.4 Arab Stock Markets 
Empirical findings show that, at one end, stock markets have no effect on the 
firms' capital structure; Titman and Wessels (1988) found that the markets' reaction to a 
firm's growth is insignificant, which means that the market pays no attention to how this 
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growth is financed. Welch (2002) states that capital structure is determined primarily by 
external stock market influences, and not by internal corporate optimizing decisions. 
Others take a middle path; Antoniou, et al. (2002) found that among other factors of 
capital structure, like size, marginal tax rates, etc., debt is significantly inversely related 
to equity premium ( equity premium is the cost of the firm's equity divided by the risk 
free rate) and the market price per share. Marsh (1982) shows that a firm's financing 
decisions are affected by the market prices of securities. Consequently, stock markets 
have a role to play in capital structure decisions. 
The degree of development of stock markets influences financial decisions from 
stock splits, to dividends, to stock issuance and redemption, to capital structure. 
Moreover, stock markets are one of the major sources of funds in most financial systems. 
Using stocks for mergers and initial public offerings to finance the growth of going 
public and secondary public offerings for existing companies are examples of the 
importance of stock markets and their role in capital structure decisions (Singh· 1995). 
To show the degree of importance of the Arab capital markets in a firm's financial 
decisions, we will review and discuss Table 3.4, which shows a time series of statistics 
and ratios on Arab stock markets for the years 1997-2001. The number of companies 
listed in Arab capital markets is very small, as shown in Table 3.4. At the end of 2001, 
there were only 1757 companies were listed in all Arab stock markets, with Egypt having 
about 60% of these companies. It is also worth mentioning that only 659 of the Egyptian-
listed companies are traded, and only 100 companies are actively traded (Arab Monetary 
Fund 2001). Of the listed companies, 39% are financial and do not serve the purposes of 
this dissertation. The number of listed firms grows about 15% annually. Comparing the 
number of listed companies in the Arab world with those in other emerging markets and 
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in developed ones, we find the following: 1,757 in the Arab world, 17,000 in emerging 
markets, and 20,000 in developed ones. Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP is 
45% on average in Arab stock markets, which is higher than the 40% in developing 
countries and lower than the 55% in developed ones (Abu Alrub and Barakat 1999). 
However, it shows the importance of the stock markets in Arab economies. The trading 
volume to GDP ratio (average of 13%) is also very small compared to 51 % in Hong 
Kong and 45% in Singapore. The trading volume to capitalization ratio averages 31 % in 
the Arab world, quite low when compared to emerging and developed markets (55% in 
developed markets (Booth, et al. 2001). 
Further evidence of the importance of the Arab stock markets as a factor in firms' 
financial decisions can be extracted from their importance as a source of economic 
development in their respective countries. Table 3.5 shows the results ofregressing the 
country GDP on stock market factors ( e.g. number of companies (NUM), capitalization 
ratio (CAP) and the trading volume (TV)). We find that all of these factors are 
significant, meaning that stock markets play a significant and positive role in the 
country's development. 
Arab stock markets are the main source of financing used by Arab firms. Table 
3.6 shows external equity financing to be 70% of total financing, very high when 
compared to 40% in developing countries and 1 % in the US. The following arguments 
may shed light on why equity financing is the first choice in the Arab world: 
1. The local governments sponsor stock markets as a tool towards globalization and 
as a tool towards economic growth (Singh and Hamid 1992). As a sign of this 
support, data shows that state-owned companies are partially or totally listed in 
these markets (no space to show these data here). 
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2. The economic restructuring that most Arab countries are carrying out as part of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) requires 
privatizing government-owned companies. Privatizing leads to higher abnormal 
returns to investors since governments sell their shares at a discount. 
3. Measures taken to improve the efficiency of Arab stock markets and attract 
foreign capital, the following are some: 
a- Improving the laws and bylaws of the stock market that enhance 
transparency and prevent fraud. 
b- Increasing the transparency and the informational efficiency of the market 
by requiring the issuance of periodical financial statements by the traded 
companies. 
c- Creating tax breaks as a major incentive to invest in the stock market. As 
shown in Table 3.1, dividends are tax exempt or taxed at a lower level 
than interest income. 
d- Increasing the foreign ownership to 49% in countries like Oman, 
Morocco, and Tunis and up to 100% in Jordan. 
e- Joining the FIBV and FEAS, international bodies (unions or associations) 
of financial markets that have minimum requirements of efficiency 
(transparency, liquidity, depth, trading volume, capitalization, and ability 
to mobilize domestic resources and attract foreign capital) to join. 
4. Creation and licensing of mutual funds. Such funds are also helping the 
development of these markets. New legislations have enhanced the integration 
between financial markets and institutions; 54.5% of the trading volume in Qatar 
for the year 2001 was either trades by banks or bank traded stocks (Alraya 2002). 
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5. Privatizing exchanges. Such exchanges are another tool to develop these markets 
by increasing the trading volume and generating profits to the private owners. 
6. Avoiding public debt. As shown in Table 3.7 the corporate bond market is fairly 
new, small, and very illiquid (no secondary bond market). The AMF joint report 
shows that the size of the corporate bonds in the Arab world was no more than $5 
billion as of the year 2001, three billion of which were issued in Europe and two 
billion in the respective countries of the issuing companies. 
7. Rising demand for stocks in the Arab world because of the high return (mostly 
capital gain) and the lower interest rates on treasury securities and consequently 
on bank deposits. The return on Arab stock markets has averaged 10% for the past 
5 years (AMF 2002). 
8. Falling cost of equity capital. Costs dropped dramatically in the 1990s in the Arab 
world because of the sharp rise in stock prices. Also, because of the debt crises in 
the Arab world in the same era, debt financing became more expensive (Lebanese 
Ministry of Information 1997). 
In summary, despite the weakness of the stock market infrastructure in the Arab 
world, stocks are still the first choice of financing. Companies capitalize on the fact that 
these markets are bullish (i.e. stocks are overvalued) by using more equity than debt. 
Table 3.6 supports this result by showing a financing pattern of 70% for external equity, 
16% for debt and 15% for retained earnings, which compares to 1, 13 and 86% in the US 
and 40, 22 and 39% in developing countries respectively. 
3.5 The Banking System in the Arab World 
Rajan (1992) argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions 
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which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have 
bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. A tradeoff between 
these costs and benefits determines the optimal amount of bank debt, and consequently 
that of ann's-length debt. Rajan also quotes the results of other studies that show that 
banks reduce the agency costs associated with lending in various ways. First, they 
provide the firm with the incentive to make the right investments through screening 
prospective clients and threatening to cut off credit. Second, the bank has the capacity to 
provide cheap 'informed' funds as opposed to costly 'uninformed' or arm's length funds. 
Finally, a positive loan renewal signal implies that other agents with fixed pay-off claims 
need not undertake a similar costly evaluation. Information about the firm and its 
projects, which firms cannot easily communicate to others, is channeled from the firm to 
the bank in the course of acquiring a loan. On the other hand, a typical arm's length 
creditor like the bondholder receives only public information. It is hard to contact these 
dispersed holders, and any renegotiation suffers from the high cost and low ability to 
communicate information. Banks lend money to firms to carry out only positive (low 
risk) NPV projects. The firm has to share some of the surplus from the project with the 
bank in order to persuade it to continue lending. This sharing of the project's profits 
encourages the firm to run the project sub optimally. Consequently, the firm may prefer 
ann's-length sources, which exhibits neither the benefits of the bank debt nor its costs. 
Again, weighing these costs and benefits helps firms decide the portion of debt from 
banks and that from ann's-length sources. Casasola and Gine (2002) found a positive 
relationship between the issuing of market debt and the reduction in the firm's banking 
cost because issuing market debt is a positive sign of the financial health of the issuing 
firm, and it increases the issuing firm's bargaining power with the bank. 
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This section discusses the characteristics of both the banking system (Islamic and 
conventional) and the corporate bond market in the Arab world, their interactions and 
their effects on corporate financing decisions. 
3.5.1 Islamic Banking System in the Arab World: 
Due to the Islamic code of ethics, there has been a strong resistance to interest-
based finance. This resentment stems from the prohibition of interest rates in Islam. The 
Quran states: Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the devil 
by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say: Trade is like usury: but 
Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury .... Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, 
but will give increase for deeds of charity, for He loves not any ungrateful sinner .... 0 
you who believe, fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if you 
are indeed believers. If you do it not, take notice of war from Allah and His messenger, 
but if you repent you shall have your capital sums; deal not unjustly, and you shall not be 
dealt with unjustly. And if the debtor is in difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him 
to repay. But if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if you only knew. 
[Surah al Baqarah, verse 275-280]. For this reason and to fill the no-interest gap, there is 
a need for an alternative to a conventional interest-based economy in general and to 
conventional banking and financial instruments in particular. No-interest Islamic finance 
and Islamic banking is the alternative. 
To promote Islamic finance and to establish an alternative to conventional 
banking, the concept of an "Islamic bank" was born at the Islamic Summit of Lahore in 
197 4, which recommended the creation of an Islamic Development Bank. At the end of 
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1998, the total amount of deposits in the 200 existing Islamic banks was evaluated at 
$200 billion US. The importance of these banks is growing, and they have rapidly 
developed in the Muslim world where they account for more than 10% of total bank 
deposits. In terms of domestic market penetration, the most successful so far is the 
"Kuwait Finance House," which accounts for one-fifth of total bank deposits in Kuwait. 
Like the Islamic banks, Islamic management of equity funds is developing rapidly. While 
some 25 of these funds currently exist, there were only 5 in 1996. The total value of these 
funds is estimated between $1 and $3 billion US. The consequence of this growing 
interest from Muslim investors, the first global Islamic stock index, the "Socially Aware 
Muslim Index" (SAMI), was launched in November 1998. It tracks stocks of 399 
companies in which investment can be placed under Sharia law (the Islamic law). A 
second Islamic index, the "Dow Jones Islamic Market" (DJIM) was launched in February 
1999 (MEDEA 2000). 
The underlying principle of Islamic banks and other Islamic financial institutions 
can be summarized as follows: there can be no riba (interest) charged on any transaction 
or service, as interest is considered usury and is condemned by the Quran. Interest is 
replaced by a share-out key determined beforehand for a share of risks and profits among 
the borrower, the bank, and the productive capital. Islamic banks submit all new types of 
transactions to a "Sharia (Islamic law) committee" in order to check their conformity with 
Islamic principles. It must be said that these Sharia committees have become more and 
more flexible in their definition of what is acceptable for Islamic banking. Riba is 
prohibited on the principle of no pain no gain. Islamic banking is very similar to venture 
capital finance or ordinary equity investment. The investor takes a share of the profits, if 
any, of the venture and is liable to lose his capital. This concept is changing in Islamic 
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law, and what was considered Halal (acceptable) in the past may have recently changed 
to haram (prohibited). Such change depends on the nature of the innovation and the 
sharia perception of it. Just as in the process of converting interest into capital gains for 
tax purposes, early Islamic investors were content to enter into zero-coupon bonds or 
discounted Treasury bills and receive the interest foregone in the form of capital gains. 
Recently such practices have been tabooed by sharia. Another example would be to 
invest in a low-interest-rate currency or even gold from the bank and then place it in an 
interest-free deposit account. At the same time the currency or gold is sold forward. But 
the forward rate is adjusted to reflect the fact that no interest is paid on the deposit 
account. Such locked-in and predetermined capital gains is in most fiscal jurisdictions 
now regarded as interest for tax purposes rather than capital gains, which is either free of 
tax or favorably taxed. Similarly such devices for converting Riha to capital gains is, in 
the most blatant forms, increasingly unacceptable to the Islamic sharia (Siddiqi 1983). 
Nevertheless, 95 per cent of Islamic banking as practiced involves some form of 
pre-determination of profit or "mark-up" which is acceptable to Sharia since it is regarded 
as capital gains (Edwards 2000). This is the essence of the claim that such transactions 
are recorded as debt in firms' financial statements. The mark-up can be considered as 
interest that is deductible in the Arab tax countries. Most of the Islamic banking 
transactions take place in non-tax countries. And most of these transactions are at the 
individual level. Al Ahli bank of Saudi Arabia reported in 2002 that 95% of their 
business was done with individuals to buy durable goods. The remaining 5% was in the 
form of long and short-term loans to small businesses. The companies in this 
dissertation's sample are the largest in the respective countries. This means that these 
companies' debt is interest-bearing and should not be affected by the Islamic banking no-
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interest debt. Finally, even for those firms that may have Islamic debt, Edwards' 
argument above shows that the predetermined mark-up is in lieu of interest and the loan 
can be considered a form of interest bearing debt. As mentioned elsewhere in this 
dissertation, the reader finds out that Islamic banking, as being conducted in the Islamic 
world, is just another form of interest lending that is wrapped in the form of capital gains. 
Again, this is in no way a claim that the Islamic system does not work; it is, on the other 
hand, a claim that Islamic banks do not conform to Islamic teachings in this regard. 
Just as there is no central, global fiscal authority, there is no Islam-wide authority 
that determines what is Halal (Permitted) and what is Haram (prohibited). There is a 
danger that some banks will go "opinion-hunting" to get Islamic approval for their 
schemes. One can not deduce that this is corruption since the same process happens in the 
form of "opinion-shopping" by banks with the Big-five accounting bodies or with various 
tax counsels on interest-bearing structured finance schemes. Such a process is natural or 
just inevitable. Furthermore, just as Western banking business moves from one tax 
jurisdiction to another, so do Islamic banks that seek approval for various schemes from 
more lenient authorities. It is known that Saudi Islamic authorities occupy the far right 
and Malaysian ones at the more liberal left (Afaneh 2001). The point of this argument is 
that Islamic banking and its instruments are not clearly set as acceptable or not in the 
context of the no-interest principle. For example, derivatives, on one hand, are considered 
as speculative interest-bearing instruments that contradict the Islamic code, on the other 
hand, they are considered as acceptable hedging techniques that promote security and 
efficiency. 
To establish the link between capital structure decisions and Islamic banking, the 
following is a brief description of the main Islamic financial instruments: 
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1-Mudaraba: 
Under the principle of no pain no gain, no one is entitled to any addition to the 
principal sum if he/she does not share in the risks involved. The capital provider ( e.g. 
Islamic bank) or rabbulmal may invest through an entrepreneur borrower or Mudarib. 
Profits are shared on a previously agreed-on basis but losses, if any, are wholly suffered 
by rabbulmal. This financing structure is called Mudaraba and looks like no recourse 
project finance. Mudaraba is also called Shirka. 
2- Musharak:a: 
Financing through equity participation is called Musharak:a. Here the partners or 
shareholders use their capital through a joint venture, Limited Partnership to generate a 
profit. Profits or losses are split between the shareholders according to some agreed-on 
pre-formula depending on the investment ratio. 
3-Murabaha 
In a Murabaha transaction, rubbulmal finances the purchase of an asset by buying 
it on behalf of its client. Rubbulmal then adds a mark-up in its sale price to its client who 
pays for it on a deferred basis. The 'cost-plus' nature ofMurabaha sounds very much like 
the interest into capital gains manipulations of tax-avoiders. 
Rubbulmal is supposed to take a genuine commercial risk between the purchase 
of the asset from the seller and the sale of the asset to the person requiring the goods. 
Rubbulmal stands between the buyer and the supplier and is liable if anything goes 
wrong. There is thus some form of guarantee with respect to the quality of the goods 
provided by the bank to the end user in the strict form of Murabaha. Title to the goods 
financed may pass to the bank's client at the outset or on deferred payment. Rubbulmal 
may be left without a buyer of the asset because the client has the right to shop for a 
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better deal during the period between the initiation of the contract and delivery of the 
asset. For this privilege the client pays what is called Arboun. Arboun can be seen as a 
call option premium if it is not redeemable. However, usually if the client chooses not to 
buy the asset (lets the call expire) from Rubbulmal then the Arboun belongs to the last. 
The difference here is that when the client decides to exercise the call (buy the underlying 
asset) then the Arboun is considered as an advance towards the payment for the asset. 
4- Baimuajjal 
It is deemed acceptable to charge higher prices for deferred payments. Such 
transactions are regarded as trades and not loans. Property financing on such a deferred 
payment basis is called Baimuajjal. 
5- Ijara 
An Islamic form ofleasing is called Ijara. Here Rubbulmal buys machinery or 
other equipment and leases it out under installment plans to end-users. As in Western 
leasing, there may be an option to buy the goods built into the contracts. The installments 
consist of rental for use and part-payment. 
6-Baisalam 
A manufacturer seeks Baisalam when he/she seeks to finance the production of 
goods he is financing. This involves the Rubbulmal paying for the producer's goods at a 
discount before they are delivered or even produced. It is thus similar to the Bankers' 
Acceptance financing in the West. 
7- Baimustaqbal 
This is exactly like a forward contract that specifies the forward price, future 
delivery date, underlying asset, and all other provisions of a forward contract. These 
contracts are used in Malaysia more than any other country. 
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8- Islamic Derivatives 
As mentioned earlier some Moslem scholars view derivatives as acceptable 
hedging techniques that promote security and efficiency. In general, a derivative is a 
financial instrument that is derived from another financial instrument or a combination of 
such instruments. Some Moslem scholars argue that as derivatives involve interest or 
interest-based products, they are contaminated and should be prohibited. However, 
derivatives only involve interest if one or both parties using the derivative seek to'hedge 
the derivative. It could be argued that Murabaha could involve interest if the parties seek 
to match the interest-free but guaranteed-return product with an interest-bearing 
equivalent. Islamic banking derivatives should be perfectly acceptable so long as they do 
not involve interest. 
Baisalam, which involves the pre-payment for goods, is indeed an Islamic 
banking derivative and can be regarded as a kind of forward contract. One would argue 
that the acceptability of a derivative boils down to intentions. Alcohol is prohibited under 
Islam. But alcohol is used for purposes other than the islamicly-prohibited source of 
pleasure. In the same sense wheat futures can be used as a gambling tool. But wheat or 
oil futures as used by farmers or oil producers can help them manage their businesses and 
iron out economic cycles. Options are but insurance policies. Just as Takaful is an 
acceptable Islamic form. of insurance (conventional insurance policies are prohibited in 
Islam), options for delivery of commodities by a producer of such a commodity should be 
acceptable (Edwards 2000). So also should options or forward contracts on any of the 
Islamic financial instruments mentioned. 
These instruments are defined in the same way in more than one source, some of 
which are Ahmed, et al. (1983) and Siddiqi (1983). 
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As the instruments may suggest, their key features are the following: 
1- They are free of interest 
2- They are trade related and there is a perceived "genuine" need for the funds. 
3- In their purest form, they are equity related 
4- They are meant to avoid exploitation - no usury 
5- The investments are ethical (no investment in harmful or prohibited assets and 
goods). 
6- There are retail and wholesale applications. 
(Siddiqi 1983) 
The discussion of this issue has been lengthy; nevertheless, it has been necessary 
to serve the purposes of this dissertation. One can sum up the above discussion as 
follows. First, Islamic banking as conducted is just another form of interest-based 
banking. Second, for the purposes of capital structure, all Islamic lending is considered as 
debt. Third, the analyses above do not claim any weakness in the Islamic system. 
3.5.2 Conventional Banking System in the Arab World: 
The conventional banking system in the Arab world is quite advanced and capable 
of assuming its role in furnishing the loans needed to fulfill the debt requirements of Arab 
public enterprises (Arab bank publications 2002). Following are the reasons for such a 
claim: 
1. The existence of the Islamic banking system added value to banking in the Arab 
world. Islamic banks play an integral role in the economy since they offer an 
alternative to those who want no dealings with conventional banks due to 
religious and cultural beliefs. 
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2. Arab countries improved the regulations and other legal infrastructure in their 
economic reforms mandated by their relations with the IMF and WB. Liberation 
of exchange rates and interest rates with the deregulation of financial institutions, 
especially banks, is one of the measures that helped Arab banking to prosper in 
the 90's (The Joint Arab Report 2001). 
3. The Arab banking system is highly regulated and quite advanced due to 
partnerships with many American and European banks (Price Waterhouse 1990). 
4. Banks are both allowed to underwrite corporate securities and to own equity in all 
kinds of companies. 
5. The data in Table 3.8 shows that the Arab banking system is quite developed in 
the context of the development of the Arab economies; there is one bank per 
27,000 residents in all 22 Arab countries and one per 9500 in the 12 countries 
studied in this dissertation. For comparison, the US has one bank per 12,000 
persons (Shoult 1999). 
6. The terms under which banks provide companies with short-term loans are very 
similar to those in the US and other parts of the world. Reputation is the leading 
term and the five C's oflending are as applicable in the Arab world as they are 
anywhere in developed countries (Price Waterhouse 1990). 
1- Long-term loans are a different story; the reasons for this difference are the 
weakness of the bond market (see table 3.7), the monopoly of long-term lending, 
government regulations, and the imperfect relationship between banks and stock 
markets in some of the Arab countries. Long-term loan requirements are· as 
follows (Arab bank publications 2002): 
a. Partial financing of the projects by the firm. 
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b. Enough tangible assets to cover at least 100% of the value of the 
loan. 
c. Comprehensive studies of the feasibility of the project showing 
scenarios of cash flows and their sensitivities to various factors. 
d. The history of the firm, including but not limited to sales, other 
loans, tangible assets, past and expected future growth, 
profitability, volatility and the amount of fixed costs the firm 
usually faces. 
Arab banks' ability to both underwrite corporate securities and to own equity adds 
to their importance in corporate financing decisions. Another measure of the importance 
of the banking sector in financing firms is the ratio of private sector bank loans to gross 
domestic product (GDP). Table 3.9 shows that the banking sector is more important than 
corporate bond markets in all Arab countries and more important than stock markets in 7 
of the 12 sample countries. 
3.5.2 The Bond Markets in the Arab World: 
Among all interest-bearing instruments, bond lending and borrowing is resented 
most in the Arab world. The interest is more obvious in bonds than in conventional 
banking and much more than that in Islamic banking. Bond income is taxable at the 
personal level while dividends are either not taxable or taxed at a much lower rate. Bonds 
are not liquid due to the nonexistence of secondary bond markets while stocks are liquid. 
Unlike stocks, bonds are not known to appreciate in price; most bonds are held until 
maturity and have no known market value (AMF 2001). For the reasons mentioned 
earlier, firms prefer bank debt. 
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Table 3.7 shows that bond financing in the Arab world is minimal compared to 
stock financing (US$5 billion compared with $86 billion). As argued above, bond 
markets are thin in the primary and nonexistent in the secondary market. This makes 
bank loans the main debt-financing instrument. Moreover, Table 3.7 shows that debt 
financing covers 21 % of the total growth in Arab firms for the years 1996-2001 (i.e. $17 
billion, of which only $5 billion is in bonds). 
In light of this evidence, the Arab economies prefer informed debt to arm's 
length debt. The reasons are first, that banks are usually holders of the borrowing firm's 
stock and give loans with better terms and conditions. Second, the long term relationship 
between banks (unlike the short term and myopic relationship with shareholders) 
enhances the performance of the firms and lowers bankruptcy costs and risks; due to this 
relationship, banks are willing to renegotiate loans and would be less strict in suing the 
firm (Antoniou, et al. 2002). A third reason is the benefit of informed debt over 
uninformed debt in preventing bankruptcy. Finally, the bank's presence on boards of 
directors, combined with both equity and debt-holding minimizes both manager-
shareholder and bondholder-shareholder agency conflicts and costs. 
Nonetheless, the strength of the banking systems in the Arab world and the fairly 
strong reliance on stock markets make it hard to classify the Arab economies as market-
based or bank-based systems. Rajan and Zingales (1995) did not find any systematic 
differences between the levels of leverage in bank-oriented and market-oriented 
countries. This suggests that differences in the importance of the banking sector have no 
effect on the firm's financing decisions. Moreover, this finding diminishes the 
importance of classifying the Arab countries as mentioned above. On the other hand, 
there are factors in the Arab world that that give banks important roles in capital structure 
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decisions and in the choice between public (stocks and bonds) and private (bank loans) 
financing. The above discussion indicates that Arab banks are capable of supplying Arab 
firms with the needed funds, that bank debt dominates market debt, and that the lack of 
use of debt cannot be blamed on any weakness on the part of the Arab banking system. 
3.6 Ownership and Control 
Harris and Raviv (1991) have an excellent review of capital structure theories that 
are driven by corporate control considerations. As mentioned earlier, these theories were 
not reviewed at length because of the limited applicability to the subject matter of this 
dissertation. These theories exploit the fact that common stock carries voting rights while 
debt does not. These theories imply that capital structure affects the outcome of takeover 
contests through its effect on the distribution of votes, especially the fraction owned by 
management. Harris and Raviv (1991) conclude that takeover targets will increase their 
debt levels, and this increase will be accompanied by a positive stock price reaction. 
Second, leverage is inversely related to the success of the tender offer. Third, targets of 
successful tender offers have more debt than targets of proxy fights. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) suggest that the active takeover market substitutes for the control over 
management. 
The market for corporate control has no effect on the level of leverage in Arab 
firms for four main reasons: 
1- Conforming to Singh and Hamid (1992), takeovers are almost unheard of in 
developing countries; the Arab world is no exception. Swabini (2001) states that 
acquisitions in the world increased from $373 billion in 1991 to $3500 billion in 
2000, compared to $ 6 billion in the last five years in the Arab world. These 
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acquisitions were in the banking system mostly, and in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia 
only. 
2- Because of the concentrated ownership (to be discussed shortly) in Arab firms, 
hostile acquisitions are almost unheard of. Singh (1995) noted that in developing 
countries, firms issue shares to finance new investments rather than to acquire 
existing corporations and their assets. Family ownership runs to about 95% in the 
Arab world (Altowaijari 2002). The firms that are partially owned by the 
government and/or institutions are managed by the families that own the majority 
of the remaining shares (Swabini 2001). 
3- El-Sherif (2000) states that acquisitions and takeovers in the Arab world emerge 
only rarely. Mergers do take place at the national level. In Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Saudi Arabia, banks are joining forces to increase market share and adapt to a 
changing business environment and increasingly competitive market, not for the 
purposes of control and discipline. 
4- Debt holders are usually banks that have either a strong tie with the owning 
family or are major partners in the firm. For example, the owners of the largest 
banks and companies in Saudi Arabia are a few families (Arab Bank Publications 
2002). Moreover, the data in Table 3.10 show the ownership structure of Arab 
firms. Individuals or families own 61 %, then institutions with 26% and finally 
government at around 13%. Altowaijari (2002) states that 95% of Arab firms are 
family owned, meaning that 95% of the 61% (or 58% of the firms) are owned by 
families. Families who usually manage these companies and institutions have a 
significant presence on these companies' boards. Banks who are the majority 
holders of the firm's debt are also a significant owner of these firms and are 
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represented on their boards. Consequently, agency conflicts are minimal and there 
is no need for the market of corporate control to tame such conflict. 
Rajan and Zinglaes (1995) claim that the effect of the concentration of ownership 
on capital structure is far from obvious. The presence of large shareholders on the board 
reduces agency costs. If these large shareholders are not diversified, they will be averse to 
debt. On the other hand, if these large shareholders are banks, they may force the firm to 
increase its debt by borrowing from the owning bank. Bathala, et al. (1994), show that the 
use of debt and managerial ownership are inversely related to institutional ownership in 
the firm. 
In summary, the Arab firms where the majority is owned by families will use debt 
rather than equity not because of the information asymmetry argument (most of the 
available debt is in the form of informed bank debt), they rather do so because they want · 
to avoid diluting the ownership and losing control over the firm. On the other hand, 
families force the firms they manage to use debt because they are also the majority 
owners in the banks that provide the firms with the needed loans. Finally, the government 
ownership gives a great boost to the lenders confidence, which in tum will increase the 
level of debt. 
3.7 Arab Culture and Society 
Arab culture is very much unlike that of the West, which is more materialistic. 
Since its very beginning, the religion of Islam has been promoting cooperation in the 
sense that the ultimate payback is in the afterlife; people should help those in need for no 
or minimal return. As was emphasized earlier, Islam ( on a par with the ten 
commandments) prohibits interest. One justification for this prohibition addresses the 
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return without risk or return without work. People should invest their wealth in projects 
without multiple intermediaries (bank to stock markets to corporations to projects and 
then to production); a person can invest by himself or by partnering with others in 
productive investments. Some Muslim scholars argue that even limited liability is not a 
practice of Islam because the company may incur more loss to the society than the value 
of the shares of its owners. This is considered unfair and destructive of society's 
economy and morality; the owners should assume full responsibility for their actions (Al 
Omari 1999). From this logic, debt instruments are not of great appeal to the Arab (99% 
Muslims) audience, which will tum their attention to direct investments in proprietorships 
or partnerships. Nonetheless, this has not hurt banking in the Arab world to a great extent 
for two reasons: 
1- Arabs are the least of the Muslims to strictly follow the teachings of Islam. 
2- Islamic banking has dressed interest rates in a Muslim dress and used very 
creative means to make interest rates look like investments that are accepted by 
Islam. The Publications of the Saudi Alahli (Alahli 2002) bank gives the 
following examples of these innovations: 
a- Buying an asset at a known market price and selling it to the bank 
customer at a higher price in return for repaying in periodical installments 
(buy and sell arrangements). 
b- Financing a project by buying part of the future cash flows of the project. 
The sum of these future cash flows is larger than the loan. 
c- Capital leases .. 
d- Mortgage financing by buying future rent revenues of rented real estate or 
buy buying part of the future salaries of the owners of the house. 
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These innovations are similar to those discussed in the Islamic banking 
subsection, but are simplified to attract less educated individuals. 
As Arabs are known for their generosity, it would be considered a shame to refuse 
lending money to trustworthy friends or family members. This, coupled with the family 
ownership and management of most companies in the Arab world, makes formal equity 
financing weaker and debt financing weakest. Finally, it is the Arab tradition to keep 
business practices and financial matters a secret of the family that owns the business. One 
of the prophet Mohammed's recommendations to Muslims is to do their business in low 
profile like manners. In summary, the Arab culture and traditions call for using less debt. 
This chapter presented the institutional factors and country traditions that are 
expected to affect both the level and the determinants of capital structure in the Arab 
world. The analysis above shows that taxes, the banking system, and the ownership 
structure are expected to have a positive effect on the level of leverage. On the other 
hand, the legal system, stock markets and the culture are expected to have a negative 
effect. The effect of these factors on the determinants of capital structure will be analyzed 
after presenting these determinants in the next chapter. 
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Table 3.1 
Corporate and Personal Taxes in the Arab World 
Personal 
Foreign Tax Capital 
Country Corporate corp. Rates on Personal tax rates gains tax 
Tax rate Tax rate div. On Interest 
At the personal tax 0% 
Morocco 35% 35% 0% bracket (13-44%) 
At the personal tax 0% 
Tunis 35% 35% 0% bracket (0-35%) 
UAE 0% 20-55% 0% 0% 0% 




Oman 0-7.5% foreign 0% 0% 
At the personal tax 0% 
Lebanon 10% 10% 5% bracket (2-28%) 
Kuwait 0% 5-55% 0% 0% 0% 
at the personal tax 0% 
Jordan 15-35% 15-35% 10% bracket (5-30%) 
Saudi 2.5% 25-45% 2.5% 2.5% 0% 
At the personal tax 0% 
Egypt 32-40% 32-40% 0% bracket (10-48%) 
Bahrain 45% oil only 0% 0% 0% 0% 
At the personal tax 0% 
Palestine 20% 20% 0% bracket (5-35%) 
Source: Info Prod research (1999). 
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Table 3.2 
Salient Features of the Bankruptcy Code in Arab Countries 
Country Forms of Forms of Management Automatic Rights of 
Liquidation Reorganization Control in Stay Secured 
Bankruptcy Creditors 
Bahrain, Voluntary Trustee and Liquidator is None.And Priorities 
Egypt, (general management appointed to creditors have may differ 
Jordan, assembly) negotiate terms supervise the right to from one 
Kuwait, e.g. and conditions. operations appoint no country to 
Oman, loss=3/4 of Liquidation if and more than the other, 
Palestine, the capital reorganization safeguard three but mainly 
Qatar, or fails company's supervisors to as follows: 
Saudi involuntary funds and assist and Employees, 
Arabia, (final court assets monitor Government, 
UAE order) e.g. liquidation rents and 
failure to leases, 
pay debt in creditors. 
a timely 
manner 
Lebanon, Same Same Same If a company is Same 




then a stay is 
possible. 
Harder to do so 
in Morocco 
Source: The respective corporate laws. 
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Table 3.3 
Average Debt Financing in Arab Countries 
Country TD/BV TD/MV LTD/BV LTD/MV STD/BV STD/MV 
Bahrain 0.147 0.257 0.140 0.241 0.008 0.016 
Egypt 0.535 0.397 0.331 0.227 0.283 0.275 
Jordan 0.210 0.250 0.154 0.186 0.078 0.085 
Kuwait 0.160 0.169 0.124 0.121 0.036 0.049 
Oman 0.817 0.726 0.484 0.593 0.470 0.306 
Palestine 0.142 0.055 0.077 0.030 0.065 0.025 
Qatar 0.303 0.313 0.231 0.229 0.072 0.085 
Saudi 0.268 0.317 0.261 0.314 0.006 0.002 
UAE 0.407 0.179 0.368 0.148 0.038 0.029 
Average 1 0.332 0.296 0.241 0.232 0.117 0.097 
Tunisia 0.494 1.293 0.163 0.421 0.331 0.872 
Lebanon 0.386 0.803 0.207 0.445 0.179 0.358 
Morocco 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.000 0.000 
Average2 0.306 0.712 0.136 0.302 0.170 0.410 
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Table 3.4 
Arab Markets Statistics (as of 12/31 of the respective years) 
Year Palestine J ordanBahrain Tunis SA OmanKuwaitEgypt Morocco 
GDP in Billions of 97 3.6 7 6.4 18.9 146.5 15.8 30 75.6 33.4 
USD 
98 4.3 7.3 6.2 20 128.4 14.2 25.3 82.7 35.6 
99 5.2 8.1 6.6 20.8 139.2 15.6 29.7 89 32.1 
20004.3 8.3 10.1 19.5 165 19.6 29.3 98.7 33.5 
20013.8 8.6 10.5 20.77171.6 20.38 30.47 102.1635.68 
Number of listed97 20 139 40 34 71 119 74 650 49 
comp am es 98 20 150 42 39 74 137 78 861 53 
99 23 152 41 44 72 140 85 1033 54 
200023 163 41 44 75 131 86 1070 54 
200123 161 42 45 76 96 88 1115 55 
Market 97 570 5456 7826 2316 393787312 29674 20875 12248 
Capitalization 98 811 5863 6771 2229 426304536 1S423 24525 15610 
in Millions ofUSD 99 995 5834 7161 2638 609524303 19598 33039 13702 
2000801 4973 6624 2809 671663518 19847 3079110875 
2001743 6314 6601 2229 7301 2634 26661243099031 
Trading Volume 97 25 501 472 225 165473875 34447 6018 1067 
in Millions of USD 98 68 705 910 174 156282854 17503 4120 1940 
99 112 892 626 697 245641096 8228 14516 3342 
2000172 869 255 412 23861531 9518 6127 795 
200140 934 249 342 22222417 11709 5912 840 
Capitalization/GDP 97 16% 78% 122% 12% 27% 46% 99% 28% 37% 
% 
98 19% 80% 109% 11% 33% 32% 73% 30% 44% 
99 19% 72% 109% 13% 44% 28% 66% 37% 43% 
200019% 60% 66% 14% 41% 18% 68% 31% 32% 
200120% 73% 63% 11% 40% 13% 87% 24% 25% 
Trading 97 1% 7% 7% 1% 11% 25% 115% 8% 3% 
volume/GDP % 98 2% 10% 15% 1% 12% 20% 69% 5% 5% 
99 2% 11% 9% 3% 18% 7% 28% 16% 10% 
20004% 10% 3% 2% 14% 3% 32% 6% 2% 
20011 % 11% 2% 2% 13% 2% 38% 6% 2% 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Trading volume/97 4% 9% 6% 10% 42% 53% 116% 29% 9% 
Capitalization % 
98 8% 12% 13% 8% 37% 63% 95% 17% 12% 
99 11% 15% 9% 26% 40% 25% 42% 44% 24% 
2000 21% 17% 4% 15% 36% 15% 48% 20% 7% 
2001 5% 15% 4% 15% 304% 16% 44% 24% 9% 
Sources: Annual Arab unified reports and the Arab Monetary Fund Publications. 
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Table 3.5 
The Role of Arab Stock Markets in the Development of 
Arab Countries' Economies 
Countries' gross domestic product is the dependent variable. NUM is the number oflisted 
companies on the exchange, CAP is the total capitalization for the market and TV is the 



















The sample size is 44. The significant levels of the estimated coefficients are for the two-
tailed test based on a priori predictions. R2 is the REG r-square, t values are given in 
parentheses. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.6 
Financing Patterns in Arab Countries, US and Developing Countries Firms 
Country Internal External Debt Equity 
Bahrain -1% 101% -2% 103% 
Egypt -3% 103% 19% 83% 
Jordan 1% 99% 15% 84% 
Kuwait 10% 90% 13% 78% 
Lebanon -4% 104% 1% 104% 
Morocco 77% 23% -5% 28% 
Oman 16% 84% 41% 43% 
Palestine 18% 82% 8% 74% 
Qatar 5% 95% 16% 79% 
Saudi 2% 98% 9% 89% 
Tunis -5% 105% 58% 47% 
UAE 60% 40% 14% 26% 
Tax Arab Countries 13% 87% 19% 68% 
Non-tax Arab Countries 18% 82% 8% 74% 
All Arab Countries 15% 85% 16% 70% 
us 86% 14% 13% 1% 
Developed Countries 72% 28% 25% 3% 
Developing Countries 39% 62% 22% 40% 
Calculations are adopted from the Singh and Hamid 1992 methodology. 
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Table 3.7 
Corporate Bond Market Statistics in the Arab world (in Millions USD) 
Bond Market Number of 
Country Ca2italization Issues Bond Market Capitalization as a fraction of GDP(%) 
Bahrain 597 5 56.86 
Egypt 1412 30 1.38 
Jordan 100 10 1.16 
Kuwait 507 9 1.66 
Lebanon 840 NR 5.38 
Morocco 373 19 1.05 
Oman 0 0 0.00 
Palestine 0 0 0.00 
Qatar 1055 2 1.23 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0.00 
Tunis 48 2 0.23 
UAE 204 3 0.44 
Source: AMF joint economic report 2001 
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Category 
Number of Banks 






Arab Banks Statistics (in Billions USD) 










Comparison of Bank, Bond and Stock Markets in Arab Countries 
Bank Credit to the Stock Market Bond Market 
Private Sector as a Capitalization as a fraction Capitalization as a fraction 
Country Fraction of GDP (%) of GDP(%) of GDP(%) 
Bahrain 69 109 6 
Egypt 68 37 1 
Jordan 95 72 1 
Kuwait 48 66 2 
Lebanon 172 10 5 
Morocco 52 43 1 
Oman 44 28 0 
Palestine 20 19 0 
Qatar 57 65 12 
Saudi Arabia 25 44 0 
Tunisia 60 13 0 
UAE 65 70 0 
Sources: Stock market and bond market data are from the AMF Joint Economic Report 




Ownership Structure of Arab Firms 






















Palestine 27% 8% 
Q~~ 33% 9% 
Saudi 2% 18% 
Tunisia 33% 9% 
UAE 9% 17% 
Average 26% 13% 
a Financial and non financial 
b Government and public institutions e.g. social security 



















Capital structure theory has very little to say directly about inter-country 
differences in corporate financing patterns. No extant theory explains why or how a 
firm's nationality affects its use of debt. However, one can draw indirect implications 
from various conceptual approaches comprising the theory. Singh (1995) demonstrates 
that inter-country variations in corporate financial structures should depend on 
differences in taxation regimes, transactions costs, and other country specific factors. In 
general, the institutional arrangements prevailing in different countries, which either 
mitigate or exacerbate various kinds of market imperfections (including the nature and 
the incidence of asymmetric information) are the driving force behind the differences in 
inter-country financing patterns. Mayer (1990) has attempted to explain inter-country 
variations in corporate capital structures and financing patterns among developed 
countries in terms of the theory-suggested determinants. He concludes that, except for the 
control models, the relevant implications of the other models (tax, agency, information 
asymmetry, product/input, ... etc.) do not accord with the pattern ofresults he found. 
Based on the extant literature, this dissertation identifies variables that are 
potentially responsible for determining the leverage ratio of a firm. Testable propositions 
and hypotheses are developed in the context of institutional arrangements and traditions 
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in the sample countries. In addition to firm specific features, a number of country-related 
variables are included in the model of determinants of capital structure. This extension 
relies on the premise that managers not only consider company specific features but also 
general environmental conditions in choosing sources of finance. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the measures and determinants of 
capital structure, analyze the effects of the Arab factors on these determinants, and then 
develop testable hypotheses. Section 4.2 presents leverage ratios and determinants as 
suggested by theory and empirical studies. Theoretical signs and significance are 
compared to the findings in empirical work. Other determinants that are not suggested 
by theory will also be presented and hypothesized for empirical testing. Section 4.3 
analyzes effects of the country traditions and institutional factors on these determinants. 
Section 4.4 develops the hypotheses for this dissertation. 
4.2 Leverage Ratios and Theoretical 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
This section presents measures of leverage. The reasons for using more than one 
measure are discussed and their implications are explained. Also, brief discussions of the 
determinants that are suggested by the various theories of capital structure to affect the 
firm's debt-equity choice are presented. These determinants' relation to an optimal 
capital structure choice, and their empirical significance are discussed. 
4.2.1 Measures of Capital Structure 
Six debt ratios will be used as dependent variables to test the determinants of 
capital structure in Arab firms. These ratios are: total debt (TD), long-term debt (LTD), 
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and short-term debt (STD) to both book and market values of equity. A summary of the 
dependent variables is presented in Table 4.1. Book values of debt will be used for the 
following reasons: 
1- Taking into account the scarcity of data, only book values of debt data are 
usually available. 
2- Bowman (1980) shows that the cross sectional correlation between the book 
value and market value of debt is very high. While this may not hold for Arab 
economies, there is no reason to expect otherwise. Consequently, minimal 
misspecification error is expected because of the use of the book value of debt. 
Thus no differences in the correlations between debt and its determinants should 
result from using book vs. market values of debt. 
3- Due to the weakness of the primary bond markets (see Table 3.7) and the virtual 
nonexistence of secondary bond markets in the Arab world, bank loans are the 
dominant form of debt. These are never tradable in secondary markets, meaning 
that no market value of debt exists. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) demonstrate that the coefficients' signs, magnitudes 
and even levels of significance of the explanatory variables will differ according to the 
maturity of debt and to whether the debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market 
values of both debt and equity. Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that the extent and the 
most important measure ofleverage depends on the objective of the analysis; agency 
problems associated with debt depend on the size of both the equity and the debt used to 
finance the firms' assets. Thus the relevant measure here would be total debt to total firm 
value. If we focus on transferring control of the firm from equity to bond holders when 
the firm is distressed, then the emphasis would be on the firm's ability to meet 
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its fixed charges, making the interest coverage-ratio the relevant measure of debt. The 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets is used when we want to measure what is left for 
equity holders in case of liquidation. They discuss other measures of leverage and their 
caveats. However, these six measures of leverage, due to their transparency and 
widespread use, will suit the purpose of this dissertation. 
The reasons for choosing six dependent variables are worth emphasizing here: 
1- Firms with high growth opportunities will have higher market-to-book ratios. 
Consequently, the debt-to-book value of equity is higher than the debt-to-market 
value of equity ratios. This will lead to different correlations and levels of 
significance with the explanatory variables. 
2- Managers consider the book value of their firm when making debt decisions 
(which supports the use of debt-to-book-value of equity ratio) while investors 
consider the market value and its implications on the firm when debt is used 
(which supports the use of debt-to-market-value of equity ratio). 
3- It is necessary to find out the determinants of the use of the firms' general level 
ofleverage, i.e. total debt (TD). 
4- If any leverage is used, we need to know what determines the mix of LTD and 
STD for financing asset growth. Traditional wisdom calls for matching of 
financing and investment maturities, LTD to finance fixed assets and STD to 
finance working capital (variations and mixes of the two that correspond to risk 
averse versus risk taking firms is not of concern here), but other factors 
determine the relationship between financing sources and investment 
opportunities. For example, most developing countries do not even have debt 
markets. Also Titman and Wessels (1988) have shown that small firms show a 
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preference for STD. In this context, the determinants of LTD and STD should be 
observed separately. 
5- Using market and book values of equity stems from the need to find out whether 
investors consider the investment opportunity to be financed (i.e. using market 
value - because NPV for an investment opportunity is added to the market value 
of the firm; thus the market value matters) or whether they consider the entire 
firm (i.e. using book value of equity - when assets are added to the firm, the 
book value of these assets is added to the book values of the assets in place; 
hence book value matters). 
6- Book values have more value than market values in the Arab world for the 
following reasons: 
a- Because of the low market efficiency in the Arab world, market values 
either reflect book values or are reached in chaotic ways (not reliable). 
b- Since bank loans are the dominant source of corporate debt, banks require 
fixed assets as collateral, which is usually priced at book. 
c- Bankruptcy and tax laws, among others, consider book (not rp.arket) 
values in their regulations and proceedings. 
d- Accounting in the Arab world relies on international standards of 
accounting, which use only book values in financial management (e.g. 
capital budgets). 
For the above reasons, the correlation between the explanatory variables and 
debt-to-market ratios is expected to be spurious. Conversely, debt-to-book is expected to 
exhibit a level of significance that would reflect the relationship between leverage and its 
determinants. Consequently, the analysis will emphasize book debt ratios. 
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4.2.2 The Explanatory Variables 
Based on the extant literature this section identifies variables that are potentially 
responsible for determining the leverage ratio of the firm. The testable propositions and 
hypotheses are developed in the context of institutional arrangements and traditions in 
the sample countries. The following discussions justify the use of the selected 
determinants followed by the effect of the Arab traditions and institutional factors on 
their cross-sectional direction and level of significance. These determinants are used to 
test the hypotheses developed in section 4.4. 
This dissertation relies extensively on the previously mentioned empirical works 
especially those of Marsh (1982), Bradley, et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Singh and Hamid (1992), Givoly (1992), Singh (1995), Rajan 
and Zing ales ( 1995), Graham (1996), Hovakimian, et al. (2001 ), Booth, et al. (2001) and 
Antoniou, et al. (2002). 
Next, the determinants and their previously estimated signs and levels of 
significance in both developed and developing countries will be presented. Finally, the 
effect of Arab country factors on these determinants will be analyzed and expectations 
for the significance and direction of these determinants will be presented. 
4.2.2.1 Collateral 
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrated that firms should use the least risky 
financing source first (retained earnings) then, if needed, riskless external debt, then 
secured debt, and so on until reaching the riskiest of all, equity. Risk refers to the 
probability of revealing favorable information the management has that the market does 
not. For this reason, collateralized debt would be in order if internal financing sources 
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were exhausted. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that firms may adopt sub optimal 
investment strategies once debt is used to expropriate wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders (also known as asset substitution). Collateralizing debt mitigates the firm's 
tendency to follow such strategy since both shareholders and bondholders carry the 
burden of bankruptcy. It is also evident from the positive relationship between risk and 
return that collateralized debt is less risky and costs less than non-collateralized debt. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that if a large fraction of the firm's assets are tangible, 
then assets should serve as a collateral, diminishing the risk of the lender suffering the 
agency costs of debt from issues such as risk shifting. They also suggest that tangible 
assets retain more value in liquidation. Antoniou, et al. (2002) state that the value of 
intangible assets almost entirely disappears in bankruptcy while tangible assets benefit 
from alternative redeployable uses. Also, in firms with more intangible assets, the costs 
of controlling capital outlays are higher as monitoring is more difficult. Finally, they 
suggest that when firms have relatively fewer tangible assets, creditors are more likely to 
impose restrictions. Thus, in most empirical studies, debt was found to be positively 
related to tangible assets/total assets (TAN/TA) and negatively related to intangible 
assets/ total assets (INTAN/TA). These two variables will serve as proxies for debt 
collateral. 
4.2.2.2 Non Debt Tax Shield {NDTS) 
Firms have the incentive to take on activities that lower their costs; debt does so 
by deducting interest from taxable income (EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes) as 
long as there is income to deduct interest from. This is called the debt tax shield (DTS). 
On the other hand, depreciation, losses, and investment tax credits provide similar 
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benefits. These are called non-debt tax shields (NDTS). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
showed that a substitution relationship between DTS and NDTS. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) incorporate the effect of corporate taxes, personal taxes 
and non-debt tax shields in their model of optimal capital structure. Their argument is 
that tax deductions for depreciation, losses, and investment tax credits are substitutes for 
the tax benefits of debt financing. This suggests an inverse relationship between debt and 
non-debt tax shields. In their comparative static analysis of the relationship between the 
optimal debt ratio, volatility, the costs of financial distress, and non-debt tax shields, 
Bradley, et al. (1984) introduced a testable hypothesis stating that the debt ratio is 
inversely related to the level of the non-debt tax shield. They measured the NDTS by the 
sum of annual depreciation charges and investment tax credits divided by the sum of 
annual earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes. They also contend that R&D and 
advertising can also be considered as non-debt tax shields since they can be fully 
expensed in the year they are incurred. Consequently, according to the substitutability 
hypothesis, firms with high R&D and advertising expenses issue less debt. Graham 
(1996) discusses NDTS in detail, and suggests that NDTS will be negatively correlated 
to debt in firms that have no or low operating profits and high probability of bankruptcy 
while it will be positively correlated to debt in firms that have high profits. His argument 
is based on the possibility that non-debt tax shields will crowd out debt tax shields when 
profits are low or equivalently when the effective tax rate is low. He also adds that as in 
Bradley, et al. (1984), changes in R&D and advertising can also be viewed as NDTS and 
should be negatively related to debt usage if they serve as tax shield substitutes. 
NDTS has been widely debated in many empirical studies; Bradley, et al. (1984) 
and Bathala, et al. (1994) found NDTS to be positively correlated to debt ratios. As 
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mentioned earlier, they explained this finding by assuming that NDTS is an instrumental 
variable for debt collateral. Titman and Wessels (1988) found this relationship to be 
negative and insignificant. Givoly, et al. (1992) and Graham (1996) found the 
relationship to be negative and explained it by the known substitutability between DTS 
andNDTS. 
4.2.2.3 Growth 
Myers (1977) shows that highly leveraged firms are more likely to pass up 
profitable investment opportunities; therefore, firms with higher future growth should 
use less debt and more equity finance to mitigate this agency problem. He uses the 
market-to-debt ratio of equity as a proxy for growth. Titman and Wessels (1988) claim 
that the costs associated with the agency relationship between equity and debt holders is 
likely to be higher for firms in growing industries because they have more flexibility in 
their choice of future investments and greater opportunities for expropriation of wealth 
from debt holders. They explain this tendency by the fact that equity-controlled firms 
may invest sub-optimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. They 
support this claim by arguing that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value 
to the firm but cannot be collateralized and do not generate current taxable income. 
Myers (1977) noted that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues short-term 
debt, which suggests a substitutability relationship between short-term and long-term 
debts. Growth should have a negative relationship with long-term debt and a positive 
relationship with short-term debt. He uses capital expenditure over total assets, 
percentage change in total assets, and R&D over sales to proxy for growth. Bathala, et 
al. (1994) suggests that a high growth rate indicates the profitability and success of the 
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firm in adding more resources into the firm, which could be associated with lower 
information asymmetry costs of equity and hence a preference of equity over debt 
financing. Rajan and Zingales (1995) offer two main reasons for a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth. First, it is expected that as the market-to-book ratio of 
equity (as a proxy for firm growth) increases, so does the cost of financial distress. 
Second, firms prefer to issue equity when the stock is over-valued. Antoniou, et al. 
(2002) argue that an increase in the probability of success in a positive NPV opportunity 
increases the market-to-book ratio of equity. This increase in the market value of the 
firm's equity can be seen as an incentive to issue equity rather than debt to finance that 
project. Booth, et al. (2001) adopts Scott's (1977) secured debt hypothesis and the 
growth option argument of Myers (1977) to conclude that debt is expected to have a 
negative relationship to the market:-to-book ratio (M/B). The marginal borrowing power 
on a dollar of market value should be less than that on a dollar of book value, because 
the latter is an existing investment while the former is an investment opportunity. 
Givoly, et al. (1992) argue that M/B is a measure of firm performance (Tobin's Q). 
Better performing firms have a higher capacity for debt, and debt may exhibit a 
significant, positive relationship with M/B. 
Other measures of growth have reported in other studies. Bathala, et al. (1994) 
used the past growth in total assets, while others used percentage change in the value of 
the firm. As in most studies, the market-to-book ratio of equity will be used as a proxy 
for firm growth in this dissertation. 
4.2.2.4 Uniqueness and Industry Classification 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Hovakimian, et al. (2001) were the only 
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researchers encountered in the literature review to deal with uniqueness. Uniqueness was 
proxied for by the employee-quit ratio ( employee tum-over, which is expected to be low 
for firms that have unique technology) and R&D expenditure. Debt was found to be 
negatively related to uniqueness because of the dangers of going bankrupt if debt 
requirements were not fulfilled coupled with the high expenditures for unique labor, cost 
of sale, high R&D, etc. Bradley, et al. (1984) found that leverage ratios range from a low 
of9.1 % for drugs and cosmetics to a high of 58.3% for airlines. A standard ANOVA 
using industry variables and showed that 54% of the cross-sectional variance in firm 
leverage can be explained by industrial classification. Furthermore, they found more 
variation in mean leverage ratios across industries than in firm leverage ratios within 
industries. Finally, they found a significant, positive relationship between the level of 
leverage and the level of regulation in industries. Despite the fact that these two 
variables are of great importance in analyzing capital structure, because of the 
nonexistence of data on such variables, uniqueness and industry classification will not be 
considered here as factors that may affect the use of debt. This omission may hurt the 
specification of the model used in this dissertation, but knowing the irrelevance of 
uniqueness in the Arab world and knowing that the data includes only large listed 
manufacturing firms (homogeneous), it is safe to expect those two variables to be 
insignificant. Dropping them should neither bias this work's results, nor should it cause 
any misspecification to its tests. These two factors will be left for further research. 
4.2.2.5 Size 
Warner (1977) suggested that leverage ratios might be related to firm size. He 
provided evidence that relative bankruptcy costs are negatively correlated with firm size 
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for railroad companies. It is also known that relatively large firms tend to be more 
diversified and less prone to bankruptcy, suggesting that large firms should be highly 
leveraged. Marsh (1982) argues that because of company-size-related differences in 
long-term debt floatation costs, smaller firms are expected to have a lower long term 
debt ratio and a higher short-term-debt to total-debt ratio. In that context, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Givoly, et al. (1992) point out that the cost of issuing securities is 
also related to firm size. Large firms have lower relative floatation costs; this suggests 
that small firms may use more short-term leverage than large firms because they would 
prefer bank loans to any security (bonds included) to avoid the higher cost of issuing 
such securities. Alternately, large firms have more access to long-term debt markets than 
do smaller firms, causing short-term debt to be a non-avoidable substitute for the former. 
Also, large firms are perceived to have more collateral and more assurance of longer 
existence than smaller ones. Exchange requirements and the reputation of being listed in 
capital markets are other assurances to creditors. Since larger firms usually have a higher 
market share and most likely are more diversified, debt would seem a good strategy, 
especially when debt tax shields are desired. Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that size 
is ambiguous because larger firms are more diversified and less likely to go bankrupt. 
Hence, size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy; thus a positive 
relationship between debt and size is expected. On the other hand, size may be an 
inverse proxy for the amount of information outside investors have, increasing their 
preference for equity relative to debt. Booth, et al. (2001) include size as an independent 
variable since it is associated with survival and the agency costs of both debt and equity. 
Their argument is based on that of Rajan and Zingales (1995). Antoniou, et al. (2002) 
argue that since monitoring costs are higher in smaller firms than in larger firms, then 
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information asymmetry in large firms is smaller; consequently, larger firms are likely to 
have easier access to debt markets and borrow at lower cost. 
Many measurements of size have been used in studies ( e.g. natural logs of firm 
value, firm assets, and sales). The natural log of sales LN (S) is used most frequently and 
will be used as a proxy for size here. Previous studies show that size usually exhibits a 
positive relationship with long-term debt and a negative relationship with short-term 
debt; these were the findings of Titman and Wessels (1988) among others. 
4.2.2.6 Volatility 
The main restriction of debt financing is the availability of cash to service it in a 
timely manner. Any fluctuation in the availability of cash simply means that creditors 
will drive the firm into bankruptcy (unless of course the indenture specifies otherwise, or 
there is a close long term relationship between the firm and its creditors as in most bank-
based economies). Business risk usually causes unwanted fluctuations in the level of 
cash the firm needs to hold. Volatility of earnings is a measure of such risk; since debt 
requires a steady level of cash flows then it only makes sense that firms with volatile 
earnings should use less debt. 
Bradley, et al. (1984) presented the most comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical analysis of volatility and its relation to the optimal debt ratio. They use 
comparative static models and empirical evidence to study the relationship between 
optimal debt level and volatility. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the 
first difference in annual earnings, scaled by the average value of the firm's total assets 
over the period. Their empirical results conform to their theoretical hypotheses; volatility 
is significant and negatively related to firm leverage ratios. They test the 
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relationship between the optimal debt ratio and volatility under different values for non-
debt tax shield (NDTS) and costs of financial distress (COFD). When both NDTS and 
COFD are assumed to be zero, the optimal ratio is always 100% because a firm that has 
zero leverage-related costs realizes all the positive tax advantage of debt leading to 
100% debt financing. On the other hand, positive COFD and NDTS causes the 
relationship between debt and volatility to be the inverse. This is consistent with the 
notion that greater present value of leverage-related costs lowers the level of debt. Other 
empirical work reviewed here illustrates the argument that a negative relationship exists 
between debt and volatility. These studies calculate volatility in different ways, the most 
common measure being the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT). This dissertation will use this definition as well. 
4.2.2. 7 Profitability 
Myers and Majluf (1984) state that firms use retained earnings as the first and 
safest source of financing to avoid signaling and transaction costs. However, this choice 
is predicated upon the existence of free cash flows after dividend payments are met. 
Myers (1977) cites evidence from other empirical works suggesting that firms follow a 
pecking order in their financing sources, first from retained earnings, second from debt, 
and third from issuing new equity. This argument suggests that a firm's profitability is a 
strong determinant of its capital structure. Marsh (1982) states that he included 
profitability because Martin and Scott ( 197 6) found them useful discriminators rather 
than because of any very strong prior grounds. Rajan and Zingales (1995) contrast the 
information asymmetry of Myers and Majluf (1984) with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow 
agency costs. Since in Myers and Majluf (1984), firms preferred retained earnings to 
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debt, then profitability should be negatively correlated with leverage. Jensen (1986) 
suggests a positive relationship since, in a strong corporate control market; firms are 
forced to commit to paying cash by leveraging up. Shareholders use debt as a 
disciplinary tool against managers to avoid consumption of excess perquisites. If the 
market for corporate control is ineffective, and if managers of profitable firms prefer to 
avoid the disciplinary role of debt, then it is expected that a negative relationship 
between profitability and debt would exist. Another consideration raised by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) is that investors are more willing to lend to firms with high profits, thus 
reducing the cost of debt, providing incentives for profitable firms to use more debt. 
Singh and Hamid (1992), Singh (1995) and Booth, et al. (2001) show that profitable 
finns in developing countries use less debt. Antoniou, et al. (2002) state that the negative 
relationship between debt and profitability is also supported in smaller firms because 
they do not have access to capital markets, nor do they qualify for large long term bank 
loans; hence, they must use their profits to finance growth. As in most studies, EBIT /TA 
will be used to capture profitability's relation to debt. 
4.2.2.8 Taxes 
As the interest on loans is tax-deductible, firms with higher tax liability have an 
incentive to use more debt. This argument holds only if firms have sufficient taxable 
income. In calculating the tax deductibility of debt, the effective tax rate is what counts, 
not the statutory tax rate; the reason is that interest is deducted from earnings before tax 
and after deducting all non-debt tax benefits (i.e. investment tax credit, operating losses, 
and depreciation). Titman and Wessels (1988) failed to find any significant effect of 
corporate tax on financial decisions. That finding was established by showing that non-
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debt tax shields are not a significant determinant of capital structure. Givoly, et al. 
(1992) define the effective tax rate as the present value of taxes paid on an additional 
dollar of income after accounting for all non-debt deductions. Graham (1996) states that, 
when compared with a low marginal tax rate (MTR), firms with a high MTR have 
greater incentive to issue debt. The reason is to take advantage of higher interest 
deductibility. This implies a positive relationship between MTR and leverage. Booth, et 
al. (2001) uses the statutory tax rate instead of MTR to deduct interest. Antoniou, et al. 
(2002) suggest that higher corporate tax rates would result in lower internal funds as 
well as higher cost of capital. As a result, the demand for debt should decrease with 
increasing MTR. This is true if the tax rates are extremely high and the non-debt tax 
shields consume all income to a point where there is no benefit to using debt since there 
are no more tax-deductible earnings. As in most studies, MTR is calculated as paid taxes 
divided by earnings before interest and taxes (TAX/EB IT) to show the taxes paid on 
each additional dollar of operating income after accounting for all deductions (but 
interest itself). MTR can be seen as a proxy for debt tax shield, the higher the MTR the 
higher the benefit from debt and the more debt to be used. Of course, in the countries 
that have no taxes, this variable will always equal zero. Consequently, the way to test the 
effect of taxes is to test whether MTR is a significant determinant of capital structure. 
4.2.2.9 Dividends 
According to the POH of Myers and Majluf (1984), retained earnings (profits-
dividends) are the first source of financing. Knowing that retained earnings have a 
negative relationship with dividends paid (retained earnings = net income-paid 
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dividends) and leverage has a negative relationship with retained earnings (external 
financing (XF) = equity financing (EF) + debt financing (DF) = total financing (TF) -
internal financing (IF)), we conclude that debt has a positive relationship with dividends. 
Alternatively, higher dividends lower retained earnings and increase the need for 
external financing. According to POH, debt is the next in line as a source of funds. Thus, 
higher dividends call for higher debt. La Porta, et al. (2000) shows that in weak law 
countries (most Arab countries) firms pay dividends to build the reputation that they care 
for their shareholders. Their motivation is to use this reputation to market future equity 
issues. This means that dividends are paid for future external equity financing not debt 
financing, which implies a negative relationship between debt and dividends. This is due 
to the negative relationship between debt and external equity financing. As in the case of 
profitability, Marsh (1982) states that he included payout ratio because Martin and Scott 
(1976) found it useful discriminators rather than because of any very strong prior 
grounds. He also states that since companies may continue to pay dividends when they 
are losing, the payout ratio is not statistically well behaved and can be misleading. 
Givoly, et al. (1992) included dividend yield as one of their explanatory variables to 
proxy for personal taxes. They found a negative relationship between debt and dividend 
yield. This is in accordance with Miller (1977) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) in that 
personal taxes consume at least a portion of the gain from leverage that accrued at the 
corporate level. Paid dividends divided by net income (DIV/NI) -or the firm's payout 
ratio- will be used as a proxy for dividends. 
Due to the fact that Arab firms generate inadequate returns, have to pay 
dividends to build the reputation La Porta, et al. (2000), and follow a reverse POH, then 
we expect the level of debt to be negatively related to dividends in both tax and non-tax 
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Arab countries. To capture the effect of personal taxes, and to isolate the effects of 
dividends (mentioned above), an interaction term between dividend yield and the 
marginal tax rate is in order. Such interaction will capture the effect of personal taxes on 
debt in tax Arab countries only. This interaction will have a value of zero in non-tax 
Arab countries since the MTR there is zero. Since investors prefer more wealth than less 
we expect them to prefer dividend income (which is always taxed at a lower rate than 
interest income) over interest income unless they are compensated for this tax 
differential. However, this compensation makes debt financing more expensive to firms, 
and unless the corporate tax break overcomes this cost, then firms will prefer equity 
financing to debt financing. Accordingly, debt is expected to have a negative 
relationship with this interaction term. 
4.2.2.10 Financial Distress 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest that highly leveraged 
firms may forego good investment opportunities due to the burden of debt. The reason is 
that debt holders claim most of the investments' profits. This transfer of wealth is an 
incentive for shareholders to forego the profitable investment opportunity. The value of 
the foregone opportunities plus the costs of enforcing the contractual provisions 
constitute the agency cost of debt. Myers ( 1977) argues that advertising and R&D create 
assets that may be viewed as options, which will be exercised according to the firm's 
financial well being and at the management's discretion. This suggests that the 
associated agency costs are higher compared to other assets. Consequently, ifR&D and 
advertising expenditures are considered proxies for agency costs, then firms with high 
levels of such costs are expected to have lower leverage. This expectation coincides with 
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Bradley, et al.'s (1984) argument that debt is inversely related to R&D and advertising 
though the rationale is different (they consider them as NDTS). Also, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) found a negative relationship between debt level and R&D, which is 
considered a proxy for growth. 
Bradley, et al. 's (1984) comparative static model implies that leverage is 
inversely related to the costs of financial distress, which include bankruptcy costs and 
agency costs of debt regardless of the variable used to proxy for these costs. Jensen 
(1986) and Stulz (1990) show that debt serves to limit managerial agency costs in 
profitable firms that lack investment opportunities. Givoly, et al. (1992) uses the inverse 
of Tobin's Q as a measure of the loss of growth opportunities and as a proxy for 
bankruptcy costs. They find it to be negatively correlated with leverage. Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996) show that when management pursues growth objectives, management and 
shareholders' interests coincide, and external equity is valuable to a firm with strong 
investment opportunities. Graham (1996) uses the Z probability to measure the 
probability of bankruptcy, Where Z is calculated as in equation 4.1. 
TA z =---------
3.3EBIT + l.4RE + l.2WC 
(4.1) 
where 
TA = total assets, 
EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes, 
RE = retained earnings, and 
WC = working capital. 
He hypothesizes that Z should have a negative relationship with debt. Booth, et 
al. (2001) suggest that where the potential for corporate opportunism is high, debt levels 
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will be low and will consist of short-term debt, especially for small firms with large 
intangible assets. This implies that short-term debt ratios are expected to have a positive 
relationship with growth. This relationship is -also consistent with the Myers (1977) 
argument mentioned in the growth section above. Booth, et al. (2001) thought of 
financial distress (bankruptcy cost BRC) as the product of the probability of entering a 
distressed situation and the cost ofresolving such a situation. The probability of 
financial distress decreases when tangible assets (TAN) act as collateral for debt issues. 
TAN/TA will be used as a proxy for distress and we expect a negative relationship 
between debt and financial distress. Since financial distress has a negative relationship 
with tangible assets, one expects a positive relationship between debt and tangible assets. 
In summary, these factors will be tested as determinants of CS in the Arab world 
for the purposes of this dissertation. Table 4.2 summarizes these factors. 
4.3 The Effects of Arab World Country Traditions and 
Institutional Factors on the Determinants of Capital Structure 
Our knowledge of capital structure has mostly been derived from Western 
economies that have many institutional similarities. The goal of this dissertation is to 
investigate the capital CS in the Arab world, which has different institutional features. 
The effect of the Arab countries' traditions and institutional factors on the directions and 
levels of significance of the determinants of CS are developed in this subsection. Each of 
the six factors discussed in the previous chapter will be analyzed separately because not 
all are expected to affect each of the determinants. The direct effect of these factors on 
the level of debt was discussed in chapter III. 
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4.3.1 The effects of Arab Capital Markets 
Arab capital markets are at their earliest stage of development. They remain 
characterized by low efficiency, low transparency and low liquidity and depth (Abu 
Alrub and Barakat 1999). For these reasons, investor confidence in these markets is low, 
though the returns on these markets have been high for the reasons mentioned previously 
(e.g. the general trend of increasing stock prices in the last decade). The low confidence 
in these markets results in investors' reliance on the book value of the firm's assets to 
price the firm's stock (Abu Al Rub and Barakat 1999). This leads to the conclusion that 
debt-to-book ratios will exhibit higher levels of significance than debt-to-market ratios. 
The market for bonds is weak, while there is no secondary market. Also, the fact that 
most debt is in the form of bank loans, which are valued at book, supports our 
hypothesis that debt-to-book ratios are more relevant and significant than debt-to-market 
ratios. Because of these market inefficiencies_, the market is not expected to react 
significantly to many of the determinants. However, tangible assets ( a book item that 
markets pick when valuing securities in the Arab world) are always a sign of the 
availability of collateral in the debt market ( especially bank debt markets), and it is 
expected to be significant and to have a positive sign. Sales volume and intangible assets 
can be seen as a sign of good reputation, which can be added to the firm's assets. These 
are expected to be significant and positively related to the use of debt. As far as the 
market is concerned, especially the market for bank loans, the existence of large sales 
and large intangible assets should help firms acquire more debt. On the other hand 
intangible assets may be considered as lack of collateral especially if they comprise a 
good percentage of total assets. This results in an undecided direction for this variable. 
Paying dividends is a sign of commitment to shareholders, which is not a good sign to 
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banks unless banks are owners in that firm. This variable is expected to exhibit a 
negative effect on the use of debt and is expected to be significant. Singh and Hamid 
(1992) suggest that because of the increase in stock prices in developing countries (e.g. 
Arab countries) investors are making high returns from capital gains. These high returns 
give firms the incentive to pay fewer dividends and use retained earnings as an 
alternative to finance growth. Azzam (1995) shows that stock markets have been the 
more popular investment outlet for surplus units for several reasons. First, stock prices 
increased in the nineties. Second, it is an acceptable alternative to investing in the 
tabooed interest based outlets (interest paying investments). A third reason, is the firm's 
inability to generate enough profits to pay previously committed dividends or to service 
debt. Hence, firms may issue stocks to finance growth and to pay dividends to attract 
new investors. The weak law countries argument of La Porta, et al. (2000) also supports 
the role of stock markets in paying higher dividends and borrowing less. For these 
reasons, markets enhance the significance of the negative correlation between the level 
of debt and dividend yield. Rajan and Zingales (1995) deduce that the market-to-book 
ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with debt due to the tendency for a firm to 
issue stock when its price is higher than its intrinsic value. On the other hand, since 
existing Arab capital markets do not exhibit high efficiency, performance measures are 
not of great importance. Thus, M/B is not expected to show significance. 
4.3.2 The effects of the Arab Culture 
Arab culture is not debt oriented due to prohibitions against interest rates and the 
belief in helping and trusting even in business matters. Moreover family ownership 
promotes cooperation among family members, especially if that family is wealthy. 
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These cultural factors promote free informal borrowing ( or at most a favor for a favor 
but still no direct financial cost) only when absolutely unavoidable, Abdelmajeed (2002). 
This gives profits a greater role in borrowing; if a firm is profitable, it will avoid all 
kinds of formal and informal (favors) borrowing. Thus profitability is expected to be 
negatively related to the use of any debt. Banks, the major source of debt in the Arab 
world, cannot avoid these cultural factors when deciding on granting a loan. 
Nevertheless, it helps to know that the borrower is well established. These cultural 
factors help lower the significance of debt altogether, especially in the long run. These 
cultural factors should lend significance to bank and bank-like loan determinants such as 
tangible or intangible assets and sales, which are expected to be of positive significance . 
. 4.3.3 The Effects of Arab Banking Systems 
Thus far, it has been established that the Arab banking system is very advanced 
and that banks consider the known standards and requirements of loans from reputation 
to collateral to expected investment project cash flows. Also, banks do not rely on 
market information when granting a loan; they require detailed studies before 
considering any loan application. The known five C's of lending (Character, Capacity, 
Collateral, Capital, and Credit) reveal the requirements of borrowing. They will be used 
as a guide to find the effect of banking on the determinants of capital structure. 
1- Character: the requirement that the borrower has the willingness to repay the 
loan, a sense of responsibility, and that this sense of responsibility 1s 
demonstrated. Past performance and established reputation are the means of 
proving such character. Consequently, firms need to follow certain policies to 
establish such character; dividend policy is an example of such policies. Thus, 
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firms need to lower dividends when they draw loans. This is explained further 
below. 
2- Capacity: the borrower's ability to demonstrate the ability to repay loans. This 
involves the financial well-being and stability of the sources of income to be used 
to repay loaned funds. Sales, future prospects of the firm and existing capital are 
some of its determinants. Thus, one expects the capacity to borrow to be 
positively correlated with sales and firm growth when the source of borrowing is 
bank based. 
3- Collateral: provides incentive for the borrower to repay the loan and a means of 
at least partial recovery if the borrower defaults. Fixed assets are a source of such 
collateral; this is the reason why tangible assets are expected to show higher 
significance in bank-based than in market-based borrowing. 
4- Capital: provides a cushion for repayment in the event of the member's having a 
financial setback. It also confirms that the borrower manages his/her financial 
affairs adequately and within his income. High profitability and low dividend 
yield are factors that positively affect the firm's capital and capacity to borrow. 
Thus, profitability and dividend yields are expected to show higher levels of 
significance. 
5- Credit: a long business relationship between banks and the borrowing firm help 
establish credibility. Also, the firm's past ability to meet obligations and its 
ability to minimize internal problems like agency and bankruptcy costs help 
expand the firm's credit. This factor enhances the significance of agency and 
financial distress factors as determinants of capital structure. 
In summary, high market-to-book ratios and intangible assets may be seen as a 
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sign of reputation. Expected sales are a form of collateral, especially in non-tax, non-
interest countries where banks purchase part of the project's cash inflows (sales) and use 
tangible assets as collateral, more so in buy-and-sell and in capital-lease arrangements. 
These variables are expected to be significantly positive. As far as banks are concerned, 
commitments to paying dividends hurt their chances of getting paid back, especially 
when the laws are weak. Knowing that Arab firms suffer from low competitive 
advantage (Abdelkareem 1998), the existence of high fixed operating costs means that 
there is a good chance that firms will not be able to generate enough EBIT to pay interest 
and/or debt principal; dividends and operating leverage are expected to demonstrate 
negative significance. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that since banks are allowed to underwrite 
corporate securities (as is the case in the Arab world) and to own equity in industrial 
companies, the barriers to lending are expected to have a milder effect in bank-based 
economies. Antoniou, et al. (2002) argue that in a bank-based economy (applies to Arab 
economies) banks (as lenders) are frequently represented in the supervisory board of the 
borrowing companies and work closely with their managements. Thus the lenders are 
likely to be fully aware of the quality of the investment opportunities. This minimizes 
information asymmetry and lowers the cost of borrowing. Therefore, the relationship 
between debt and market-to-book ratio is not expected to be negative. Nor is it expected 
to be significant. They also argue that since collateral is more relevant in traditional bank 
lending than in borrowing from capital markets, the importance of tangible assets is 
more prominent and is expected to have a positive and highly significant relationship 
with debt. Finally, they expect the volatility of earnings to have low or no significance 
because of the close relationship between banks and the borrowing firms. 
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4.3.4 The Effects of the Arab Legal Systems 
The legal systems in the Arab world suffer from either weak old laws or from the 
weak enforcement of these laws or both (Abu Bakr 2002). Hence, these weaknesses hurt 
the firm's ability to raise debt and make debt an expensive source to finance 
investments. Furthermore, banks' and investors' requirements become more stringent 
and restrictive when loaning money to firms in such environments. For that reason, bank 
loan requirements (collateral, reputation ... etc.) are emphasized and expected to come 
out positive and significant in their relationship with the firm's level ofleverage. On the 
other hand, these restrictions will make dividends come out significantly negative. 
These legal drawbacks force firms to use less debt and use more equity because, when 
combined with the personal tax disadvantage of debt, equity comes out cheaper than 
debt. The effect of these drawbacks on the determinants will be negative and should 
diminish their significance; the absence of law causes chaos and diminishes the 
significance of any organized trends. La Porta, et al. (2000), in an argument that supports 
this hypothesis, show that in weak law countries (Arab countries are no exception) firms 
pay dividends to build reputation to be able to market future equity issues not because of 
the strength of shareholders. This means that dividends are paid for future external 
equity (not debt) financing, which implies a negative relationship between debt and 
dividends due to the negative relationship between debt and external equity financing. 
4.3.5 The Effects of the Tax System in the Arab World 
It is the opinion of this dissertation that taxes are the most potent and decisive 
factor of all. This factor is expected to be the one that helps this dissertation gain a great 
deal of significance. As has been demonstrated, the Arab world is divided into tax and 
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no-tax countries. Taxes are one of the main forces (besides avoiding dilution of 
ownership and the low liability of using other people's money, etc.) that drive the use of 
debt. Since interest is deductible from taxable income and dividends are not, it is to the 
firm's advantage to use debt financing rather than equity. The use of debt is not of great 
advantage in the Arab world for the following reasons: 
1- Arab tax laws do not have loss carry backs. 
2- The data shows that Arab firms report low profitability if not loss. 
3- Arab firms they pay very low MTR if any at all. 
4- NDTS either does not exist (in non-tax countries) or is very low because not 
enough profits are reported to use NDTS. 
For these reasons, MTR does not enable firms to benefit from the tax break of 
interest. However, corporate greed and other benefits of debt will drive towards the use 
of debt even if the tax benefit is small. Accordingly, MTR is expected to be positive 
with small magnitude. 
Furthermore, because of the low earnings, NDTS is not expected to be of great 
value in Arab countries; hence, it cannot be perceived as a substitute for debt as in 
Givoly, et al. (1992) and Graham (1996). However, since Arab economies are bank 
based, lending banks will perceive NDTS as a sign of collateral which gives the 
borrowing firm more borrowing capacity. This is consistence with Bradley, et al. 
(1984). Accordingly, NDTS is expected to have a positive relationship with debt in tax 
Arab countries and to be ofno significance in non-tax Arab countries. 
4.3.6 The Effects of Corporate Governance 
Arab corporations are owned by governments, rich families, institutions (which 
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are owned by the very same rich families) and small individual investors. Because of the 
concentrated ownership, and because the owners are usually the managers, one can 
conclude that managerial agency conflict is at its minimum. Also, since most debt is 
bank loans, which are known to be stringent, and also to avoid being denied future loan 
grants, managers have to work in harmony with their debt holders. As a conclusion, 
agency conflict proxies ( capital expenditure, market-to-book ratio and variability of 
returns) are not expected to exhibit the traditional negative relationship with debt in the 
Arab world. This expectation is in part due to concentration of ownership. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) argue that ownership concentration reduces agency costs and gives the 
owner manager the incentive to avoid activities that increase financial distress. Thus the 
significance of agency cost and financial distress are not expected to be significant. 
Antoniou, et al. (2002) show that closely held firms pay lower dividends, which implies 
that dividend yield, albeit negative, will be of small magnitude and of low significance. 
They also argue that the owners of firms avoid issuing shares to avoid diluting their 
ownership; and to lower the risk of financial distress, they avoid issuing debt. This 
implies that profitability will exhibit a stronger negative relationship with debt and a 
higher level of significance. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the hypothesized effects of the Arab country traditions and 
institutional factors on the suggested determinants of capital structure. 
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
Thus far we have set the stage to develop the hypotheses of this dissertation. The 
measures and determinants of capital structure have been introduced and the effects of 
the institutional factors and country traditions have been analyzed and predicted. 
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the institutional factors and country traditions have been analyzed and predicted. 
To test the applicability of capital structure theory in Arab counties, this 
dissertation will use the determinants that have been suggested by theory and were tested 
repeatedly by scholars in both developed and developing countries as we have seen 
earlier. The empirical tests will seek to determine whether Arab firms are following in 
the footsteps of western economies in their financing behavior. Differences in country 
traditions and institutional factors are expected to have some power in explaining 
differences in aggregate capital structure. Furthermore, cross-sectional differences 
between firms in a country can be examined by studying the cross-sectional correlations 
of debt with certain factors that determine the level of debt. Empirical evidence has 
shown that these correlations hold in the US, developed, and developing countries. This 
dissertation will examine if these relations hold in the Arab counties and try to explain 
any cross-country variation in these correlations (tax vs. non-tax countries). If a factor 
does not work as predicted by theory in a country, it must be either because the 
theoretical rationale for that factor is spurious, because the data is problematic, or 
because institutional differences alter how the factor works. 
The purpose of this section is to develop the hypotheses to answer the following 
. questions: Are the models of capital structure valid in environments that are different 
from those in Western economies? Do country traditions and institutional factors affect 
the determinants of capital structure? Do country traditions and institutional factors 
affect the order of financing sources? Is the theory of capital structure robust or is it 
incomprehensive and needing to be amended to be more robust? 
The importance of these questions stems from the fact that different country 
traditions and institutional factors can play a significant role in shaping capital structure 
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decisions. The analysis above has shown that these factors have a great effect on the 
level of leverage and on the direction, magnitudes, and levels of significance of the 
determinants of capital structure. 
4.4.1 Failure of the Previous Literature to Address Issue of Interest 
Previous literature has not addressed the two main issues in this dissertation, 
specifically the effects of the absence of taxes and the existence of different country 
traditions and institutional factors on the determinants of capital structure. From a 
theoretical perspective MM (1958) showed that capital structure is irrelevant to the value 
of the firm in the absence of taxes. No empirical work was conducted to test this theory. 
Moreover, no theory was developed and no empirical work was done to test the 
determinants of capital structure in the absence of corporate and personal taxes. This 
dissertation will be the first empirical work to carry out such testing. 
Some of the theories have institutional factors and their effects imbedded in 
them. For example, the agency models of capital structure analyze the effects of the 
concentration of ownership on capital structure choice. However, no theory has 
explicitly tackled the effects of the various institutional factors on the firm's leverage. 
There have been several attempts to empirically test the effects of these factors; these 
studies are divided into two main groups and each suffers from obvious drawbacks that 
make it insufficient to tackle this issue. 
One group of studies has tested the determinants of capital structure and 
financing behavior in developed countries (e.g. Mayer 1990; Rajan and Zingales 1995; 
and Antoniou, et al. 2002). These studies suffer a major drawback; they study countries 
that have similar institutional factors. Consequently, no variations in the determinants of 
117 
capital structure were detected among these countries. They also aggregated the 
institutional factors into bank-based and market-based economies with the exception of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) who studied the institutional factors in detail. For the same 
reasons (homogeneity in the institutional factors) this group did not find any differences 
in the aggregate financing behavior in the countries of its sample. 
A second group has tested the determinants of capital structure in developing 
countries (e.g. Singh and Hamid 1992; Singh 1995; and Booth, et al. 2001); however, 
these studies suffer from two main problems. First, they all used the same sample, 
which narrows them down to one study. Second, the first two used descriptive statistics 
to explain why developing countries follow a reverse pecking order and used 
correlations to find the relationship between leverage and a few determinants (shown in 
the empirical review in chapter II) without the use of regression analysis and estimation 
techniques. The Booth, et al. (2001) study aggregated the institutional factors in the 
country of origin and macroeconomic variables. They ran levels of debt against tax rate 
(not MTR), business risk, size, profitability, and market-to-book ratio without 
hypothesizing on the effect of the institutional factors on these variables. They used 
their empirical results to reach two aggregate conclusions: that the country of origin 
explains up to 43% of the variation in total debt, and that finance theory is portable 
across countries due to the similarities in the sign and level of significance of the 
suggested determinants. In summary, no explicit institutional factors were analyzed. 
This dissertation attempts to overcome these drawbacks and offer a 
comprehensive test of capital structure theory. This work will be the first to consider 
these institutional factors to test the robustness of capital structure theory. 
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4.4.2 Hypotheses of Interest 
In section 4.4.1, it was pointed out that most of the literature overlooked the 
environment in which the firm operates (country traditions and institutional factors). 
Additionally, an argument is made that some countries do not have a tax system in 
place. Therefore, the incentives to use debt are different from those suggested by the tax 
models of capital structure theory. Finally, the financing behavior (the choice of 
financing sources) depends on some macro and micro economic factors that have not 
been analyzed in theory and in most of the empirical work. Therefore, it is the goal of 
this dissertation to design empirical research that will address the criticism of the 
previous literature and test capital structure theory in environments different from those 
of its birth. 
The theoretical review in Chapter II showed that firms do trade off the costs of 
debt with its benefits in their efforts to minimize costs and increase value. It has also 
been demonstrated by empirical tests that there are determinants of the optimal level of 
leverage. The deductibility of interest is the main driving force behind the use of 
leverage. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for the use of debt. Asymmetry of 
information enables the firm to extract wealth from using leverage by paying less return 
for what is riskier than what lenders know. Another motive is keeping ownership from 
the dilution that accompanies the issuance of more equity as a source of funds. A third 
reason is the use of leverage to mitigate the agency costs by committing the firm to fixed 
financial costs that discourage management from consuming perquisites. The sum of 
these incentives can be modeled in a linear multi-factor model that will show the 
magnitudes and directions of these effects. In summary this model will include the 
determinants of the level of leverage that maximizes the benefits of the use of such 
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financing resources for a given level of costs or minimizes such costs for a given level of 
desired benefits. In economics, this approach is called comparative statics or the static 
tradeoff between the benefits of debt and its costs. 
Similar firms that operate in homogeneous environments are expected to behave 
in a similar manner. In other words, firms that face similar opportunities and constraints 
should pursue activities and make decisions in the same fashion. This has an intuitive 
appeal to it since firms' objective functions are similar: to increase the net worth of the 
firm. For these reasons it is only logical to expect firms that have similar environments 
to have similar levels of leverage and similar determinants of leverage. 
Since Arab countries have a similar economic system to that of Western 
countries, Arab firms' financing characteristics should be similar to those of Western 
firms. The way to test this hypothesis is to examine whether the determinants of capital 
structure in Arab firms exhibit similar behavior to those of firms in Western economies. 
Theory is a universal finding of facts that should be valid within a given set of 
assumptions. Accordingly, it is logical to assume that Arab firms would conform to the 
same theory that Western firms follow, if these firms operate within the assumptions of 
that theory. Since the theory mainly emphasizes the tax implication of the use of debt 
(i.e. the tax deductibility of interest) and since Arab economies have similar tax laws, 
Arab firms' financing behavior is expected to be similar to that of Western economies. 
Two constraints limit this hypothetical situation: first, the fact that some of the 
Arab countries do not have taxes, and second, Arab countries' institutional factors are 
different from those in Western economies. These two constraints account for some 
differences in the directions and levels of significance of the suggested determinants of 
capital structure. Booth, et al. (2001) concluded their study by finding that although 
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finance theory is applicable across countries, more in-depth analysis is needed to 
understand the impact of institutional factors on capital structure choices. It is the 
purpose of this dissertation to do so. Subsequently, the following hypotheses will be 
tested for Arab countries, which have a unique set of institutional factors. 
4.4.2.1 Tax Hypotheses: 
The first set of hypotheses is designed to test the tax models of capital structure 
theory. In MM's (1958) perfect world (no taxes, no agency costs, no informational 
asymmetry etc.) capital structure is irrelevant on the basis of the "no pain no gain" 
argument. With no DTS and no COFD, leverage is irrelevant. In MM (1963), they show 
that if there is no pain and there is a gain from debt (DTS but no COFD) then the optimal 
level ofleverage is 100%. Reality is different; there is a benefit from debt (DTS) when 
there is a tax system, and there are disadvantages to debt (COFD). Consequently, the 
optimal level ofleverage for a firm is one that equates its marginal benefits with its 
costs. This is the main premise of the tax model of capital structure theory. 
The Arab world provides us with a rare opportunity to test this theory. It is the 
only collection of countries with homogeneous characteristics in many respects, with the 
exception that some of the countries do not have taxes. This is similar to an ideal 
hypothetical situation where some of the US companies pay taxes while others do not. 
Such a situation will give us a clean-cut answer to whether taxes do affect the level of 
firms' leverage. If firms in the tax Arab countries use more debt than those in the non-
tax Arab countries, then taxes do affect the choice of capital structure and we will have 
found rare and clear evidence that support the tax model of capital structure. Since the 
tax laws in the Arab world are similar to those described in the tax models of capital 
121 
structure, then one would expect to find supporting evidence for this theory in the Arab 
world. This leads us to the first testable hypothesis of this dissertation. 
H 1: Firms in Arab countries with a corporate tax regime are expected to have higher 
leverage than those in countries with no corporate taxes. 
Knowing that the firms in the sample operate in a different environment from 
the environment of the theory, it is safe to assume that the hypothesized positive 
differential in the use of debts between the two groups of countries may be due to other 
factors that the theory failed to consider. To test the robustness of the tax model in 
different environments, we will follow in the footsteps of Graham (1996) when he tested 
the relationship between the firm's level ofleverage and its marginal tax rate. The test 
states that if the tax model of capital structure theory is valid, the level of leverage 
should be positively correlated with the firm's MTR because MTR measures the size of 
the tax break the firm will get when it pays interest. 
Considering tax Arab countries only, the level of leverage should increase when 
the firm's MTR increases. MTR is used here because it gives the net tax advantage of 
debt, as will be shown in the methodology in chapter V. The theoretical expectation is to 
find supporting evidence regardless of the environment in which the sample firms 
operate. However, it is the claim ofthis dissertation that due to the special environment 
in which the sample firms operate, theory may not behave as expected. However, if it 
does behave as expected then it is robust and portable across different environments. The 
Arab tax environment is different from the one considered in the theory. Following are 
some arguments to support this claim. First, Arab tax laws do not have loss carry backs. 
This is one of the components of MTR; hence, the Arab tax countries' MTR is different 
from the MTR in Western economies. Second, the data shows that Arab firms report low 
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profitability, if not loss. Accordingly, MTR is usually very small if at all it exists. 
Nevertheless, MTR is expected to be significant and positive when MTR is positive 
because firms will always try to capitalize on any savings opportunity. Finally, 
Antoniou, et al. (2002) argue that if tax rates are very high, then a good portion of the 
profits will be consumed by taxes, which leads firms to require external financing. 
Therefore, debt is expected to have a negative relationship with MTR. Since taxes are 
low or absent due to low or no profits, then MTR is -again expected to have a positive 
correlation with debt in Arab economies. This leads us to the second testable hypothesis 
of this dissertation: 
H2: In Arab countries operating in a corporate tax regime, leverage is expected to 
be positively related to the marginal tax rate. 
Testing the tax models of capital structure will not be complete without 
considering the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) non-debt tax shield. In brief, NPTS is 
considered either as a substitute for DTS (see DeAngelo and Masulis 1980, Graham 
1996 and Hovakimian, et al. 2001) or as a proxy for collateral (Bradley, et al. 1984, and 
Bathala, et al. 1994). If the tax model of capital structure is valid and robust in different 
environments, as the theory expects, Arab firms that operate in a tax regime will have a 
positive (sign of collateral argument) or negative (a substitution effect) NDTS 
coefficient. On the other hand, in non-tax Arab countries, NDTS will be positive (sign of 
collateral argument) or not significant since no taxes exist. 
As mentioned in the analysis above, since most Arab firms do not report profits, 
one would expect low or no NDTS effect. Also, since Arab countries tax laws do not 
have loss carry backs, NDTS is expected to be smaller than that for a comparable firm in 
Western economies. These two facts show that NDTS has smaller effect on the firm's 
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level of debt than expected by theory. Moreover, since there are not enough profits for 
the firm to benefit greatly from debt interest, NDTS is not expected to be a substitute for 
DTS. At best it is expected to be a sign of collateral for lending banks. For non-tax Arab 
countries, NDTS cannot be considered a substitute for debt because debt has no tax 
considerations in these countries. Also, since NDTS does not offer any tax break in these 
countries, it is not expected to be of significance. However, the collateral argument lends 
NDTS some significance in non-tax Arab countries. This leads to the third hypothesis of 
this dissertation: 
H3: In Arab countries, non-debt tax shields are expected to be positively related to 
leverage. 
Another factor affecting capital structure is taxes on individuals. Personal taxes 
were neglected by MM ( 1963); hence they found that the gain from leverage is the entire 
DTS. Miller (1977) contends that the gain from leverage at the corporate tax level is 
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fully exhausted at the personal tax level. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) find a path in 
between. Nonetheless, from the discussion of this topic in chapter two, we find that 
higher personal tax rates lower the gain from leverage. Accordingly, tax models of 
capital structure theory expect leverage to be inversely related to personal taxes. 
Due to the absence of taxes, non-tax Arab countries will not be considered in 
testing the personal tax model of capital structure. Tax Arab countries either do not tax 
dividends and capital gains or tax them at a lower level than interest income. Interest 
income is taxed at the investor's tax bracket. This tax preference to dividend income 
over interest income at the personal level should lower the level of leverage. The ability 
to test this prediction depends on the observability of cross-sectional differences in the 
personal tax advantage of the equity income relative to the debt income of the marginal 
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investor. Givoly, et al. (1992) state that the tax rates of the marginal investor in the 
firm's securities are not observable; hence, a proxy for the personal tax advantage of 
equity income relative to debt income exists in the form of the firm's dividend yield. 
Accordingly, leverage is expected to be negatively correlated with dividend yield. 
However, due to the Arab institutional factors, the above argument is not valid in the 
Arab world. Previous sections have shown that dividends carry other effects, some of 
these effects are: 
1- La Porta, et al. (2000) show that in weak law countries ( e.g. the Arab world), 
firms commit to paying higher dividends to attract investors to buy future stock 
issues. Consequently, since the target is future equity not debt financing, debt is 
expected to have an inverse relationship with dividend yield. 
2- Since dividends are a commitment to equity holders, debt holders (banks) will 
view the firm unfavorably for future loans. 
3- Equity is preferred over debt in the Arab culture; hence, more dividends lead to 
higher stock prices which in tum induce firms to capitalize on these prices by 
using equity financing, not debt financing. 
4- The data show that Arab firms generate low profits; consequently, paying 
dividends consumes the better part of the firm's earnings. In fact Table 3.6 shows 
that some Arab firms' internal financing is negative, which means that, on 
average, these firms use some of the proceeds from external financing sources to 
pay dividends. Table 3.6 shows equity financing to be an Arab firm's first 
choice; therefore, higher dividends means higher equity not debt financing. 
The fourth argument shows that Arab firms follow a reverse pecking order. For 
this reason, Arab firms raise equity, not debt, to finance excess dividends. If POH were 
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followed, then the ultimate capital structure would be the one that trades off the personal 
tax disadvantage of debt with the amount of harmful information the firm would 
dissipate by using external funding. 
These effects are valid in both tax and non-tax Arab countries. Consequently, 
dividends, as they were used in Givoly, et al. (1992), will not serve our purposes here. 
An interaction between MTR and dividend payout ratio will isolate the effect of personal 
taxes on capital structure. Since MTR is zero for non-tax Arab countries, this interaction 
term is zero for these countries. Furthermore, the interaction will capture the effect of 
personal taxes in tax Arab countries only. Since investors prefer more wealth to less, we 
expect them to prefer dividend income (which is always taxed at a lower rate than 
interest income) to interest income unless they are compensated for this tax differential. 
However, this compensation makes debt financing more expensive to firms, and unless 
the corporate tax break overcomes this cost, firms will prefer equity financing to debt 
financing. Accordingly, debt is expected to have a negative relationship with this 
interaction term. Hence, we can develop the fourth hypothesis of this dissertation: 
H4: In accordance with the personal tax model of capital structure, in tax Arab 
countries, firms with high dividend yields will use less leverage than firms with low 
dividend yields. Or, leverage is expected to have an inverse relationship with 
personal taxes in tax Arab countries. 
There are other reasons for the use of debt beside the tax advantage. As 
mentioned earlier, the benefits of avoiding dilution of ownership (Leland and Pyle 
1977), information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf 1984) and mitigating managerial 
agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976) are some of the sufficient reasons for using 
debt. These benefits can be traded off with the costs of debt (e.g. financial distress) to 
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arrive at the optimal level of leverage. The following subsection develops the hypotheses 
to test the non-tax models of capital structure. 
4.4.2.2 Agency Hypotheses: 
As discussed in the literature review, agency is a two-legged conflict; a 
manager/shareholder leg and a shareholder/debt holder leg. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
demonstrate that conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because managers 
hold less than 100% of the residual claim. Consequently, managers do not capture the 
entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, nor do they bear 100% of the costs 
of self-indulging activities. Hence, managers have the incentive to invest less effort in 
managing the firm's resources and may be able to transfer firm resources to their own 
personal benefit, e.g., by consuming more perquisites. Increasing the fraction of the 
firm's equity owned by the manager can mitigate such behavior. Leverage is another 
agency mitigating mechanism. Therefore, these two mechanisms are substitutes for one 
another (i.e. they are inversely related). Additionally, Bathala, et al. (1994) concluded 
that increased managerial ownership aligns interests of managers with the interests 
outside shareholders and reduces the role of debt as an agency mitigating mechanism. 
Friend and Lang (1988) demonstrated that since managers decrease their diversification 
when they invest in the firm they manage, they are hesitant to take on more debt. Thus 
leverage is expected to be negatively related to the manager's ownership in the firm. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, managerial agency conflict in the Arab world is 
minimal; 95% of Arab firms are family owned and managed. Furthermore, the firms that 
are owned by the government or private institutions are managed by the families that 
own the majority of the remaining shares, (Swabini 2001). These facts minimize the 
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Manager/shareholder agency costs, which means they will offset a trivial amount of the 
benefits of debt. This calls for an elevated use of debt level. To avoid loosening their 
grip on the firm, the managers (i.e. the majority owners in the firm) want to avoid 
diluting their ownership by issuing equity. Thus, they will issue new debt instead. 
Additionally, government ownership in the firm is a sign of security to lenders. 
Antoniou, et al. (2002) suggest that if the government is an owner in firms, these firms 
are expected to have a higher level of debt because of the assurance effect the 
government has on the lenders and because of the lower probability of agency conflicts. 
This leads us to believe that: 
H5: Due to the high concentration of ownership, agency conflict in Arab firms is 
minimal and the managers' control is substantial. Consequently, family and 
government ownership are positive determinants of capital structure. 
Myers (1977) shows that highly leveraged firms are more likely to pass up 
profitable investment opportunities; therefore, firms with higher future growth should 
use less debt and more equity finance to mitigate this agency problem. He uses the 
market-to-debt ratio of equity as a proxy for growth. One can conclude that theory 
suggests an inverse relationship between leverage and growth. Rajan (1992) shows that 
the use of bank debt reduces agency costs, which will lower the significance of growth 
(i.e. market-to-book ratio) in determining the use of leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
show that the presence of large shareholders on the board reduces agency costs and if 
these large shareholders are banks, they may force the firm to increase its debt by 
borrowing from the owning bank. Antoniou, et al. (2002) suggest that in bank-based 
economies, the long term relationship between the firm and the lending bank, combined 
with the strong cooperation between the two in determining the firm's need for funds 
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And how to satisfy it, mitigates the agency conflict of debt and increases the borrowing 
capacity of the firm. 
· It has been established that the providers of debt capital in the Arab world are 
usually banks that have either strong ties with the owning family and a long-term 
relationship with the firm or are major partners in the firm. Banks also serve as members 
of the board and as advising committees to the firms that borrow from them. Banks grant 
loans to companies after these companies show the profitability of their capital budgets 
through professional feasibility studies. Finally, the family that owns the firm sometimes 
owns the lending bank. This minimizes the shareholder/debt holder agency costs. 
Consequently, agency conflicts are negligible and there is no need for the market of 
corporate control to exist for the purpose of taming such conflict, well, such markets do 
not exist in the Arab world. Hence, growth is not expected to cause agency conflicts. 
Since Arab markets consider only the book values of the firm's assets when 
pricing its shares, then the market-to-book ratio is expected to be of no significance. 
However, the fact that Arab bond markets are limited weakens this argument. Also, the 
fact that the market-to-book ratio is low exaggerates the debt-to-market ratios. This in 
turn leads us to believe that the market-to-book ratio will not be significant in the debt-
to-market ratio regressions. Nevertheless, because banks are informed lenders to the 
firm, any growth is expected to be well founded. Such growth means that the firm has 
good future prospects and is worthy to receive a loan. Expecting a positive relationship 
between leverage and growth, leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
H6: In both tax and non-tax Arab countries, the level of debt is expected to be positively 
related with growth. 
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4.4.2.3 Country of Origin Hypothesis: 
The above hypotheses lead to one of the most significant hypothesis of this 
dissertation. Thus far, we have established that institutional factors and country 
traditions are expected to affect the use of debt. Table 3.6. shows that 16% of the Arab 
countries firm financing is in the form of debt, compared to 25% in developed countries 
and 22% in developing countries. These differences are due to differences in institutional 
factors pertaining to each of these three categories. Therefore, the region of origin is 
expected to have a significant role in determining the level of debt a firm may use after 
controlling for all other determinants. 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) touched on the subject but never 
tested it. They claim that due to certain country-specific factors, it is expected that each 
country have a role in determining the level of debt. Booth, et al. (2001) test the null 
hypothesis that everything is institutional and that we can explain capital structure 
differences by knowing the nationality of a company. They found that up to 43 % of the 
variation in the firm's debt is explained by the country of origin. The expectations of the 
above hypotheses are that country factors play an important role in financing decisions. 
Hence, thes.e factors are expected to change the significance of the theory suggested 
determinants of capital structure. These country factors are also expected to introduce 
new determinants of capital structure, determinants that theory did not tackle. Since it is 
not the purpose of this dissertation to identify such determinants, they will be summed 
up in one factor - a country dummy variable. Identifying such determinants is left for 
future research. 
H7: The country of origin is a significant determinant of capital structure in the Arab 
world. 
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4.4.2.4 Information Asymmetry Hypothesis: 
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that if management has favorable inside 
information, and it acts in the best interest of the existing shareholders, then management 
will refuse to issue shares even ifit means passing up positive NPV projects, because the 
loss in existing stock price ( due to the issuance of new stock) might outweigh the 
project's NPV. On the other hand, passing up positive NPV projects is contrary to 
wealth maximization. To get out of this trap, issuing debt is in order if internal resources 
are not sufficient to take on the positive NPV investment projects because they both 
( external debt and internal funds) are not information-revealing sources of funds and 
involve no undervaluation due to any information asymmetry. Accordingly, investments 
are to be financed in that order. This conclusion is called the pecking order hypothesis 
(POH) of Myers and Majluf. Myers (1984) compares POH with STO and finds that 
neither is able to strongly explain capital structure policies, and a mix of both may lead 
to the optimal capital structure decisions. 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that developing countries follow 
a reverse pecking order in their financing patterns. They explain this finding by the 
institutional factors of these countries. Arab countries have similar characteristics to 
those of developing countries and are also expected to follow a reverse pecking order. 
Following are some of the reasons that support this claim: 
1- The trend of continuous increase of stock prices in Arab stock markets 
throughout the nineties yielded high capital gains to investors and lowered the 
cost of equity finance to firms. 
2- Arab governments sponsor stock markets and encourage investing in these 
markets in many ways. Arab governments use these markets to trade stocks they 
131 
own and utilize them to privatize their companies as part of their International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(WBRD) policies to reconstruct their respective economies. Moreover, Arab 
governments give tax incentives to equity trading and have solid securities and 
security markets laws to encourage foreign investors. 
3- Capital gains and dividend income are both tax free at the personal level while 
interest income is taxed at the personal tax bracket level of the investors. 
4- As mentioned earlier, debt is not attractive in the Arab culture due to religious 
beliefs and cultural doctrines such as the mandate to help others, family and 
institutional ownership and the exchange of favors combined with the tendency 
to use informal borrowing to hide the volume of work for taxes and secrecy in 
conducting business. 
5- The weakness of the bond primary market and the absence of a debt secondary 
market combined with the restrictive bank loan provisions. 
6- It is mandatory to service debt by the obligation to meet timely payment 
compared to the relatively more lenient dividend policies and obligations. 
Moreover, the data shows that Arab firms report losses or highly volatile and 
relatively low earnings, which is not a healthy prerequisite for the use of debt, 
which requires stable stream of cash inflows. 
These reasons made equity financing more attractive than debt financing. Finally 
the fact that Arab firms do not generate enough profits to retain and use to finance 
growth, combined with the fact that they need funds to pay dividends to build the 
reputation to be able to market future equity issues (the Laporta, et al. (2000) argument) 
makes it hard for these firms to use retained earnings to finance growth. This leads to the 
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last hypothesis of this dissertation. 
H8: Due to country traditions and institutional factors, Arab firms follow a 
reverse pecking order in their financing patterns. 
Finding evidence to support these hypotheses means that capital structure 
theory is neither robust nor portable across different environments. This concludes the 
development of the hypotheses.' The next chapter contains a detailed explanation of the 
data and methodology used in testing these hypotheses. 
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Table 4.1 






Long-term debt divided by the market and book value of 
equity respectively 
Short-term debt divided by the market and book value of 
equity respectively 




Summary of the Determinants of Capital Structure and their Interpretations. 
Explanatory Variable Interpretation Indication 
MTR Marginal tax rate Effect of corporate taxes 
Substitute to tax shield 
Character 
NDTS Non debt tax shield 










Interaction between the Effect of personal taxes 
marginal tax rate and the 
payout ratio 
Market-to-book ratio Growth, financial distress 
Government ownership Ownership structure 
Family ownership Ownership structure/ Agency 
Tangible assets divided by Collateral 
total assets 
Intangible assets divided by Collateral, cost of financial 
total assets distress, reputation 
Natural log of sales Size 
Standard deviation of earnings Volatility, business risk 
Earnings before interest and Profitability 
taxes divided by total assets 
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Table 4.3 
A Summary of the Effects of the Arab Country Traditions and Institutional Factors on the 
Suggested Determinants of the Various Ratios of Debt 






































DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5 .1 Introduction 
The empirical literature so far has failed to produce a detailed test of the effects of 
institutional factors on both the level of leverage and its determinants. It also failed to test 
the determinants of capital structure in economies that do not have a tax system in place. 
As a result, some testable hypotheses for an empirical analysis of these issues were 
developed in Chapter IV. These testable hypotheses are: 
Hl: Arab countries with a corporate tax regime are expected to have higher leverage 
than countries with no corporate taxes. 
H2: In Arab countries operating in a corporate tax regime, leverage is expected to be 
positively related to the marginal tax rate. 
H3: In Arab countries, non-debt tax shields are expected to be positively related to 
leverage. 
H4: In accordance with the personal tax model of capital structure, in tax Arab 
countries, firms with high dividend yields will use less leverage than firms with low 
dividend yields. Or, leverage is expected to have an inverse relationship to personal 
taxes in tax Arab countries. 
H5: Due to the high concentration of ownership, agency conflict in Arab firms is 
minimal and the managers' control is substantial. Consequently, family and 
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government ownership are positive determinants of capital structure. 
H6: In both tax and non-tax Arab countries, the level of debt is expected to be 
positively related to growth. 
H7: The country of origin is a significant determinant of capital structure in the Arab 
world. 
HS: Due to country traditions and institutional factors, Arab firms follow a reverse 
pecking order in their financing patterns. 
These hypotheses are tested using two different methodologies. The first 
methodology examines the hypotheses through cross-sectional analysis to find the ability 
of the suggested explanatory variables to verify or negate these hypotheses. The second 
methodology uses descriptive statistics and summaries to test the eighth hypothesis. The 
reason for not using the traditional testing techniques in hypothesis 8 is due to short time 
series data that is not likely to produce any reliable results. Shyam Sunder and Myers 
(1999) state that when the test is based on 3-5 years, the coefficients do not exhibit 
significant even when they are significant. Consequently, the eighth hypothesis will be 
tested using descriptive statistics. 
The variables used in this dissertation are divided into two main sets. The first set 
is six dependent variables to test the robustness of the results and to probe the different 
determinants for the different kinds of debt. The second set is the group of independent 
variables that were selected according to theory and other empirical research in an effort 
to isolate the effect of institutional factors on the level of leverage used by the firm. 
This has been a broad overview of the data and methodology to be used to 
perform the empirical analysis in this dissertation. The following two sections look at the 
data and the methodology in more detail. 
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5.2 Data 
Collecting the data was one of the most challenging and time-consuming parts of 
this dissertation. There exists no set of ready data (as those of Compustat and CRSP) in 
the Arab world. No form of data bank is available and the Compustat Global Vantage had 
from O to 5 companies in each Arab country slot; moreover these companies were mostly 
empty of any usable data. The data is unique in many respects. First, it is the first 
database in the Arab world to include the data needed to test capital structure and other 
financial issues. Second, it is the first data set from economies that do not have a tax 
system in place. Third, though from less developed countries, it is reliable because of the 
reliability of its sources and because of the enforcement by the respective governments of 
international accounting standards for reporting and for tax purposes wherever tax apply. 
Finally, analyzing each financial statement individually, each observation was recorded, 
calculated, and filtered with great care and according to the required standards of data 
recording and filtering. 
5.2.1 The Sample 
The sample includes cross-section time series data on the various measures of 
leverage and the suggested determinants of capital structure for the Arab countries 
included in these tests. The criteria for inclusion in the sample is that the country must be 
an Arab country (a member of the Arab league, to insure homogeneity in country 
traditions and institutional factors), have a stock market, and be included in more than 
one data source to be able to verify the available data and to lengthen the time series as 
much as possible. For example, as we will see shortly, some data sources cover different 
periods of time (Shuaa' Capital covers 1996-1999 and Alshabaca covers 1998 -2001). 
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The criteria for including a company in the data set are that it have the needed financial 
statements to extract the required observations, that it be non-financial, domestic 
(because foreign companies have special tax arrangements and have different sources of 
financing that will have a vast effect on their capital structure decisions) and listed in its 
country's stock market. This will bias our data towards the largest companies. However, 
this bias is more beneficial than· harmful, because large companies are the ones that are 
expected to have reliable financial statements. 
The data were extracted from financial statements found at Arab markets 
websites; some were requested from companies themselves, and sometimes they were 
obtained through personal contacts, especially in Palestine and Jordan. However, most of 
the financial statements were acquired from private and state-sponsored sources like 
Shuaa' Capital, a private financial institution in UAE (a securities firm - brokerage and 
investment banking) and Alshabaca (an information-based institution that was established 
by the Union of Arab Stock Exchanges to provide information and services to the 
financial market community within the Arab world), the Arab Monetary Fund, and the 
International Finance corporation and other published works. 
Since these statements did not follow a consistent format, ratios and other pieces 
of information had to be calculated and extracted through a time consuming and 
repetitive process, one at the time, and with great care. 
The data covers the period 1996-2001 for the listed non-financial companies in 
the stock markets of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and UAE. A total of 12 countries, 461 companies 
and 1115 company years (1 to 5 years per firm) worth of data were collected. Table 5.1 
gives a description of the sample. Information for companies that did not have complete 
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records was acquired from different sources. In other words, some data were collected 
from more than one source. Whenever there was a match on the other pieces of data from . 
the various sources, the new (missing) pieces of data were accepted. Summary statistics 
of the variables used in the models are presented in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 shows the pair-
wise correlation matrix for all the variables. The correlation matrix does not suggest any 
serious concerns for multicollinearity problems. This is further confirmed in the results 
Tables of Chapter VI; the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is always less than five. 
5.2.2 Accounting Standards and Data Reliability 
Currently all Arab countries have societies that certify accountants. These 
societies are members of both the International Federation of Account~ts (IF AC) and the 
Arab Society of Certified Accountants (ASCA) (ASCA electronic report 2002). The 
accounting profession in the Arab world has two main characteristics. First, it is 
improving continuously due to governmental support and the evolution of stock markets. 
The ASCA has been developing the accounting profession continuously since 1984 
through establishing the society's certifying institute; translating, explaining, and 
publishing the international accounting standards; and through periodical consortiums 
and journal publications on the accounting profession and how to improve it in the Arab 
world. The ASCA' s credibility stems from its works and its support from the Arab 
public, and educational and private institutions. Additionally, the ASCA is a member of 
the following international societies and committees: International Federations of 
Accountants (IF AC), International Accountants Standards Committee (IASC), 
International Audit Practices Committee (IAPC), and the UN Intergovernmental Working 
Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR). Also, 
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the ASCA is represented on the Board of the UN Economic and Social Council. 
The second characteristic of the accounting profession in the Arab world is its 
compatibility with the economic and legal developments in the Arab world. The number 
of certified accountants who use the international and local standards is continually 
increasing. The countries' governments are producing new legislation and amending 
existing laws according to developments in the accounting standards especially in the 
areas of securities, companies, stock markets, and tax laws. These laws require businesses 
to keep accounting books and records, release periodic financial statements and have 
these statements audited by licensed auditors and according to the international and local 
accounting standards (Price Waterhouse 1990, and the ASCA 2002). 
The fact that the accounting profession in the Arab world follows the international 
accounting standards and that businesses are legally required to use accounting standards 
for reporting and auditing give the data the needed reliability to form the basis for this 
dissertation's empirical tests. 
5.2.3 Data problems 
The fact that the data is a cross-section time series prompted testing for both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test confirmed 
heteroscedasticity, which is blamed on the cross-sectional nature of the data. Most of the 
explanatory variables were significant when regressing the variance of the error term on 
these variables. The data was tested for autocorrelation by using the Durbin-Watson test. 
The results show that the disturbances are autocorrelated. Since these two problems cause 
the loss of the efficiency property of OLS and invalidates statistical tests, OLS (though 
unbiased) is ruled out as an estimation technique. 
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The dependent variable -the level of debt- suffers from the limited dependent variable 
problem; since it can take only certain values, it is truncated. Truncated outcomes are 
those where observations are not sampled at the lower range of values (left truncation), 
upper range of values (right truncation), or both. In other words, the truncated outcome 
results when respondents at the lower or upper range of values are excluded from the 
sample. The dependent variable is defined as the book value of debt (total, long or short 
term) divided by the value (book or market) of equity. This definition limits the values 
that the dependent variable can take to be between zero and 1 and in extreme cases this 
value can be a little larger than 1. These limitations occur because the level of debt can 
never be negative (unless the firm is 100% equity financed and invests some of its profits 
in long-term loans to others, which conflicts with the profit maximization theory of the 
firm's objective) and because a firm's use of debt is limited to a certain percentage of its 
equity since the last is used as a collateral on the debt or as a measure for debt capacity. 
Greene (1997) shows that, by construction, the error term of the truncated model has a 
zero mean but it is heteroscedastic. Thus, using OLS will cause the loss of both efficiency 
and unbiasdness. Truncated dependent variables can be analyzed with truncated 
regression. One goal of the truncated regression model (Maximum likelihood) is to 
estimate the relation between a predictor, i.e. the determinants of capital structure, and 
the truncated outcome, i.e. total book-debt-ratio, in the population where the dependent 
variable can take only certain values. Truncated regression will produce slopes and 
standard errors that are less biased and more efficient than those obtained from OLS 
regression. In other words, it increases the level of significance of the estimated means. 
Data was collected from 12 countries that use similar accounting and recording 
standards. However, these countries have minor differences in the layout of the financial 
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statements. These differences may also exist within a given country. Some of the 
financial statements group variables in one entry; an example would be aggregating all 
financial expenses in one category. Such aggregation causes gaps in the data. Despite the 
fact that in general, aggregating companies were dropped from the data set, in very 
narrow cases, some were still included because of the scarcity of data in some countries. 
As mentioned earlier, multiple sources were used to collect the data and what was 
missing in one source was found in another so that the number of missing observations 
was minimal. Considering the fact that missing observations in the dependent variable 
may cause a loss of unbiasdness and efficiency, all the companies that had missing 
dependent variables were dropped from the sample. Missing observations in the 
independent variables were noted by a dot. Again, since the number of cases is minimal, 
no averages were filled and the regressions were left to have lower degrees of freedom 
rather than tampering with the data in any way. The missing observations minimally 
lower the efficiency of the estimates and decrease their level of significance. However, 
since these missing observations are not numerous, no major loss of efficiency is 
expected and the significance should not be affected considerably, i.e. it is not expected 
to cause a significant factor to become insignificant. Moreover a range of significance 
levels will be given in the results chapter; these levels range from 1 to 10%. 
As is the case in most data, some outliers were encountered. Outliers were detected by 
ordering data points in an ascending/descending manner, visually and by using the SAS 
MEANS and UNIVARIATE procedures. Most of the variables are normalized by factors 
like equity value or total assets. Usually, these ratios do not exceed unity; however, due 
to data problems, in very limited cases, they do. To avoid this problem the upper and 
lower 1 % of the data were dropped. 
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The fact that the data is a cross-section time series creates random effects. The 
sample firms have 1-6 time series observations for each variable; this causes the random 
effects problem. Consequently, OLS will not be sufficient to capture these random 
effects. 
Finally, despite all these limitations, accounting data are often the only basis that 
outside investors have to makejudgments about comparative corporate performance. 
Though at a fairly high level of development, accounting standards in Arab countries are 
expected to continue to improve over time due to the opening of their markets for foreign 
investors as part of the IMF and WBRD-imposed economic restructurings. 
5.3 Methodology 
The methodology is designed to test the hypotheses using techniques that take the 
above stated data problems into account. The following is a discussion of variable 
calculations, data testing methods, models, and estimation techniques. 
5.3.1 Variable calculations 
As stated earlier the dependent variables use the book value of the firm's debt 
because most debts are in the form oflong-term bank loans and a secondary bond market 
does not exist. The debt book values are both short and long term and are divided by both 
the market and book values of equity. As shown in Table 4.2, the majority of the 
explanatory variables are simple financial ratios. However, a few of them require 
additional explanation. Depending on the availability of data, two methods are used to 
calculate the NDTS. The first is adopted from Graham (1996) and is given in equation 
5.1: 
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NDTS = NOL+ DEP + ITC 
TA 
where 
NDTS = non-debt tax shield, 
NOL = net operating losses, 
DEP = depreciation, 
ITC = investment tax credit, and 
TA = total assets. 
Investment tax credit is calculated as in equation 4.2: 
ITC= CAP EXP* (1- STR) 
where 
ITC = investment tax credit, 
CAP EXP = capital expenditure, and 
STR = statutory tax rate. 
The second method is adopted from Titman and Wessels (1988): 
NDTS = EBIT - INTEXP- TAX 
STR 
where 
EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes, 
INT EXP = interest expense, and 




The marginal tax rate is calculated as in Graham ( 1996) and Antoniou, et al. 
(2002). It is equal to the taxes paid on an additional dollar of income after accounting for 
non-interest tax deductions like investment tax credit, depreciation, and losses. MTR 
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equals the actual taxes paid divided by EBIT. 
5.3.2 Data Tests 
Using the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity, the data was found 
to be heteroscedastic. The Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation showed that the 
disturbances are autocorrelated: The SAS Variance Inflation Factor was used to test for 
multicollinearity; none of the determinants exceeded 5, which means that no severe 
multicollinearity is found. Country dummy variables have VIF that are greater than five 
which is an indication of the similarities among Arab countries. Other data problems 
where deduced from the nature of the variables being tested. SAS PROC MEANS and 
PROC UNN ARIATE confirmed these problems. 
5.3.3 Estimation Techniques 
To deal with these problems and to retain all the desired regression properties, 
four estimation techniques were used. The first estimation technique uses OLS 
implemented through SAS PROC REG. The second uses maximum likelihood 
implemented through SAS PROC MIXED with fixed and random effects, and 
heteroscidasticity treatment. The third TOBIT truncated data model implemented through 
PROC LIFEREG. The fourth uses maximum likelihood with heteroscidastic TOBIT and 
random effects implemented through SAS PROC NLMIXED. The heteroscidastic 
TOBIT results are presented and analyzed because TOBIT is the one model that copes 
with the problems inherent in the data sample. The OLS results are presented and 
compared to those of the TOBIT model. The results are found to be robust regardless of 
the estimation technique; the directions and levels of significant are comparable across 
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the estimation methods. 
The results are compared with the predicted signs in Table 4.3 to test the effects 
of country traditions and institutional factors on both the aggregate level of leverage and 
on its determinants. The results are also compared to those for W estem economies to test 
the applicability of the theory of capital structure in the Arab world, an environment that 
is different from that in which the theory was developed. 
5.3.4 Methodology to Test the Hypotheses 
On the basis of the static tradeoff model in deciding the firm's capital structure, 
linear regressions that include the theory and empirical determinants of capital structure 
are the appropriate methodology. Cross-section time series models are used; the 
dependent variable is the debt ratio and the theory and empirically suggested 
determinants of capital structure are the explanatory variables. Accordingly, the 
empirical model is expressed as: 
Di, r = /30 + I, ftX, j, r + &;, r 
v;, I i=l 
(5.4) 
Six equations, one for each of the six dependent variables, are proposed. The 
suggested determinants of capital structure are the regressors in these equations. 
Collateral, size, business risk, and profitability are the control variables. The remaining 
regressors test the effect of taxes, agency costs, informational asymmetry, and the 
country of origin, which capture the independent influence of the institutional factors and 
country traditions. The regressors' magnitudes, directions and levels of significance are 
compared with those in the empirical tests in Western economies. This regression 
equation is estimated by using the estimation techniques mentioned earlier. 
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5.3.4.1 Empirical Models to Test the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis suggests that firms operating in tax Arab countries will utilize 
more debt than those in non-tax Arab countries. Using DTAX -a dummy variable that 
has a value of one if the company is in a tax country and zero otherwise- captures the 
effect of taxes on corporate capital structure. The specification of the regression equation 
is given in equation 5.5. 
D 
- =/Jo+ f]1DTAX + f]2MTR + f]3NDTS + f]4 MB + p5DJVNJ + 
E 
f]6MTRDIV + [J7FAM + /Jg GOV+ [J9TANTA + p10INTANTA + 
fJ11LNS + [J12SDOE + [J13EBITTA + c 
(5.5) 
DIE represents the six debt ratios presented in Table 4.1; the independent 
variables and the expected signs of their coefficients are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
The model does not control for the country of origin effect to avoid the trap of perfect 
multicollinearity that occurs when the country dummy variables are added to the tax 
dummy variable. 
The second hypothesis tests the effect of the marginal tax rate on the level of 
leverage in Arab countries. This regression controls for the effect of the country of origin 
on the level of debt. The empirical equation to test this hypothesis is given in equation 
5.6. 
D 
- =/Jo+ fl1MTR + flzNDTS + /J3MTRDIV + /J4DIVNI + /J5MB+ 
E 
[J6GOV + [J7FAM + [J8DBAHRAIN + f]9DJORDAN + [J10EGYPT+ 
[J11DKUWAIT + p12DLEBANON + [J13DMOROCCO+ f]14DOMAN + 
f]15DPALESTINE + f]16DQATAR + f]17DSAUDJ + p18DUAE + 
p19TANTA + [J20JNTANTA + p21LNS + [J22SDOE + p23EBITTA + & 
(5.6) 
Equation 5.6 is similar to equation 5.5; however, the tax dummy variable is 
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Omitted and the country dummy variables are added. To avoid the perfect 
multicollinearity trap, Tunisia is the excluded country dummy variable. 
The third hypothesis suggests that the NDTS is positive in the Arab countries with 
no or low significance. The NDTS variable in equation 5.6 captures the effect ofNDTS 
on the firm's level ofleverage. To separate the effect ofNDTS in tax countries from that 
in non-tax countries a DNT AX variable is introduced. DNT AX is non-tax dummy 
variable that has a value of one if the country is a non-tax Arab country and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, DT AX is a dummy variable equal o 1 if the Arab country is a tax 
country and O otherwise. NDTS*DTAX interaction term captures the effect ofNDTS in 
tax Arab countries while the NDTS*NDTAX captures the effect ofNDTS in non-tax 
Arab countries. The regression model to test this difference appears in equation 5.7. To 
avoid the perfect multicollinearity trap, Tunisia is the excluded country dummy variable. 
D 
- =/Jo+ j31NDTS * DTAX + [J2NDTS * NDTAX + [J3MTR + j34DJVNI + 
E 
j35MB + J36GOV + j37FAM + J38DBAHRAIN + j39DJORDAN + 
j310EGYPT + p11 DKUWAIT + j312DLEBANON + j313DMOROCCO + 
J314DOMAN + p15 DPALESTINE + p16DQATAR + j317 DSAUDI + 
p18nUAE + J319TANTA + j320 JNTANTA + p21 LNS + j322SDOE + 
p23 EBITTA + & 
(5.7) 
The interaction between the marginal tax rate and dividend payout ratio is used to capture 
the effect of personal taxes on capital structure in the countries that levy taxes. This 
methodology will enable us to isolate the other effects of dividends on capital structure, 
especially in non-tax Arab countries. The effects of dividends can be seen in any of the 
above models. However, we use equation 5.6 to discuss the fourth hypothesis by relating 
personal tax effects (proxied by dividend yield) to leverage. 
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Figure 5 .1 illustrates the difference between the effects of dividends in both tax 
and non-tax Arab countries and the effects of personal taxes on capital structure. The last 
column shows the effect of personal taxes on leverage. The effect is negative in tax Arab 
countries because the personal taxes on interest income are always higher than that on 
dividend income. On the other hand, it has no effect in non-tax Arab countries because 
there are no personal taxes. We test the personal tax effect by interacting dividend yield 
with MTR. The coefficient of this interaction should be negative. 
Hypothesis 5 points out that concentration of ownership calls for increased use 
of debt. The proxies for this concentration are family and government ownership. This 
Hypothesis will be tested while controlling for the variables of the other hypotheses. The 
regression model in equation 5.6 will serve this purpose. 
Hypothesis 6 tests the effect of the agency conflict between debt holders and 
shareholders on the firm's leverage. Growth is the proxy for this conflict. Again, equation 
5.6 will be utilized to test this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7 claims that controlling for all the variables that theory and 
empirical works suggest that they would have an effect on capital structure is not enough. 
There are other factors that are specific to these countries that play a role in determining 
the firm's level ofleverage. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to identify these 
factors; hence, they are summed in one factor, a country dummy variable. Equation 5.6 
is used to test the significance of these dummy variables when controlling for other 
variables. Equation 5.8 presents the model to test the significance and explanatory power 
of these factors by themselves. 
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D 
- =/Jo+ {J1DBAHRAIN + {J2DJORDAN + {J3EGYPT+ {J4DKUWAIT + 
E 
{J5DLEBANON + {J6DMOROCCO + {J7DOMAN + {J8DPALESTINE + (5.8) 
[J9DQATAR + [J10DSAUDI + {]11 DUAE + & 
Hypothesis 8 suggests that Arab firms follow an exact reverse pecking order. Country 
traditions and institutional factors are assumed to be the motive for such financing 
behavior as explained in chapters three and four. The methodology to test this hypothesis 
uses simple summary statistics of financing patterns as shown in Table 3.6. Again for the 
reasons mentioned earlier (the availability of a short data set of 3-6 years and Shyam 
Sunder and Myers (1999) statement that when 3 - 5 year time series data are used, the 
coefficients are not significant) regressions to test the POH will not be used and will be 
left for further research. 
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Table 5.1 
Country-Company Data Summary 
Country Company-years Companies in Total listed Financial 
in sample sample comp am es comp am es 
Jordan 401 141 161 78 
Bahrain 56 19 41 21 
Tunis 13 9 44 35 
Saudi 176 62 75 14 
Oman 69 52 131 44 
Kuwait 133 65 86 32 
Lebanon 12 5 13 7 
Egypt 158 69 1071 372 
Morocco 3 1 55 14 
Palestine 12 6 23 10 
Qatar 19 9 22 12 
UAE 63 23 35 17 
Total 115 461 1757 656 
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Table 5.2 
Summary Statistics for Consolidated Arab Countries Data 
Variable N B STDV MIN MAX 
Independent Variables 
GOV 564 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.75 
FAM 570 0.44 0.21 0.00 0.66 
TANTA 1094 0.41 0.26 0.00 0.96 
INTANTA 1109 0.04 0.14 0.00 1.01 
NDTS 1059 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.92 
LNS 1073 16.70 2.17 6.90 22.75 
SDOE 624 0.44 0.43 0.00 1.98 
EBITTA 1053 0.10 0.14 0.00 1.76 
MTR 1105 0.07 0.20 0.00 1.67 
MB 1087 1.40 1.42 0.00 11.67 
DIVNI 1065 0.28 0.42 0.00 2.82 
MTRDIV 1011 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.56 
Dbahrain 1115 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Degypt 1115 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Djordan 1115 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Dkuwait 1115 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Dlebanon 1115 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Dmorocco 1115 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Doman 1115 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Dpalestine 1115 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Dqatar 1115 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Dsaudi 1115 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Dtunisia 1115 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
DUAE 1115 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Dtax 1115 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Dependent Variables 
TDBV 1078 0.32 0.56 0.00 2.98 
TDMV 1059 0.30 0.53 0.00 2.81 
LTDBV 1081 0.23 0.45 0.00 2.64 
LTDMV 1067 0.22 0.43 0.00 2.79 
STDBV 1103 0.12 0.34 0.00 2.82 
STDMV 1085 0.11 0.34 0.00 2.78 
154 
Table 5.3 
Correlation Matrix for Variables used in Models 
GOV FAM TANT A INT ANT A NDTS LNS SDOE EBITTA MTR MB DIVNI MTRDIV 
GOV 1.00 
FAM -0.74 1.00 
TANT A -0.07 0.03 1.00 
INTANTA 0.14 -0.15 -0.22 1.00 
NDTS -0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.09 1.00 
LNS 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 -0.06 1.00 
SDOE -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.17 1.00 
EBITTA -0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.38 0.13 -0.19 1.00 
>-' MTR 0.00 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.01 1.00 
VI 
VI MB 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.18 -0.09 0.18 0.06 1.00 
DIVNI -0.04 0.00 -0.16 -0.06 0.00 0.24 -0.15 0.10 0.00 0.17 1.00 
MTRDIV -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.08 0.15 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.48 1.00 
TDBV -0.05 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.24 -0.01 -0.03 0.53 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
TDMV 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.15 -0.03 -0.11 0.36 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 
LTDBV -0.03 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.01 -0.04 0.36 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 
LTDMV -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.21 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11 
STDBV -0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.41 0.09 0.01 0.00 
STDMV -0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.34 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
Dbahrain 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.09 
Degypt 0.11 -0.12 0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.13 
Djordan -0.04 0.02 -0.12 0.15 -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.13 
Dkuwait -0.04 0.07 0.12 -0.12 0.08 -0.27 0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 
Dlebanon -0.07 0.08 0.15 -0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 
Dmorocco -0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.08 
Doman 0.06 -0.05 0.12 -0.08 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.13 













FAM TANT A INT ANT A 
0.01 0.01 -0.04 
0.05 -0.09 0.02 
0.07 -0.11 -0.03 
0.00 -0.11 -0.05 
Table 5.3 (Continued) 
NDTS LNS SDOE EBITTA MTR MB DIVNI MTRDIV 
0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 
0.19 0.19 -0.14 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.25 
0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.19 
-0.11 0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
Table 5.3 (Continued) 
TDBV TDMV LTDBV LTDMV STDBV STDMV Dbahrain Degypt Djordan Dkuwait Dlebanon Dmorocco 
TDBV 1.00 
TDMV 0.68 1.00 
LTDBV 0.84 0.57 1.00 
LTDMV 0.61 0.80 0.69 1.00 
STDBV 0.56 0.44 0.20 0.18 1.00 
STDMV 0.46 0.57 0.17 0.21 0.71 1.00 
Dbahrain -0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 1.00 
Degypt -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 1.00 
Djordan 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 -0.31 1.00 
Dkuwait -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.15 -0.28 1.00 
Dlebanon -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 1.00 
Dmorocco -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 ...... 
-0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 Vl Doman 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.06 
-...J 
Dpalestine -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Dqatar -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
Dsaudi 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.23 -0.10 -0.18 -0.33 -0.16 -0.05 -0.02 
Dtunisia 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 

















Table 5.3 (Continued) 
DEalestine Dqatar Dsaudi Dtunisia DUAE 
1.00 
-0.01 1.00 
-0.05 -0.06 1.00 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.05 1.00 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 1.00 
Figure 5.1 


























*** The positive and higher personal taxes on interest income makes debt a less desired 
form of investment for individual investors which in turn have a negative effect on the. 





Capital structure theory was developed in W estem economies that have a unique 
environment (i.e. country traditions and institutional factors). The focus of this 
dissertation is to test capital structure theory in the business environment of the Arab 
world. The hypotheses developed in Chapter IV are tested using the data and 
methodology in Chapter V. The results are presented in two sections. The first presents 
the results for the hypotheses in four subsections: tax models, agency models, country of 
origin model, and information asymmetry (POH) model, respectively. The second section 
presents the results for the control variables: collateral, volatility, size and profitability. 
The implications of the theory and empirical evidence are mentioned briefly in this 
chapter, because they have been presented and analyzed extensively in previous chapters. 
The findings are compared with those in developed and developing countries to arrive at 
a conclusion on whether capital structure theory holds in the Arab environment. 
6.2 Hypothesis test results 
The results for the tests of the hypotheses are discussed in the following 
subsections. The first presents and analyzes the results for the tests of the tax models of 
capital structure theory (hypotheses one to four). The second subsection presents the 
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results for agency models (hypotheses five and six). The third presents the results for the 
undefined country-specific factors role in determining the firm's capital structure 
(hypothesis seven). Finally, the fourth subsection presents the results for testing the role 
of information asymmetry and the Pecking Order Hypothesis in the Arab world 
(hypothesis eight). 
6.2.1 Results for the Tax Hypotheses: 
Tax theory of capital structure is presented in four different models; each 
examines an aspect of this theory. The first model tests the general effect of taxes on 
leverage (hypothesis 1). The second deals with the role of the marginal tax rate as a proxy 
for tax subsidy on interest paid (hypothesis 2). The third focuses on the role of non-debt 
tax shields, whether they are a substitute for debt tax shields or a proxy for greater debt 
capacity (hypothesis 3). The fourth model examines the negative effect of personal taxes 
on debt financing (hypothesis 4). 
6.2.1.1 The Results for the First Hypothesis Test: 
The tax models of capital structure theory claim that due to the tax subsidy, debt 
should correlate positively with tax rate. However, there has been no means to test 
whether taxes have a direct role in determining the level ofleverage. Givoly, et al. (1992) 
used the event of the 1986 TRA to test the effect of taxes on leverage and found evidence 
for the tax model of capital structure theory. Two scenarios can provide a stronger and 
more direct test of the effect of taxes on leverage. One is to test the change of the level of 
leverage surrounding the enactment and enforcement of a tax system in a country that did 
not have a tax system. An example would be the case of the country of Oman, which had 
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no corporate or personal taxes until 1994. An increase in the general level of firms' 
leverage would lend support to the theory. Another scenario involves testing the 
difference in leverage between firms operating in countries that have a tax system in 
place and those in countries that do not have a tax system. This is, of course, after 
controlling for all the other foreseeable factors that affect the firm's level ofleverage. 
This dissertation provides the first opportunity, to do a direct test of the tax hypothesis. 
This test is possible because some of the sample countries have a tax system and others 
do not. 
The first hypothesis test investigates whether the benefits of taxes encourage 
firms to use more leverage. A dummy variable is included in equation 5.5 that has a value 
of 1 for tax countries and zero otherwise. The results in Table 6.1 show that, when 
controlling for the other factors that may affect leverage, the tax dummy variable is 
positive and significant. This means that tax Arab countries use more debt than non-tax 
Arab countries. This result conforms to the predictions of the hypothesis and lends solid 
support to the tax theory, as we know it. 
6.2.1.2 The Results for the Second Hypothesis Test: 
Due to the tax deductibility of interest, firms with a higher marginal tax rate are 
expected to use more debt. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between the 
firm's effective tax rate and its level of leverage. This relationship is demonstrated in 
Arab countries that have a tax system and is of no consequence in non-tax Arab 
countries. However, Arab specificities such as no loss carry forward, firms reporting very 
low profits, low MTR, and high NDTS, reduce the observable effect of MTR on the level 
of leverage. As a result, the MTR coefficient is expected to be of low magnitude, 
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positive, and significant. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, MTR is found to be significantly positive in Table 
6.1. Table 6.2 shows similar results even when controlling for the country of origin. This 
means that the lowest MTR does significantly give firms the incentive to use debt. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) in the US and Antoniou, et al. (2002) in Europe did 
not find any significant effect of corporate tax on financial decisions. Givoly, et al. 
(1992) found the effective tax rate to be positive and significant. Graham (1996) found 
that firms with higher MTR issue more debt than those with small MTR. Booth, et al. 
(2001) use the statutory tax rate instead of MTR and found it to have a positive 
relationship with the firm's level ofleverage in developing countries. The conclusion 
here is that the MTR model is universal; debt has a positive relationship with MTR when 
MTR is greater than zero, regardless of the country of origin. 
6.2.1.3 The Results for the Third Hypothesis Test: 
NDTS is positive and significant for the pooled Arab country data. This result is 
robust because the positive significance is persistent whether the model uses a tax 
dummy variable or country dummies. The-positive relationship between debt and NDTS 
may be due to the fact that NDTS is a proxy for collateral, as noted in several Western 
based studies. The substitute relationship between DTS and NDTS is weak in the Arab 
world. The fact that reported EBIT is low in tax Arab countries and because some Arab 
countries do not have a tax system, NDTS is not expected to provide a tangible tax break 
that may substitute for the tax break from paying debt interest. This last argument 
suggests that there may be a substitute relationship in tax Arab countries if EBIT is high 
and that NDTS is always a sign of collateral in non-tax Arab countries. Table 6.3 reports 
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the results for NDTS in tax Arab countries through the interaction between the tax 
dummy and the NDTS and the results in non-tax Arab countries through the interaction 
between the non-tax country dummy and NDTS. For tax Arab countries, the relationship 
is negative and insignificant. This lends weak support to the substitutability effect of 
NDTS. On the other hand, the results for non-tax Arab countries show a positive and 
significant relationship, lending support to the collateral aspect ofNDTS. In sum, the 
substitutability relationship is supported if a tax system exists and the MTR is high, and 
the collateral implication is supported if there are no taxes or the MTR is low. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that NDTS is a substitute for debt tax shield. 
Titman & Wessels (1988), Givoly, et al. (1992), Graham (1996), and Hovakimian, et al. 
(2001) found support for the substitutability argument in the US. Bradley, et al. (1984), 
and Bathala, et al. (1994) found for the collateral implication ofNDTS. The results in the 
Arab world were consistent with both arguments; therefore, the tax model of capital 
structure theory is universal and robust regardless of the firm's country of origin. 
6.2.1.4 The Results for the Fourth Hypothesis: 
Two tests of the effect of personal taxes on the firm's level of leverage were 
encountered in the literature review of chapter two. The first test in Graham (1996) who 
proxied for personal taxes by taking the ratio of ( 1- the personal tax rate on interest 
income) to (1- the personal tax rate on equity income). He found that the relative taxation 
of debt and equity at the personal level does not seem to affect corporate debt policy. 
Since debt income is taxed at the investor's tax bracket in the Arab world, it is hard to 
calculate this ratio here. At this point, we have no means of verifying whether these 
findings are applicable in the Arab world. The second test in Givoly, et al. ( 1992) used 
164 
the dividend yield as a proxy for this effect. We believe that this variable is troublesome 
because it proxies for other institutional effects as well as personal taxes. For example, it 
was argued in chapter four that dividend yield is an indicator of the fact that Arab firms 
follow a reverse POH. Firms need to raise external capital to finance growth when 
dividend payout is high. Consequently, due to the reverse POH, Arab firms will most 
likely raise equity, not debt. The negative relationship between equity and debt financing 
explains the negative relationship between dividends and debt. Furthermore, La Porta, et 
al. (2000) argue that dividends are paid to attract future external equity financing, not 
debt financing, implying a negative relationship between debt and dividends. This 
negative relationship is further supported because of the negative relationship between 
debt and external equity financing. Finally, as far as the lending banks are concerned, 
paying dividends is a sign of commitment to equity holders, not to these lending banks. 
Hence, banks will try to include more protective covenants in their lending contracts. 
Such covenants will make debt less appealing to firms, which enforces the negative 
relationship between debt and dividend payout. On the other hand, debt holders consider 
paying dividends as an added risk since they mitigate the firm's ability to pay the 
required timely fixed interest. Debt holders will require a higher return as a compensation 
for bearing such risk. This in tum makes debt more expensive and less appealing to the 
firm, thus enhancing the negative relationship between the use of debt and dividend 
payout. 
To avoid these implications of dividend payout, an interaction term is introduced 
to the regressions to isolate the effect of personal taxes on the use of debt. This 
interaction term is the product of dividend yield and the marginal tax rate (refer to the 
previous chapter). Table 6.1 shows the results for personal taxes while controlling for tax 
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countries and other variables. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the results when controlling for 
country of origin as well as other variables. The results are robust in all of these tables; 
whether significant or not, personal taxes are always negative, meaning that due to the tax 
preference of dividend income over interest income in the Arab world, investors prefer 
equity over debt unless compensated for the higher interest tax burden. This makes debt 
more expensive to the firm than equity (at the personal tax level). This is also in 
accordance with Farrar and Selwyn (1967), Brennan (1970), Miller (1977), and 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) in that personal tax consumes at least a portion of the gain 
from leverage that accrued at the corporate level. This finding also lends further support 
to the portability of the tax model of capital structure theory across countries. 
The dividend yield variable itself gives mixed results. It is negative and 
significant for the total and long-term debt ratios while positive and significant for the 
short-term debt ratios. The results for the total and long-term debt ratio provide indirect 
support for the dividend clientele theory (Givoly, et al. 1992). The results also lend 
support to the La Porta, et al. (2000) argument that paying dividends in weak law 
countries is a sign of commitment to the shareholders, not to the debt holders. Moreover, 
it is consistent with the preference in Arab culture to equity returns. The negative relation 
can also be explained by the fact that banks (the primary source of debt in the Arab 
world) prefer firms that pay low dividends. Finally, the weaker protection to debt holders 
makes them require more stringent debt covenants, one of which is a control overpaying 
dividends. The results, on the other hand, contradict the POH argument that high payout 
leads to lower retained earnings and higher need for external finance. Since debt is the 
first choice of external finance (according to POH) then there is a positive relationship 
between dividends and leverage. This is especially untrue in the Arab world because 
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firms there follow a reverse POH as will be shown in the results of the eighth 
hypothesis of this dissertation. 
The results for short-term debt ratios are positive and significant. This can be 
explained by the fact that dividend-paying firms need immediate cash, especially when 
their profits are limited as is the case in most Arab firms. The best and fastest source for 
short-term cash is short-term bank loans. This is further supported by the fact that most 
Arab firms' debt is in the form of short-term bank loans (refer to Table 3.3). 
6.2.2 Results for the Agency Conflict Hypotheses Tests: 
The discussion in chapters three and four showed that agency costs in the Arab 
world are minimal. The following two subsections present results for the fifth and the 
sixth hypotheses. The fifth hypothesis tests the effect of the agency conflict between 
management and shareholders on the firm's level ofleverage. The sixth hypothesis tests 
the effects of the agency conflict between debt holders and shareholders on capital 
structure. 
6.2.2.1 Results for the Fifth Hypothesis Test: 
The fifth hypothesis implies that due to the concentration of ownership in Arab 
firms, agency conflict is minimal. This is due to the fact that the majority owners in Arab 
firms are families and/or the government. The fact that the majority of the firm's shares 
are owned by the family who manages the firm mitigates the shareholder/manager agency 
conflict. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), firms with high shareholder/manager 
agency conflict have the incentive to use debt as an agency-mitigating agent. 
Consequently, debt is positively correlated with agency conflict. Since agency conflict in 
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the Arab world is low, we expect firms to use less debt, ceteris paribus. In other words, 
we should expect a negative relationship between family ownership and debt. 
Furthermore, since managerial ownership is an agency-mitigating mechanism that can be 
used to substitute for the use of debt, ownership and debt are expected to be negatively 
related. Bathala, et al. (1994) found that the use of debt and managerial stock ownership 
are inversely related to institutional ownership in the firm. This implies that government 
ownership is negatively related to debt. Because of the greater monitoring on the part of 
the government, less debt is needed as an agency mitigating mechanism. Finally, Friend 
and Lang (1988) argue that since higher managerial ownership means less diversification 
for the manager (human capital and personal wealth are invested in the firm), managers 
are more risk averse and try to use less debt because it is riskier than equity. 
However, due to Arab world specific factors, these models are not expected to 
fare very well in Arab firms. Since owning and controlling the company is part of the 
owning family's honor, the family is expected to try to keep that honor. Issuing equity to 
finance growth means diluting ownership and losing control over the firm. Thus, family 
owned firms have the incentive not to use equity as a source of finance; such firms are 
expected to use more debt. On the other hand, as far as debt holders are concerned, 
government ownership provides assurance that the firm will not fail. This will add to the 
firm's debt capacity. The results in Table 6.1 show that coefficient of family ownership 
as a factor explaining leverage is positive and significant while government ownership is 
positive but not significant. The insignificance of the government ownership coefficient 
can be explained by the fact that governments are privatizing their companies and the 
government's assurances either no longer exist or are expected to seize to exist at some 
point in the future. These facts have more effect in Arab countries because most debt is in 
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the form of bank loans; banks are more informed than bondholders. Bond markets are a 
more fertile ground for emotions and emotional reactions than banks because they 
include smaller and less informed or uninformed investors. 
These results lead to the conclusion that the manager/shareholder agency model 
of capital structure has little explanatory value due to Arab specific factors. 
6.2.2.2 The Results for the Sixth Hypothesis Test: 
The sixth hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between debt and 
growth. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the low debt holder/shareholder agency 
conflict and to the fact that growth is a proxy for good future prospects of the firm. The 
results in Table 6.1 show a positive and significant relationship between debt-to-book 
value of equity ratios and growth and a negative and significant relationship between 
debt-to-market value of equity ratios and growth. These are the strongest results thus far, 
because the results are robust. The results exhibit the clearest and most direct effects of 
country factors on capital structure models. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show similar results when 
controlling for country of origin and other factors. 
The positive and significant coefficients of the market-to-book ratio in the debt-
to-book value of equity equations are due to the fact that most debt in the Arab world is 
in the form of bank loans. Banks have strong ties with borrowing firms because 
1- They have long-term relationships 
2- They are major partners 
3- They serve as members of the firms' boards 
4- Bank officials are on their advising committees 
5- They grant loans to these firms after they have shown the profitability of their 
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capital budgets through professional feasibility studies, and 
6- They are partially owned by these firms. 
Therefore, one expects debt agency costs to be negligible. Furthermore, there is no need 
for the market of corporate control to exist for the purpose of taming such conflict. 
Consequently, growth is not expected to cause any agency conflicts. On the contrary, 
growth may portend promising future for the firm, encouraging banks to provide them 
with loans. The results show just that. Also, higher market-to-book-ratios arise from 
higher expected future cash flows, implying higher debt capacity. Finally, firms with high 
market values relative to their book values have higher borrowing capacities and hence 
have higher debt levels relative to their book values {Titman and Wessels 1988) 
The negative relationship between the debt-to-market value of equity and market-
to-book ratio is also robust. This result is due to Arab factors, not the prediction in the 
theory that market-to-book ratio is a proxy for agency cost-of-debt. First, the increase in 
stock prices in the late nineties made the market value of equity higher than its book 
value (stocks are overvalued), which provided firms with the incentive to issue equity 
rather than debt. Second, the marginal borrowing power on a dollar of market value is 
less than that on a dollar of book value (Scott 1977). Third, high stock returns are 
associated with improved growth opportunities and thus, lower optimal leverage ratios 
(Hovakimian 2001). 
Unlike the tax model of capital structure, the results above show that when 
including institutional factors, the agency model of capital structure fails. Thus, the 
agency framework is not portable across countries, and a revision of its models is 
warranted. 
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6.2.3 Results for the Seventh Hypothesis Test: 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth, et al. (2001), and Antoniou, et al. (2002) 
among a handful of studies that try to tackle some of the institutional factors that create 
differences in capital structure for similar firms in different countries. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) considered factors like taxes, bankruptcy laws, banking systems, capital markets, 
and ownership and control. They concluded that despite these institutional differences, 
firm leverage is more similar across G-7 countries than previously thought. Furthermore, 
they mention that the differences among these countries are not explained by the 
institutional differences stated earlier. A deeper examination of the data from these 
countries suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still 
largely unresolved. To do so, deeper understanding of the institutional differences, more 
data, and more accurate proxies are necessary. Antoniou, et al. (2002) state that their 
results are generally consistent with the results reported in the literature. The instances of 
differences in the results can be attributed to differences in corporate governance, tax 
system, role of capital markets, and investor protection in these countries. Booth, et al. 
(2001) state that their results generally support conventional capital structure models. 
However, the regression coefficients differ across countries both in size and sign. There 
are several possible reasons, some statistical (different number of per-country 
observations), and some financial (different institutional factors); taxation, legal 
structures, and bankruptcy laws were among the principal causes. 
There are three methods to test the effect of these institutional factors; the first is 
to test the null hypothesis that everything is institutional and that we can explain capital 
structure differences by knowing the nationality of a company. The second is to test the 
null hypothesis that the differences are due to both company-specific factors and country 
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of origin. In this model the significance of the country of origin should decline. The third 
method includes country-specific factors and company-specific factors along with the 
country of origin. In this model, controlling for country and company specific factors 
should render the country of origin factor insignificant. If the differences between 
countries persist after controlling for all the company, industry, and country factors, then 
the Miller (1977) neutral mutations theory applies. The proxies for the country factors are 
not available for this dissertation because we either do not know the proxy for the factor 
or the data is not available. For example, the effect of the banking system can be proxied 
by the number of banks, the number of branches, the bank ownership in the firm or all of 
them. Since there is no theoretical model to help us determine what proxy to use, it is a 
mere empirical task to find the appropriate proxies and models to test these effects. This 
topic will be left for future research. 
This seventh hypothesis is tested by using an all-country dummy model and then 
a model that includes both country dummies and the other factors considered in this 
dissertation. Table 6.4 gives the results of the regression model using country dummies as 
the sole independent variables. Tunisia is excluded to avoid the perfect mutlicollinearity 
trap and because Tunisia has the highest debt level of all Arab countries. The rationale 
behind this choice is to compare the debt levels of Arab countries with those in Western 
economies that have an even higher debt level than that of Tunisia. For example, if a 
certain Arab country has a significantly lower debt level than that of Tunisia, then that 
country, necessarily, has a lower debt level than those in Western economies. The 
coefficients should be interpreted as the significance of debt ratio differences relative to 
Tunisia, or Western countries for that matter. Significant or not, the Arab countries' debt 
ratios are lower than that of Tunisia. Saudi Arabia is the only country that has a positive 
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coefficient in three of the six debt ratios. This is perhaps due to the advanced interest 
banking system and the relative weakness oftlie taboo against interest in Saudi Arabia. 
These coefficients are, however, not significant and very small, meaning that they are still 
lower than those in Western countries. A formal debt comparison with W estem countries 
is left for further research. 
The Table 6.4 coefficient estimates (TOBIT) agree with those of table 6.4a (OLS) 
in sign and level of significance. Both the total debt ratio and the short-term debt ratios' 
(book and market value of equity) models are significant at the 1 % level, and the long-
term debt ratio models are significant at the 5 and 10% levels (book and market value of 
equity, respectively). For the total debt ratios, 4% of the variability in debt ratios is 
explained by the nationality of the company. For the debt ratios, the explanatory power is 
2%. For the short-term debt ratios, it is 6 and 7% for the book and market values of 
equity respectively. According to Booth, et al. (2001 ), there are three explanations for 
these results: 
1- The different debt ratios reflect differences in industrial structure and other 
company-specific factors, such as business risk. This explanation is not valid. 
Once these factors are included in the models, the significance of the country 
dummies (separately or collectively) does not decline; rather, it increases in some 
cases. See Tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
2- There are systematic differences in the effect of factors such as those discussed in 
chapter three. The coefficients on the independent variables are different because 
of the country effects attributable to missing variables. These differences are not 
profound because of the similarities between the Arab countries' factors. Such 
differences will be more profound once these countries are compared with a 
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W estem country. Empirical evidence supports this claim; a regression was run to 
compare US companies with the Arab companies in the sample, and the results 
(not presented here) showed larger magnitudes and higher levels of significance 
than those reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.4a. 
3- The results could be spurious either because of inadequate data (this reasoning is 
not applicable here due to the reliability of the data set) or because of Miller's 
(1977) neutral mutation theory. The purpose of this dissertation is to prove that 
country factors are at work and they are as shown in the arguments and results of 
this research. 
The results for the second approach in testing the effects of the country of origin 
on capital structure are reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Testing country dummies while 
controlling for the other determinants shows that the significance of the country dummies 
increased. An F test on the country dummies in these models shows that they are 
significant at the 1 % level for all debt ratios. The R2 increases from 17-27% (for all debt 
ratios, see Table 6.la) without the country dummies to 20-40% (for all debt ratios, see 
Tables 6.2a and 6.3a) with the country dummies. The regression coefficients are 
comparable in all regressions. This is true for both the country dummies and for the firm 
specific factors. 
In sum, there are country specific factors that affect the firm's level ofleverage. 
These factors are not known to us and are significant. The F values, t values, and the R 
squares lend support to this hypothesis. The country dummies that were used to proxy for 
these factors should come out insignificant if we include exact proxies for these factors. 
The general conclusion here is that capital structure theory that was developed in Western 
economies is only partially effective in other environments such as the Arab world. The 
174 
theory needs to be revised to include such factors. 
6.2.4 Results for the Eighth Hypothesis Test: 
The eighth hypothesis states that due to regional and country-specific factors, 
Arab country firms follow a reverse POH. The intention of this hypothesis is to test the 
informational asymmetry model of capital structure theory. 
Summary statistics are used to test this hypothesis due to the short time series, as 
discussed earlier. The POH suggests that firms' financing behavior depends on the 
asymmetry of information between the firm's insiders and the market. The choice of 
financing source is determined according to this informational asymmetry. To avoid any 
decline in the stock price, management refuses to issue new shares unless the marginal 
benefits from the use of the funds is at least equal to the marginal costs ( decline in stock 
price) due to the issuance of the new shares. To avoid the decline in stock prices 
altogether, issuing debt is in order if internal resources are not sufficient. This conclusion 
is the Pecking Order Hypothesis. 
The results in Table 6.5 show that Arab firms follow a reverse POH. Of the firm's 
funds, 15% come from retained earnings, 16% from debt and 70% from the issuance of 
new equity. This is the opposite of the POH, which is followed closely by Western 
countries. For example, 86% of the US firms' funds come from retained earnings while 
only 1 % comes from new equity and the remaining 13% from debt. The results show that 
Arab firms behave exactly in an opposite manner to the one implied by the POH. As 
discussed earlier, the reasons for such behavior stem from factors specific to the Arab 
world. Examples are the continuous increase of stock prices in Arab stock markets 
throughout the nineties, the sponsorship of Arab governments for their respective 
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markets, the preferred tax treatment of equity income over interest income, the 
prohibition of interest, the weakness or absence of a bond market, and the fact that Arab 
firms generate low profits that may not be enough to meet the timely obligations of debt. 
These reasons make equity financing more attractive than debt financing. Finally 
the fact that Arab firms do not generate enough profits to retain and use to finance 
growth, combined with the fact that they need funds to pay dividends to build the 
reputation to be able to market future equity issues (the La Porta, et al. 2000 argument) 
makes it Difficult for these firms to use retained earnings to finance growth. As a result, 
the optimal financing order for these firms is the exact reverse of the POH. 
6.3 Control Variables Results 
In this section, the results for the control variables are presented. No formal 
hypotheses are made in regards to these variables. However, expectations of the effects of 
the Arab factors on their magnitudes, directions, and levels of significance were 
developed in chapter four. The following subsections document the results for each of 
these variables. Their magnitudes, signs, and levels of significance are discussed in light 
of the Arab factors. Moreover, in an attempt to investigate the role of these factors in 
testing capital structure theory, a comparison of the results with both prior expectations 
and the results of similar tests in developed and developing countries is presented. 
As pointed out earlier, some Arab countries' institutional factors are similar to 
those in Western economies. These similarities are due to many factors, some of which 
are: 
1- In their efforts to build their economies, Arab governments, companies, and 
academicians all try to follow the footsteps of the West. 
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2- Many Arab countries were colonized by the West and have legal and economic 
systems that have carried over from their colonial past. 
3- The terms of membership in both the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund mandate homogeneity with Western economies. Moreover these two 
international institutions required economic restructuring (becoming Western-
like) when Arab countries needed their help. 
4- Homogeneity is spontaneously created when countries want to join the GATT and 
WTO. Arab countries have been most active in these efforts since the late 1980's. 
5- Arab countries have been amending their laws and economic systems to meet the 
requirements of international investors who are usually from W estem economies. 
However, there still exist some country traditions and institutional factors that are 
different from those in Western economies. The presentation in chapter three included 
Arab culture, absence of bond markets, different tax treatment of various types of 
income, lower efficiency of capital markets, and ownership structure. These differences 
are expected to have minor effects on the control variables and should not impinge on the 
robustness of capital structure theory in this capacity. 
The control variables are used in the tests of all the hypotheses other than the 
eighth one (due to the different methodology employed there). Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 
6.4 present the estimates for these variables. The results for all four control variables are 
robust regardless of the other variables in the models. For instance, collateral is positive 
and significant in all estimations; the only change is a slightly smaller or larger 
magnitude or slightly higher or lower level of significance. These minor variations should 
not harm the main finding. These variables are summarized and isolated here to abridge 
the presentation. The tests are two tailed unless otherwise stated. One-tailed tests are used 
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when both the level of significance and the direction of the estimated value are 
being tested. Following are the results for each of the control variables. 
6.3.1 Collateral 
The ratio of tangible assets to total assets is positive and significant at the 1 % 
level for both long term and total debt ratios. This is consistent with the theory in that the 
availability of collateral increases the debt capacity of the firm. This is especially true in 
Arab economies since they are considered bank based. In these economies, collateral is 
more significant since it is a requirement when acquiring bank loans. Harris and Raviv 
(1990a) and Stulz (1990) demonstrate that leverage is positively correlated with 
liquidation and aggregate value of the firm. This finding is supported by empirical 
evidence in the studies shown in Table 2.4. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that tangible 
assets are easy to collateralize, and thus they reduce the agency cost of debt. They also 
state that firms with a close relationship to creditors (i.e. banks) need to provide less 
collateral because relationship substitutes for the need for collateral. This may only be 
true for short-term small-sized loans, and may be the reason collateral is not significant in 
the short-term debt equations. Antoniou, et al. (2002) argue that firms with high tangible 
assets face difficulties in shifting their investments to riskier projects as their debt is 
secured against these assets. Therefore, tangible assets mitigate the agency cost of debt 
financing, thereby raising the optimal level of debt. In that respect, tangible assets can be 
considered as insurance to the creditors because in case of bankruptcy and liquidation 
some value exists to be awarded to these creditors in the form of compensation. This is 
especially true in the Arab world where liquidation is one of the immediate results of 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, banking laws in the Arab world limit the amount of 
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uncollateralized loans made by banks. Similarly, banks traditionally require sufficient 
collateral, causing a positive relationship between the fixed assets and leverage. Tangible 
assets are both negative and insignificant in short-term debt-ratio equations because 
larger firms are more likely to possess an abundance of tangible assets. These firms either 
do not need short-term funds or can acquire them from the banks with which they have a 
long relationship without the need for collateral. Also, short-term funds are usually 
smaller in amount than long term funds and are trivial compared to the size of the firm's 
tangible assets. 
Intangible assets are positive and significant. Though this contradicts the 
conventional wisdom, it conforms to the traditions in the Arab world. The reason is that 
intangible assets ( as shown in Arab company balance sheets and explained in their 
footnotes) usually represent reputation, copyrights, patents or some form of goodwill. 
These are signs of monopolistic features that indicate the higher future earnings that are 
desired by banks. Additionally, the same finding for short-term debt relationship with 
intangible assets applies to tangible assets. 
The general finding here is that collateral is positive and of high significance; this 
is explained by the bank-based borrowing that is common in the Arab world. 
Additionally, short-term debt is more common in smaller firms, which is consistent with 
the finding of Titman and Wessels (1988). 
6.3.2 Size: 
The proxy for the size variable is the natural log of sales. Its coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 1 % level for all debt ratios, with higher magnitude for long-term 
debt and total debt than for short-term debt ratios. This implies that firms use less short-
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term debt than long-term debt. Ragan and Zingales (1995) state that size can be 
considered a proxy for the inverse probability of default and should not be significant in 
countries where the costs of financial distress are low. Knowing that in Arab countries it 
is easy to liquidate a distressed company and that the possibility of a stay on liquidation is 
very low, it is expected that size will show a high significance. This is exactly the case in 
the results, where size shows the highest level of significance of all the variables 
estimates and for all the debt ratios. In a similar argument, Antoniou, et al. (2002) state 
that larger firms are less exposed to bankruptcy risk. Hence, the positive relationship 
between debt and size implies that the cost of financial distress is one of the main 
determinants of the use ofleverage. This is true in the Arab world since banks compete in 
both owning and lending to large firms. One can deduce here that short-term debt is more 
common among smaller firms. This is further confirmed in the short-term debt equation, 
which shows a smaller coefficient. Moreover, as argued by Warner (1977), market value 
of a firm is inversely related to the ratio of direct cost of bankruptcy to firm value. This 
implies that large firms might not envisage considerable difficulties in raising external 
loans. Assuming that size is an inverse proxy for bankruptcy probability, these arguments 
may help explain the positive association between firm size and leverage. This argument 
is more relevant in the Arab world since the bankruptcy code is not conducive to 
reorganizing firms, and firms entering bankruptcy are usually liquidated in a costly and 
lengthy liquidation procedure. 
In the Arab world, as in other places of the world, sales are a transparent sign of 
reputation and capacity. This makes firms with higher sales a preferred target for banks 
that are looking for capacity to repay loans. 
Finally, the positive relationship between debt and size implies that the 
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borrowing capacity of the firm is significantly limited by its bankruptcy risk and that the 
optimal leverage ratio of the firms with lower bankruptcy risk is high. 
6.3.3 Volatility 
The proxy for volatility is the standard deviation of earnings. The coefficient is 
negative and significant. The level of significance is low due to fact that 70% of the per-
firm data was available for three years only. Also, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that 
the standard deviation of the change in operating income cannot be directly affected by 
the firm's debt level. Moreover, they argue that the potential for spurious correlation 
arises if the impact of leverage and taxes is not completely purged from the volatility 
estimates. They found the relationship to be negative but never significant. For similar 
reasons, Antoniou, et al. (2002) found volatility to exhibit mixed, but always 
insignificant, signs. They suggest that the relation is spurious. However, since advanced 
and risk-calculating banks are the source of debt in Arab countries, it is logical to reach 
the same conclusion here. 
Bradley, et al. (1984) found volatility to be significant and negatively related to 
firm leverage ratios. The explanation is that volatility is a proxy for the cost of financial 
distress. Hence, higher costs of financial distress lead to lower borrowing capacity. Along 
these lines, the expectations were that volatility would exhibit a negative association with 
debt in the Arab world. This is especially true in the Arab world because Arab banks, the 
major source of debt for Arab firms, are advanced and take volatility into account when 
they study the credit-worthiness of the borrowing firm. Another line ofreasoning 
suggests that volatility may exhibit low significance because banks have close relations 
with their customers, i.e. the borrowing firms. Bathala, et al. (1994) found an inverse 
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relationship between debt and earnings volatility. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Bradley, et al. (1984) among others. 
Firms with high earnings volatility are more likely to miss debt service payments 
over time; this increases the probability of bankruptcy. Higher costs of debt compared to 
its benefits decrease the optimal amount of debt used by the firm. The main restriction on 
debt financing is the availability of cash to service it in a timely manner. Any fluctuation 
in the availability of cash simply means that creditors will drive the firm into bankruptcy 
(unless of course the indenture specifies otherwise, or there is a close long-term 
relationship between the firm and its creditors as in most bank-based economies). 
Business risk usually causes unwanted fluctuations in the level of cash the firm needs to 
hold. Volatility of earnings is a measure of such risk; since debt requires a steady level of 
cash flows, it only makes sense that firms with volatile earnings (i.e. high business risk) 
should use less debt. However, the above results and the results of some studies found a 
weak relationship between debt and earnings volatility. The above discussion suggests 
earnings volatility is not a sufficient measure of business risk and other variables need to 
be included. Further investigation of this topic is warranted. 
6.3.4 Profitability 
Earnings before interest and taxes normalized by total assets is the proxy for 
profitability. The results show that the relationship between the level of debt and 
profitability is significantly negative for all debt ratios. Other studies found similar results 
and blamed them on consistency with the POH. Further investigation of this issue is 
needed. It is expected that a regression of equity on profitability would produce stronger 
results than that for debt on profitability in the Arab world. This stronger relationship is 
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due to the fact that Arab firms follow a reverse POH. The conclusion here is that 
profitability means less reliance on external financing in general. This is based on the 
view that higher profitability increases internal resources and hence reduces the need for 
external financing. The results also imply a rejection of the free cash flow theory of 
Jensen (1986) that implies a positive relation. This in tum implies that the free cash flow 
agency conflict predictions cannot outweigh the predictions of POH based on the 
implications of information asymmetry. It also contradicts the finding ofHovakimian, et 
al. (2001) in which they suggest that debt is positively related to profits since the latter is 
positively related to higher assets that imply a higher capacity for debt. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) found debt to have a negative and significant 
relationship with profitability. They explain this relationship to be partially due to the 
transaction costs that accompany the issuance of debt. This explanation does not apply in 
the Arab world since most of the debt is in the form of bank loans. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) explain this inverse relationship by the fact that profitability may proxy for the 
quality of investment opportunities. This fact was used to explain the different levels of 
significance in their sample countries. Assuming that their argument is valid, one would 
expect a positive relationship between debt and profitability, especially in bank-based 
economies. This argument will be adopted here to explain the low level of significance. 
Antoniou, et al. (2002) explain the negative relationship in weak law countries to be due 
to the relatively weaker protection of investors and creditors, implying difficulty in 
raising external capital and forcing firms to rely on internal equity. This is also true in 
Arab countries. However, the fact that firms in weak law countries revert to other tactics 
to overcome the difficulty of raising external funds contradicts this argument. One of 
these tactics, introduced by La Porta, et al. (2000), is the increased payment of 
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Dividends. Antoniuo, et al. (2002) explain the low level of significance by the fact that 
firms' close relation with banks and concentrated ownership mitigate asymmetric 
information problems. This reduces their dependence on internal financing. The fact that 
Arab firms are closely held and the fact that most debt is in the form of bank loans gives 
more credibility to this explanation. 
In summary, the results fare very well in the Arab world where financial 
markets are less than perfect and informational asymmetry is high. Higher profits cause 
firms to pay higher dividends and build the reputation of being fair to the shareholders, 
which helps in marketing future stock issues. Additionally, as argued earlier and as was 
seen in the results of hypothesis eight, these results help explain the fact that Arab firms 
follow a reverse pecking order. Thus, higher profits mean higher ability to pay dividends 
and higher ability to raise more equity and a lower need for debt financing. Ultimately, 
higher profitability relieves the firm from raising external funds altogether. 
6.3.5 Concluding Remarks on the Control Variables: 
The results above show that Arab firms' reaction to the control variables is similar 
to that in Western economies. This may be due to reasons specific to the Arab world. 
There are also minor differences between the results in the Arab world and those in 
Western economies. For example, intangible assets in the Arab world are significant and 
positive because they are a sign of reputation. On the other hand, intangible assets are 
negative in Western economies because they are a sign of lack of collateral. 
These findings show that the robustness of the theory is limited. This limitation is due to 
problems in the choice of proxy, as is the case in volatility, or due to the fact that the sign 
and significance are due to reasons other than the ones asserted by theory. For example, 
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the negative relationship between debt and profitability is weaker than originally thought 
because in the Arab world, firms tend to use more equity than debt when profits are low. 
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Table 6.1 
Estimated Coefficients for the First Hypothesis 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit 
model. The estimated model is: 
D 
~=/Jo+ f]1DTAX + f]2MTR + f]3NDTS + f]4MB + f]5DJVNI + f]6MTRDIV + f]7FAM + f]8GOV + 
E 
+ f3w1NTANTA + /JuLNS + /J12SDOE + /J13EBJTTA + s 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV 
Intercept -2.234*** -2.435*** -1.055*** -1.461*** -1.624*** -1.830*** 
(-6.16) (-5.45) (-2.78) (-2.55) (-2.02) (-2.81) 
Dtax 0.035 0.142* -0.003 0.277*** 0.335*** 0.061 
(0.18) (1.60) (-0.04) (2.92) (3.01) (0.45) 
MTR 0.818*** 0.407** 0.823*** 1.318*** 0.728*** 1.054*** 
(3.86) (1.70) (7.61) (4.41) (1.97) (3.27) 
NOTS 1.782*** 1.281*** 0.541** 0.251 0.314 1.372*** 
(3.99) (2.29) (1.67) (0.39) (0.38) (2.99) 
MB 0.038** 0.040** -0.012 -0.062*** -0.046** -0.068*** 
(1.96) (1.96) (-0.56) (-1.99) (-1.80) (-2.01) 
DIVNI -0.160** -0.276*** 0.107* -0.184* -0.403*** 0.272*** 
(-1.69) (-2.73) (1.58) (-1.64) (-2.96) (2.00) 
MTRDIV -0.450 -0.092 -0.663 -0.623 0.250 -1.695*** 
(-0.99) (-0.12) (-1.32) (-1.03) (0.28) (-1.99) 
FAM 0.363** 0.411** 0.232* 0.233 0.248 0.337 
(1.88) (1.86) (1.65) (1.12) (1.15) (1.36) 
GOV 0.013 0.195 -0.017 0.028 0.032 0.137 
(0.05) (0.99) (-0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.40) 
TANTA 0.353*** 0.451*** 0.007 0.503*** 0.601*** 0.035 
(.2.09) (2.11) (0.05) (2.65 (3.01) (0.19) 
INTANTA 1.852*** 1.294*** 0.763*** 2.196*** 2.311*** 0.177*** 
(3.44) (2.97) (2.27) (4.52) (5.15) (2.26) 
LNS 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.048*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.087*** 
(6.72) (6.12) (1.98) (3.43) (3.22) (2.08) 
SDOE -0.102 -0.132* -0.112** -0.231*** -0.268*** -0.159** 
(-1.29) (-1.49) (-1.78) (-1.97) (-2.13) (-1.83) 
EB ITT A -1.911 *** -1.986*** -0.231 -1.529*** -1.786*** -0.765* 
~-4.14) (-2.99) (-0.68) (-2.38) (-2.11) (-1.59) 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the TOBIT model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.la 
Estimated Coefficients for the First Hypothesis 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using OLS. The estimated model is: 
D 
- =/Jo+ f31DTAX + {32MTR + {33NDTS + {34 MB + p5DIVNJ + f36MTRDIV + {37FAM + /Jg GOV+ 
E 
p9TANTA + p10INTANTA + p11LNS + {312SDOE + {313EBITTA + s 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV VIF 
Intercept -1.439*** -1.123*** -0.228*** -0.732*** -0.348 -0.522*** 0 
(-5.94) (-5.06) (-2.42) (-2.30) (-1.28) (-2.8) 
Dtax 0.018 0.060 -0.030 0.234*** 0.214*** -0.001 1.113 
(0.28) (1.00) (-1.18) (2.72) (2.91) (-0.02) 
MTR 0.710*** 0.284* 0.488*** 1.049*** 0.510*** 0.437*** 1.243 
(3.72) (1.62) (6.58) (4.19) (2.38) (2.98) 
NOTS 1.311*** 0.566** 0.202* 0.052 -0.168 0. 759**** 1.338 
(3.69) (1.74) (1.47) (0.11) (-0.42) (2.78) 
MB 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.006 -0.061*** -0.039*** -0.031*** 1.105 
(2.78) (2.93) (1.02) (-2.9) (-2.17) (-2.56) 
DIVNI -0.121* -0.175*** 0.034 -0.161** -0.265*** 0.096** 1.666 
(-1.60) (-2.54) (1.15) (-1.64) (-3.14) (1.67) 
MTRDIV .-0.731 -0.444 -0.203 -0.998* -0.229 -0.807*** 1.617 
(-1.39) (-0.92) (-0.99) (-1.45) (-0.39) (-1.99) 
FAM 0.588*** 0.411*** 0.179*** 0.558*** 0.266* 0.324*** 2.343 
(3.65) (2.78) (2.86) (2.64) (1.47) (2.62) 
GOV 0.318*** 0.209 0.107** 0.331* 0.079 0.237** 2.363 
(1.99) (1.43) (1.73) (1.58) (0.44) (1.93) 
TANT A 0.149** 0.153** 0.003 0.279*** 0.304*** -0.008 1.113 
(1.58) (1.77) (0.07) (2.26) (2.87) (-0.12) 
INTANTA 1.159*** 0.977*** 0.193 2.011*** 2.018*** -0.008 1.147 
(3.14) (2.88) (1.35) (4.14) (4.87) (-0.03) 
LNS 0.080*** 0.064*** 0.010** 0.047*** 0.028** 0.029*** 1.445 
(5.96) (5.21) (1.91) (2.7) (1.89) (2.85) 
SDOE -0.020 -0.023 -0.008 -0.126* -0.102* -0.026 1.179 
(-0.34) (-0.42) (-0.33) (-1.63) (-1.53) (-0.58) 
EB ITT A -1.280*** -0.878*** -0.125 -0.959*** -0.695** -0.657* 1.494 
(-3.81) (-2.85) (-0.96) (-2.17) (-1.85) (-2.62) 
F 12.23*** 7.53*** 7.81*** 7.3*** 6.46*** 4.13 
QSQUARE 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.17 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the OLS model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.2 
Estimated Coefficients for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Hypotheses 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit 
model. The estimated model is: 
D 
- =/Jo+ f31MTR + f32NDTS + /33MTRDIV + f34DIVNI + fJ5MB + f36GOV + f37FAM + f38DBAHRAIN + 
E 
j39DJORDAN + j310EGYPT + p11 DKUWAIT + f312DLEBANON + j313DMOROCCO + p14DOMAN + 
p15DPALESTINE + p16DQATAR + f317DSAUDJ + /318DUAE + /319TANTA + j320INTANTA + p21 LNS + 
f322SDOE + p23EBITTA + & 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV 
Intercept -1.735*** -1.914*** -0.858*** -0.388 -0.871* -1.171 *** 
(-3.02) (-2.66) (-1.96) (-0.66) (-1.62) (-1.96) 
MTR 0.637*** 0.325 0.530*** 1.061 *** 0.548** 0.779*** 
(3.46) (1.22) (5.98) (4.12) (1.88) (2.73) 
NOTS 1.070*** 0.883** -0.520 -0.845 -0.428 0.422 
(1.99) (1.68) (-1.12) (-1.02) (-0.46) (0.48) 
MTRDIV -1.486*** -0.695 -1.875*** -2.243*** -0.563 -3.312*** 
(-2.04) (-1.07) (-2.88) (-3.15) (-0.45) (-3.33) 
DIVNI -0.141 * -0.252*** 0.104* -0.123 -0.366*** 0.302*** 
(-1.47) (-2.98) (1.52) (-1.13) (-3.00) (1.99) 
MB 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.0111 -0.049** -0.039* -0.05*** 
(3.46) (2.02) (0.97) (-1.92) (-1.47) (-1.97) 
GOV -0.007 0.163 -0.035 0.023 0.026 0.086 
(-0.07) (0.56) (-0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) 
FAM 0.249 0.331* 0.073 0.119 0.210 0.103 
(1.35) (1.48) (0.35) (0.34) (0.75) (0.38) 
Dbahrain -0.595*** -0.572*** -0.268* -1.108*** -0.780*** -0.735*** 
(-2.85) (-2.05) (-1.46) (-4.12) (-3.46) (-2.96) 
Degypt -0.592*** -0.633*** -0.210 -0.798*** -0.585** -0.468** 
(-2.93) (-3.41) (-1.28) (-3.36) (-1.85) (-1.79) 
Djordan -0.426** -0.363 0.057 -0.488* -0.178 -0.279 
(-1.80) (-1.42) (0.37) (-1.57) (-0.48) (-0.98) 
Dkuwait -0.393** -0.414** -0.005 -0.827*** -0.559** -0.492** 
(-1.74) (-1.79) (-0.08) (-3.91) (-1.88) (-1.82) 
Dlebanon -0.251 -0.360 0.111 -0.424 -0.409 -0.156 
(-0.58) (-0.88) (0.39) (-1.02) (-1.03) (-0.22) 
Dmorocco -0.310 -0.504 0.202 -0.648 -0.663 -0.097 
(-0.85) (-1.02) (0.59) (-1.32) (-1.35) (-0.05) 
Doman -0.389* -0.349 -0.087 -0.558** -0.186 -0.561** 
(-1.64) (-1.28) (-0.33) (-1.74) (-0.44) (-1.85) 
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Dpalestine -3.170 -3.260 -1.634 -4.543 -4.318 -2.947 
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Dqatar -0.574** -0.538* 0.083 -1.063*** -0.700* -0.267 
(-1.66) (-1.68) (0.34) (-1.97) (-1.63) (-0.51) 
Dsaudi -0.265 -0.451 *** 0.213 -0.626*** -0.534*** -0.134 
(-1.28) (-1.98) (1.27) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-0.41) 
DUAE -0.579*** -0.649*** -0.190 -1.185*** -0.941*** -0.572*** 
(-2.82) (-2.76) (-1.21) (-4.61) (-3.01) (-2.05) 
TANT A 0.362*** 0.479*** -0.022 0.451*** 0.569*** 0.003 
(3.03) (2.84) (-0.08) (2.05) (2.01) (0.02) 
INTANTA 1.727*** 1.295*** 0.427* 1.790*** 2.087*** -0.349 
(2.91) (3.17) (1.56) (3.77) (4.51) (-0.52) 
LNS 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.044*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.081*** 
(5.74) (4.88) (2.06) (2.23) (2.20) (2.18) 
SDOE -0.061 -0.128* -0.050 -0.181 ** -0.260*** -0.059 
(-0.55) (-1.45) (-0.76) (-1.78) (-1.99) (-0.44) 
EBITTA -1.639*** -1.735*** 0.129 -0.893* -1.208** -0.503 
(-3.60) (-2.1n (0.22) (-1.45) {-1.75) (-1.05) 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the TOBIT model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.2a 
Estimated Coefficients for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Hypotheses 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using OLS. The estimated model is: 
D 
- = {30 + f31MTR + {32NDTS + {33MTRDIV + f34DIVNI + f]5MB + f36GOV + j37FAM + f38DBAHRAJN + 
E 
j39DJORDAN + j310EGYPT + f311 DKUWAIT + {312DLEBANON + {313DMOROCCO + p14DOMAN + 
p15 DPALESTINE + p16DQATAR + f317DSAUDI + f318DUAE + p19TANTA + j320 JNTANTA + p21 LNS + 
f322SDOE + f]23EBITTA + s 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV VIF --·-··-··---···-·-----··-·--·---·---
Intercept -0.935*** -0.710*** -0.133 0.280 0.262 -0.081 0 
(-2.92) (-2.40) (-1.12) (0.68) (0.73) (-0.33) 
MTR 0.647*** 0.267* 0.397*** 0.924*** 0.434*** 0.384*** 1.399 
(3.22) (1.44) (5.29) (3.56) (1.92) (2.52) 
NOTS 0.948*** 0.377 -0.111 -0.545 -0.457 0.476* 1.704 
(2.38) (1.03) (-0.75) (-1.06) (-1.02) (1.58) 
MTRDIV -1.498*** -0.931** -0.615*** -2.277*** -0.859 -1.475*** 2.041 
(-2.55) (-1.72) (-2.81) (-3.01) (-1.30) (-3.31) 
DIVNI -0.107 -0.175*** 0.044* -0.107 -0.247*** 0.130*** 1.853 
(-1.36) (-2.41) (1.51) (-1.05) (-2.79) (2.18) 
MB 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.010** -0.054*** -0.036** -0.029*** 1.168 
(3.07) (3.11) (1.67) (-2.59) (-1.95) (-2.31) 
GOV 0.280** 0.174 0.104** 0.301* 0.066 0.222** 2.394 
(1.76) (1.18) (1.75) (1.46) (0.37) (1.83) 
FAM 0.491*** 0.342*** 0.136*** 0.463*** 0.237 0.253*** 2.463 
(3.00) (2.26) (2.22) (2.19) (1.29) (2.03) · 
Dbahrain -0.517*** -0.447*** -0.104* -0.975*** -0.613*** -0.369*** 8.991 
(-2.77) (-2.59) (-1.50) -(4.04) (-2.91) (-2.60) 
Degypt -0.526*** -0.537*** -0.048 -0.735*** -0.503*** -0.217* 6.807 
(-2.79) (-3.08) (-0.69) (-3.02) (-2.37) (-1.51) 
Djordan -0.489*** -0.419*** -0.060 -0.550*** -0.274 -0.293*** 3.582 
(-2.48) (-2.30) (-0.83) (-2.16) (-1.24) (-1.96) 
Dkuwait -0.456*** -0.391*** -0.066 -0.85878 -0.529*** -0.363*** 10.025 
(-2.54) (-2.36) (-0.99 (-3.70) (-2.62) (-2.66) 
Dlebanon -0.375 -0.369 0.003 -0.590* -0.453 -0.204 1.676 
(-1.31) (-1.40) (0.03) (-1.60) (-1.41) (-0.94) 
Dmorocco -0.423 -0.362 -0.043 -0.771** -0.509 -0.294 1.386 
(-1.33) (-1.23) (-0.37) (-1.88) (-1.42) (-1.22) 
Doman -0.432*** -0.349** -0.082 -0.576*** -0.234 -0.373*** 3.619 
(-2.11) (-1.84) (-1.08) (-2.17) (-1.02) (-2.39) 
Dpalestine -0.419* -0.374 -0.041 -0.943*** -0.652*** -0.309 1.682 
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(-1.47) (-1.42) (-0.39) (-2.55) (-2.02) (-1.42) 
Dqatar -0.551*** -0.484*** -0.083 -0.968*** -0.647*** -0.344** 1.868 
(-2.11) (-2.00) (-0.86) (-2.86) (-2.20) (-1.73) 
Dsaudi -0.306** -0.358*** 0.067 -0.643*** -0.462*** -0.161 11.108 
(-1.78) (-2.26) (1.05) (-2.90) (-2.39) (-1.24) 
DUAE -0.460*** -0.416*** -0.089 -0.975*** -0.621*** -0.330*** 7.231 
(-2.49) (-2.44) (-1.29) (-4.09) (-2.99) (-2.36) 
TANT A 0.190** 0.204*** -0.006 0.289*** 0.322*** -0.010 1.233 
(1.93) (2.23) (-0.17) (2.26) (2.90) (-0.13) 
INTANTA 1.087*** 1.039*** 0.054 1.698*** 1.904*** -0.253 1.206 
(2.88) (2.98) (0.39) (3.48) (4.48) (-0.88) 
LNS 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.008* 0.038*** 0.023 0.022** 1.839 
(5.18) (4.69) (1.44) (1.96) (1.42) (1.94) 
SDOE 0.014 -0.009 0.016 -0.086 -0.090 0.011 1.274 
(0.24) (-0.16) (0.72) (-1.09) (-1.32) (0.24) 
EBITTA -1.215*** -0.823*** -0.062 -0.617 -0.438 -0.622*** 1.712 
(-3.40) (-2.50) (-0.47) -(1.34) -(1.09) -(2.29) 
F 7.6*** 4.7*** 6.3*** 5.3*** 4.16*** 3.37*** 
RSQUARE 0.4 0.29 0.36 0.26 0.2 0.23 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the OLS model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.3 
Estimated Coefficients for the Third Hypothesis in Both Tax Arab Countries and Non-
Tax Arab Countries 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit 
model. The estimated model is: 
D 
- =/Jo+ {J1NDTS * DTAX + f32NDTS * NDTAX + p3MTR + {J4DIVNI + {J5MB + {J6GOV + {J7FAM + 
E 
p8DBAHRAIN + {J9DJORDAN + {J10EGYPT + {J11 DKUWAIT + p12DLEBANON + {J13 DMOROCCO + 
p14DOMAN + p15DPALESTINE + {J16DQATAR + {J17 DSAUDI + {J18DUAE + p19TANTA + 
{J20JNTANTA + fJ2iLNS + p22SDOE + p23 EBITTA + s 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV 
Intercept -1.639*** -1.809*** -0.843*** -0.339 -0.739 -1.165*** 
(-2.99) (-2.36) (-1.99) (-0.93) (-1.29) (-1.96) 
NDTSTAX -0.824 -1.058 -0.903 -1.857 -2.873 0.287 
(-0.78) (-0.72) (-0.84) (-1.03) (-1.41) (0.13) 
NDTSNONTAX 1.224*** 1.027*** -0.485 -0.744 -0.192 0.429 
(2.69) (1.97) (-1.25) (-1.28) (-0.29) (1.20) 
MTR 0.594*** 0.283 0.522*** 1.035*** 0.496* 0.776*** 
(3.67) (1.27) (6.01) (3.68) (1.62) (2.96) 
MTRDIV -1.577*** -0.801 -1.888*** -2.291*** -0.687 -3.318*** 
-(2.01) (-1.08) (-3.01) (-3.11) (-0.77) (-3.67) 
DIVNI -0.143* -0.254*** 0.105* -0.124 -0.368*** 0.301*** 
(-1.58) (-2.02) (1.58) (-1.17) (-2.96) (2.01) 
MB 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.011 -0.048*** -0.038* -0.051*** 
(3.17) (2.05) (1.16) (-1.97) (-1.50) (-1.99) 
GOV -0.006 0.164 -0.036 0.022 0.026) 0.085 
(-0.07) (1.14) (-0.31) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) 
FAM 0.252 0.333* 0.071 0.121 0.213 0.102 
(1.31) (1.52) (0.45) (0.43) (0.38) (0.48) 
Dbahrain -0.681*** -0.661*** -0.285* -1.156*** -0.893*** -0.741*** 
(-2.21) (-2.37) (-1.49) (-3.06) (-3.24) (-2.02) 
Degypt -0.678*** -0.722*** -0.226 -0.845*** -0.698*** -0.474** 
(-3.03) (-3.36) (-1.26) (-2.96) (-1.98) (-1.66) 
Djordan -0.383* -0.326 0.066 -0.465* -0.134 -0.275 
(-1.61) (-1.32) (0.33) (-153) (-0.33) (-1.29) 
Dkuwait -0.482*** -0.506*** -0.021 -0.876*** -0.679*** -0.455** 
(-1.99) (-1.98) (-0.10) (-4.19) (-2.02) (-1.77) 
Dlebanon -0.182 -0.287 0.122 -0.388 -0.318 -0.152 
(-0.66) (-0.94) (0.56) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.45) 
Dmorocco -0.253 -0.477 0.216 -0.619 -0.634 -0.092 
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(-0.99) (-1.29) (0.85) (-1.32) (-1.25) (-0.18) 
Doman -0.382* -0.342 -0.088 -0.555** -0.181 -0.561 ** 
(-1.49) (-1.22) (-0.48) (-1.70) (-0.85) (-1.80) 
Dpalestine -3.156 -3.228 -1.633 -4.521 -4.250 -2.946 
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.09) 
Dqatar -0.566** -0.532* 0.086 -1.059*** -0.693** -0.266 
(-1.66) (-1.46) (0.28) (-1.99) (-1.77) (-0.99) 
Dsaudi -0.362* -0.549*** 0.194 -0.680*** -0.662*** -0.141 
(-1.63) (-1.98) (1.29) (-3.16) (-2.02) (-0.89) 
DUAE -0.672*** -0.743*** -0.208 -1.235*** -1.060*** -0.579*** 
(-3.32) (-3.27) (-1.29) (-4.64) (-4.55) (-2.09) 
TANT A 0.339*** 0.454*** -0.026 0.438*** 0.540*** (0.016** 
(3.4 7) (3.58) (-0.37) (4.22) (4.52) (1.67) 
INT ANT A 1.736*** 1.303*** 0.429* 1.803*** 2.098*** -0.347 
(3.03) (3.19) (1.49) (3.96) (3.99) (-0.59) 
LNS 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.043*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 
(5.65) (5.05) (2.22) (2.03) (2.13) (2.07) 
SDOE -0.059 -0.124 -0.049 -0.180** -0.254*** -0.059 
(-0.46) (-1.40) (-0.44) (-1.78) (-2.03) (-0.46) 
EB ITT A -1.540*** -1.611 *** 0.139 -0.847 -1.088* -0.496 
(-3.01) (-2.26) (0.30) (-1.42) (-1.48) (-1.03) 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the TOBIT model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.3a 
Estimated Coefficients for the Third Hypothesis in Both Tax Arab Countries and Non-
Tax Arab Countries 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using OLS. The estimated model is: 
D 
- = f3o + j31NDTS * DTAX + f]2NDTS * NDTAX + f]3MTR + j34DIVNJ + j35MB + J36GOV + j37FAM + 
E 
J38DBAHRAIN + j39DJORDAN + J310EGYPT + f311 DKUWAIT + f312DLEBANON + j313DMOROCCO + 
J314DOMAN + J315 DPALESTINE + J316DQATAR + j317DSAUDI + J318DUAE + J319TANTA + 
j320JNTANTA + J321 LNS + j322SDOE + J323 EBITTA + & 
TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV VIF 
Intercept -0.889*** -0.672*** -0.141 0.305 0.315 -0.105 0 
(-2.75) (-2.25) (-1.17) (0.73) (0.86) (-0.43) 
NDTSTAX 0.035 -0.385 0.064 -1.058 -1.520 0.981 2.576 
(0.03) (-0.4) (0.16) (-0.78) (-1.28) (1.22) 
NDTSNONTAX 1.037*** 0.451 -0.128 -0.494 -0.352 0.426 1.654 
(2.54) (1.19) (-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.77) (1.37) 
MTR 0.625*** 0.249 0.401*** 0.912*** 0.409** 0.396*** 1.417 
(3.09) (1.33) (5.30) (3.48) (1.79) (2.57) 
MTRDIV -1.552*** -0.976** -0.604*** -2.308*** -0.923 -1.445*** 2.061 
(-2.63) (-1.79) (-2.74) (-3.03) (-1.39) (-322) 
DIVNI -0.108 -0.176*** 0.044* -0.107 -0.248*** 0.131 *** 1.853 
(-1.37) (-2.42) (1.52) (-1.06) (-2.80) (2.19) 
MB 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.01 O** -0.054*** -0.0359*** -0.028*** 1.167 
(3.06) (3.10) (1.67) (-2.59) (-1.96) (-2.30) 
GOV 0.281 ** 0.174 0.104** 0.301* 0.067 0.221** 2.393 
(1.76) (1.18) (1.75) (1.46) (0.37) (1.83) 
FAM 0.491*** 0.342*** 0.135*** 0.463*** 0.238 0.252*** 2.462 
(3.00) (2.26) (2.21) (2.19) (1.29) (2.03) 
Dbahrain -0.561*** -0.484*** -0.096 -1.000*** -0.664*** -0.345*** 9.558 
(-2.91) (-2.72) (-1.34) (-4.01) (-3.06) (-2.36) 
Degypt -0.572*** -0.575*** -0.040 -0.761*** -0.556*** -0.191 7.253 
(-2.93) (-3.19) (-0.55) (-3.02) (-2.53) (-1.29) 
Djordan -0 .4 71 *** -0 .404 *** -0.064 -0.540*** -0.254 -0.303*** 3.614 
(-2.38) (-2.21) (-0.87) (-2.11) (-1.14) (-2.01) 
Dkuwait -0.502*** -0.429*** -0.057 -0.884*** -0.583*** -0.338*** 10.777 
(-2.70) (-2.49) (-0.83) (-3.67) (-2.78) (-2.39) 
Dlebanon -0.346 -0.344 -0.002 -0.574* -0.419 -0.220 1.696 
(-1.20) (-1.3) (-0.02) (-1.54) (-1.30) (-1.01) 
Dmorocco -0.399 -0.341 -0.048 -0.757** -0.480 -0.307 1.394 
(-1.25) (-1.16) (-0.4) (-1.84) (-1.34) (-1.27) 
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Doman -0.431 *** -0.348** -0.083 -0.575*** -0.233 -0.374*** 3.618 
(-2.1) (-1.84) (-1.08) (-2.16) (-1.01) (-2.40) 
Dpalestine -0.347 -0.313 -0.055 -0.902*** -0.567 -0.350* 1.806 
(-1.17) (-1.14) (-0.5) (-2.35) (-1.70) (-1.55) 
Dqatar -0.548*** -0.481 *** -0.084 -0.966*** -0.644*** -0.346** 1.868 
(-2.10) (-1.99) (-0.86) (-2.85) (-2.19) (-1.74) 
Dsaudi -0.358*** -0.402*** 0.077 -0.673*** -0.523*** -0.132 12.264 
(-1.98) (-2.41) (1.14) (-2.88) (-2.57) (-0.97) 
DUAE -0.51 O*** -0.458*** -0.079 -1.003*** -0.680*** -0.302*** 7.845 
(-2.65) (-2.58) (-1.11) (-4.04) (-3.14) (-2.07) 
TANT A 0.183** 0.198*** -0.005 0.285*** 0.314*** -0.006 1.239 
(1.85) (2.17) (-0.14) (2.23) (2.82) (-0.09) 
INTANTA 1.099*** 1.049*** 0.052 1.704*** 1.918*** -0.260 1.207 
(2.91) (3.00) (0.37) (3.48) (4.51) (-0.91) 
LNS 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.008* 0.037** 0.023 0.022** 1.841 
(5.15) (4.66) (1.46) (1.94) (1.39) (1.95) 
SDOE 0.016 -0.008 0.016 -0.085 -0.089 0.010 1.275 
(0.27) (-0.14) (0.71) (-1.08) (-1.29) (0.22) 
EBITTA -1.109*** -0. 735*** -0.082 -0.557 -0.315 -0.680*** 1.884 
(-2.96) (-2.12) (-0.59) (-1.15) (-0.75) (-2.39) 
F 7.32*** 4.53*** 5.15*** 5.07*** 1.02*** 3.24*** 
RSQUARE 0.40 0.30 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.23 
The sample size is from 624-1108. The significance levels of the OLS model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.4 
Estimated Coefficients for the Seventh Hypothesis in Both Tax Arab Countries and Non-
Tax Arab Countries 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit 
model. The estimated model is: 
D 
- =/Jo+ j31DBAHRAIN + f32DJORDAN + j33EGYPT+ /34DKUWAIT + j35DLEBANON + 
E 
j36DMOROCCO+ j31DOMAN + j38DPALESTINE + j39DQATAR + j310DSAUDI + j311 DUAE + & 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV ________________ ,_,, _____,_., .. ___ ., ___ , _______ , ___ ,_ 
Intercept 0.332* 0.106 0.268* 0.578*** 0.280* 0.065 
(1.55) (0.99) (1.46) (3.96) (1.63) (0.86) 
Dbahrain -0.196 -0.041 -0.829*** -0.584*** -0.358** -0.627*** 
(-1.08) (-0.84) (-5.44) (-2.01) (-1.83) (-2.50) 
Degypt -0.229 -0.076 -0.955*** -0.471 *** -0.237 -0.724*** 
(-1.32) (-1.01) (-2.20) (-1.99) (-1.27) (-2.22) 
Djordan -0.097 0.004 -0.488*** -0.355** -0.156 -0.303** 
(-1.06) (0.04) (-4.51) (-1.77) (-0.99) (-1.69) 
Dkuwait -0.279 -0.205 -0.624*** -0.502*** -0.357*** -0.424*** 
(-1.38) (-1.10) (-4.88) (-2.18) (-1.96) (-2.47) 
Dlebanon -0.189 -0.113 -0.682*** -0.210 -0.067 -0.428* 
(-1.00) (-0.81) (-1.97) (-0.87) (-0.68) (-1.63) 
Dmorocco -0.289 -0.507 -0.446 -0.519 -0.646* -0.238 
(-0.97) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.40) (-1.46) (-0.95) 
Doman -0.230 -0.123 -0.403*** -0.384*** -0.203 -0.191 
(-1.07) (-0.91) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.38) (-1.24) 
Dpalestine -0.466* -0.214 -0.641*** -0.722*** -0.404* -0.429* 
(-1.58) (-1.01) (-1.98) (-2.14) (-1.56) (-1.60) 
Dqatar -0.193 -0.015 -0.411** -0.241 -0.065 -0.186 
(-0.95) (-0.09) (-1.73) (-1.31) (-0.77) (-0.84) 
Dsaudi 0.207 0.122 -0.108 -0.158 -0.152 0.111 
(1.32) (0.83) (-0.77) (-0.99) (-0.98) (0.94) 
DUAE -0.454*** -0.383** -0.693*** -0.802*** -0.688*** -0.479*** 
(-1.96) (-1.86) (-4.66) (-2.72) (-2.00) (-2.45) 
The sample size is from 1115. The significance levels of the TOBIT model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 6.4a 
Estimated Coefficients for the Seventh Hypothesis in Both Tax Arab Countries and Non-
Tax Arab Countries 
The dependent variables are the total, long-term and short-term debt to equity ratios 
divided by both book and market values of equity. The explanatory variables are as in 
Table 4.2. The regression is estimated using OLS. The estimated model is: 
D 
- =/Jo+ f31DBAHRAIN + f32DJORDAN + {J3EGYPT + /3 4DKUWAJT + {J5DLEBANON + 
E 
{J6DMOROCCO + {J7DOMAN + {J8DPALESTINE + f39DQATAR + {J10DSAUDI + f311DUAE + & 
Ind. Variables TDBV LTDBV STDBV TDMV LTDMV STDMV VIF 
Intercept 0.447*** 0.227** 0.492*** 0.505*** 0.255*** 0.249*** 0 
(2.88) (1.80) (5.21) (3.26) (1.99) (2.61) 
Dbahrain -0.142 0.049 -0.465*** -0.333*** -0.102 -0.231*** 5.613 
(-0.84) (0.36) (-4.48) (-1.96) (-0.73) (-2.20) 
Degypt -0.246* -0.073 -0.453*** -0.252* -0.041 -0.204*** 12.471 
(-1.53) (-0.56) (-4.62) (-1.57) (-0.31) (-2.05) 
Djordan -0.122 0.010 -0.392*** -0.185 -0.003 -0.150* 23.242 
(-0.78) (0.08) (-4.09) (-1.18) (-0.03) (-1.55) 
Dkuwait -0.270** -0.084 -0.459*** -0.297** -0.081 -0.215*** 11.476 
(-1.67) (-0.64) (-4.66) (-1.84) (-0.61) (-2.16) 
Dlebanon -0.264 -0.073 -0.464*** -0.105 0.090 -0.196* 2.068 
(-1.23) (-0.42) (-3.55) (-0.49) (0.51) (-1.48) 
Dmorocco -0.404 -0.189 -0.487*** -0.446 -0.201 -0.244 1.269 
(-1.2) (-0.69) (-2.39) (-1.33) (-0.73) (-1.18) 
Doman -0.191 -0.041 -0.318*** -0.173 0.006 -0.076 6.651 
(-1.14) (-0.30) (-3.13) (-1.04) (0.05) (-0.74) 
Dpalestine -0.293 -0.074 -0.491 *** -0.369** -0.120 -0.248** 2.068 
(-1.36) (-0.42) (-3.75) (-1.72) (-0.68) (-1.88) 
Dqatar -0.157 0.005 -0.382*** -0.043 0.085 -0.128 2.679 
(-0.81) (0.03) (-3.22) (-0.22) (0.53) (-1.07) 
Dsaudi 0.057 0.056 -0.233*** -0.069 -0.032 0.013 13.737 
(0.36) (0.43) (-2.39) (-0.44) (-0.24) (0.13) 
DUAE -0.274* -0.071 -0.475*** -0.422*** -0.190 -0.232*** 6.255 
(-1.63) (-0.52) (-4.63) (-2.52) (-1.37) (-2.23) 
F 4.16*** 1.44* 7.41 *** 3.41 *** 1.56** 6.03*** 
RSQUARE 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 
The sample size is from 1115. The significance levels of the OLS model estimated 
coefficients are for the two-tailed test based on a priori predictions. T values are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and 




7 .1 Benefits and Uniqueness 
This dissertation set out to explore the determinants of capital structure in the 
Arab business environment. The purpose of this exploration is to test the models of 
capital structure in an environment different from where they were developed, i.e. 
Western economies. The tests include the tax, agency, country of origin, and information 
asymmetry models of capital structure theory. The general finding is that capital structure 
theory is not as robust as was previously thought. 
This dissertation is unique in that: 
1- It is the first work to test capital structure theory in countries that do not have tax 
regimes in place. 
2- It is the first work that empirically tests CS theory in Arab countries. It is also one 
of the few studies to tackle these issues outside the US, much less in developing 
countries. 
3- It utilizes a unique database assembled by the author from several data sources. 
4- It is one of the few to use TOBIT "maximum likelihood estimation." Despite the 
fact that similar tests suffer from the limited dependent variable, empirical studies 
usually fail to accommodate this problem. 
5- It opened the way for many new research ideas to answer the puzzling question of 
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how firms choose their capital structures. 
7.2 Summary of the Major Results 
The findings of this dissertation are: 
1- Tax models of capital structure are supported by empirical evidence from 
economies that are different from Western economies. More specifically: 
a- Firms operating in countries that have a tax system in place utilize more 
debt than those operating in countries that do not have a tax system. 
b- The marginal tax rate is positive and significant. To benefit from debt tax 
shields, firms with higher MTR utilize more debt than those with lower 
MTR. 
c- Non-debt tax shield is a positive and significant determinant of capital 
structure for firms operating in countries that do not have a tax system. 
This is inconsistent with the tax hypothesis but may be due to NDTS 
proxying for collateral. However, for firms operating in countries that 
have a tax system and firms with high MTR, NDTS is negative but not 
significant. This implies that NDTS may be a substitute for DTS in tax 
countries as expected. 
d- Personal taxes have a significant negative effect on the firm's level of 
leverage, implying that firms do take personal taxes into account when 
they make capital structure decisions. This is especially true in economies 
where the tax differential between interest income and dividend and 
capital gains income is substantial. 
2- Agency models of capital structure are not supported by evidence from the Arab 
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world. This implies that the agency theory is not as relevant in the Arab world as it is in 
Western economies. Specifically, 
a- The manager/shareholder agency conflict is not significant in the Arab 
world because the family that owns the majority of the firm's stock is also 
the managing team of that company. Furthermore, there is a positive 
relationship between the firm's level ofleverage and the level of 
managerial ownership. This contradicts the finding of the studies in 
Western economies. This positive relationship is explained by the owning 
family's desire to keep control of the firm. This is accomplished by using 
debt rather than equity to avoid diluting ownership. 
b- Government ownership is not significant. This implies that that the 
argument of government assurance to debt holders does not hold. This is 
either because the government monitoring is weak ( due to administrative 
weaknesses in these governments) or because the lenders know that these 
governments are privatizing their firms. In both cases the value of 
government backing and assurance is insignificant. 
c- The shareholder/debt holder agency conflict is not significant in the Arab 
world. The main reason for this lack of conflict is that banks (the majority 
debt holders) are also shareholders of the firm. The market-to-book ratio is 
positive and significant because, due to Arab world specific factors, it is a 
proxy for good future prospects. 
3- Information asymmetry theory is not supported by evidence from Arab 
economies. Due to factors that were analyzed extensively, Arab firms follow a 
reverse POH. No formal test was conducted and these results are tentative; such 
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a test is contingent on the availability of longer time series data. 
4- The country of origin is a significant determinant of capital structure. This lends 
the strongest support to the assumed weakness of capital structure theory. 
Furthermore, due to Arab-specific factors ( other than the ones that are included in 
the models above), Arab firms use significantly less leverage than comparable 
Western firms. The country dummies that represent the country-specific factors 
are expected to lose significance once the models control for these factors. 
With regard to the control variables this dissertation documents several findings: 
1- Dividend payout is negative and significant. Among the many implications of 
dividends, they are a sign of commitment to shareholders, not to debt holders. 
Consistent with the weak law country argument, this is especially true in the Arab 
world and supports the fact that dividends play an important role in the capital 
structure decision and that dividend clienteles exist. 
2- Collateral is significantly positive. Collateral is especially important in the Arab 
world because most debt is in the form of bank loans. Intangible assets are also 
positive and significant. Due to Arab factors, intangible assets are not a sign of 
lack of collateral; they are rather a sign of reputation and promising future 
prospects. 
3- Size is positive and significant. The perception that size is a sign of strength and a 
proxy for decreased bankruptcy risk applies to Arab economies too. 
4- Volatility is negative but not always significance. This is due to the short time 
series that is used to calculate firms' volatilities. The negative sign is due to the 
fact that debt is mostly in the form of bank loans and the fact that banks choose 
the more stable firms. 
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5- Profitability is negative and significant. This is due to the fact that profitable firms 
use less external financing. However, it is expected that equity financing may 
have a stronger negative relationship with profitability since it is the second 
highest source of Arab firms' financing. 
Control variable estimates in the Arab world agree with those in Western 
economies, but for different reasons in some cases. Table 7.1 presents a summary of the 
findings of this dissertation and a comparison with the findings in W estem economies. 
7 .3 Implications for Future research 
This dissertation triggered many topics for future research, referred to in the 
various chapters. The following is a summary of the more important issues that warrant 
future research: 
1- The country dummies tested the collective effects of the institutional factors on 
the level ofleverage. To understand capital structure decisions, we need to test the 
implications of these factors individually. 
2- The POH test is weak. A test similar to Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999) is more 
appropriate. More data is needed to conduct a comprehensive test of the POH in 
the Arab world. 
3- Tax theories can be further tested through the use of event studies. For example, 
Oman passed its tax law in 1994; investigating the change in the level of leverage 
around that year should lend some insight to the tax model of capital structure. 
Also the change in magnitude, sign, and level of significance of NDTS and 
payout ratio would shed light on the effect of taxes on capital structure. 
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4- Further investigation of the total tax benefit/burden of corporate and personal 
taxes at the various corporate and personal tax brackets will be of great benefit to 
arrive at the optimal level of leverage for each combination of these tax brackets. 
5- More data is needed to test the models of capital structure that were not tested in 
this dissertation. The product/input model and the market for corporate control are 
the two that were not tested in this dissertation. 
6- Business risk (volatility) and short-term growth (annual capital expenditure) roles 
need to be given more attention. For example, we need to consider other measures 
of business risk. 
7- Other institutional factors and country traditions that were not tested in the 
Western economies need to be identified, proxied for, and tested to find an answer 
to Myers (1984) puzzle. 
Finally, this dissertation is a genuine attempt to expand the theory of capital 
structure and to research new methods and approaches to equip it with the needed rigor to 
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